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Introduction

Why do we want to study history? Is it to try to excavate every last fact about the past, like the antiquarian Mr Casaubon caricatured in George Eliot's *Middlemarch*? Or is it to try and better understand the human condition, both past and present, so that we may work together towards a better future? In the opening pages to his memoir, the historian Geoff Eley reminds us that:

how exactly the past gets remembered (and forgotten), how it gets worked into arresting images and coherent stories, how it gets ordered into reliable explanations, how it gets pulled and pummelled into reasons for acting, how it gets celebrated and disavowed, suppressed and imagined – all have tremendous consequences for how the future might be shaped. All of the ways in which the past gets fashioned into histories, consciously and unconsciously, remain crucial for how the present can be grasped.¹

George Orwell's famous phrase took this understanding further, arguing that: 'Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past'.² Can historical narratives be this powerful? Are they, to use a concept drawn from Michel Foucault, a discourse of power? Some historians think they are. For example, it has been argued that the conceptualization of European history into medieval and modern both 'disguises the truth about the past' and justifies a particular political order in the present.³ We will take up this debate again a little later in the chapter, but these brief examples demonstrate that history is not just about the past, but the present and future too.

Both past and present are always intertwined in historical practice. Historians seek to understand people whose lives and sensibilities were very different to their own. We also try to make sense of the present by investigating the processes of change over time that contributed to shaping the world in which we live. Both these activities are conducted with historical hindsight, which consists of at least two interrelated

dimensions. Each new generation of historians brings different questions to the study of the past, drawing upon their own collective experiences and socio-economic contexts. In addition, new scholars critically engage with and respond to the perspectives of the earlier generation. The questions that emerge from this process generate new interpretations or analyses that make connections, or identify patterns of change, of which our historical actors were not always aware.

In the process of formulating new questions and interpretations, and identifying patterns of change in the past, historians draw upon concepts and theories from a wide range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, particularly literary criticism, linguistics, anthropology, sociology, psychology, geography, and philosophy. Each of those academic subjects is based upon an explicit body of concepts and theories that form a constantly evolving foundation for the discipline, taught at undergraduate level. In contrast, it could be argued that historians, working in a wide range of fields, geographical contexts, and time periods, draw upon a multidisciplinary set of approaches. The skills of source criticism (whether the sources are written documents, photographs, material objects, or oral history) are the unifying constant of university history training. While critical source analysis is essential, it does not necessarily facilitate the kind of broader disciplinary reflexivity that should also be at the heart of an education in history.⁴ The purpose of this book is to introduce students to the diversity of theoretical and conceptual approaches that have so enriched the study of the past.

But is it possible to construct an account of history and theory that reflects the diversity of approaches in many different global contexts? Peter Burke has proposed that historians now share a 'global' culture, which consists of a set of similar principles and questions. These, he argues, were shaped through long interaction and converged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This convergence, he goes on to say, weakened, if not dissolved, Western hegemony over the academic discipline of history.⁵ Burke lists these practices in the form of 'ten theses' that include, for example: a linear view of the past; a concern with epistemology; the idea of objectivity; the preponderance of causal explanations; and literary forms. All of these 'theses' entail a theoretical dimension and are integral to the content of subsequent chapters in this book. Needless to say, Burke's proposition has met with lively debate, and two responses in particular are important to bear in mind.

First of all, Aziz Al-Azmeh draws our attention to the diverse influences in late antiquity upon Burke's 'coherent historical tradition': these emerged from the Mediterranean to Persia, cut across languages, and included

Christian, Jewish, and Islamic traditions. The early influences, therefore, were neither Western nor Eastern in an exclusivist sense.⁶ Turning to the contemporary world, however, historians were more inclined to see Burke's model of historical principles as less a convergence and more of an imposition. Hayden White, for example, asks whether Burke's 'ten theses' represent the 'Westernization' of other cultures in the context of the spread of global capitalism.⁷ In this context Dipesh Chakrabarty also draws our attention to the institutionalization of the historical profession and the development of the modern university. In India, for example, 'traditions of history [were] considered amateur, and the university scholars waged a fight to become the highest custodians of the nation's past'.⁸ This debate over the global homogeneity of professional historical practice alerts us to both the diverse roots of Burke's paradigm of historical thinking, and the importance of contextualizing the spread and adaptation of historical approaches within global economic and political processes and the growth of national educational systems.

The Houses of History will explore the theoretical perspectives and debates that are generally acknowledged to have been the most influential within the university-led practice of history over the past century and a half. The chapters are organized very broadly into a chronological framework: that is, based upon the period in which each theory generated the most substantial body of historical writing. But the structure of this book should not be taken to cover all possible theoretical or conceptual approaches to the past, or reflect uniform national trajectories. For example, Chinese historiography has converged and diverged from the path of Western historiography and theory at different times over the course of the twentieth century.⁹

What do we mean by theory? The historian Arif Dirlik has proposed the following definition:

I think that most of us working in these fields [of social, political and cultural theory] understand theory to mean the formulation of abstract relationships that seek to make sense of diverse historical phenomena.... The grand theories or metanarratives associated with the names of K. Marx and M. Weber or, more recently, of world-system analysis, are of this type. For historians, however, theory may simply mean the use of abstract concepts such as class and gender in organizing and/or explaining historical data. Theory mediates the relationship between the particular and the general; it suggests patterns to the relationship ...¹⁰

Theories, therefore, may range from the identification of patterns in the historical evidence that explain historical change over long periods of time

to smaller abstract concepts to define particular phenomena. Concepts are also the building blocks of grand theory, as in the concept of 'class' for the Marxist theory of historical materialism. The development of theoretical models or concepts, as Dirlik later points out, does not foreclose on historical truth: other theories may posit alternative understandings based on emphasizing different aspects of, or evidence from, the past. He concludes that 'theorization – the activity of producing theories – therefore is an interpretive act in its choice of concepts, and their relationships, to represent reality'.¹¹ This book is based on the understanding that every piece of historical writing has a theoretical basis on which evidence is selected, filtered and understood.

One criticism often made of the historical profession is that the theorization upon which historical accounts are constructed is rarely made explicit, in contrast to the cognate disciplines referred to earlier. There is a perception that 'substantial numbers of practising historians remain relentlessly uninterested in fundamental questions concerning the status of the knowledge they produce'.¹² Critics attribute this disciplinary omission to the institutional forces that influence what is produced, from peer expectations to the needs of commercial publishers.¹³ In the absence of explicit theorization in a historical text, it can be difficult to identify the theory or concepts upon which it rests. When reading the following chapters, therefore, we suggest that you bear in mind the following four inter-linked themes: *context*, *temporal framework*, *causation or drivers of change*, and *subjectivities*. These themes will help you elicit and understand the theories underlying a work of history.

The approach of historians to these themes will also reflect their fundamental *epistemological* stance. By epistemology we mean the theory of knowledge, or justification for what constitutes historical knowledge. During the late twentieth century, orthodox empirical historians were riven by disagreement over the ideas and implications of poststructuralism. Empiricism and poststructuralism are, in pure form, conflicting epistemologies. The first is based upon the belief that it is possible to reconstruct the past from surviving evidence, that historians are able to gain access to aspects of a real past. In contrast, poststructuralists argue that our understanding of the past, and our sources, are framed through structures of language and discourse, and that there is no access to an unmediated past. These two perspectives are encapsulated in the terminology of reconstruction (empiricist) and representation (poststructuralist). We suggest that you might wish to read the chapters on empiricism and poststructuralism first, for the remaining chapters on different theories and concepts

contain references to the work of historians from both epistemological perspectives.

Returning to the four themes, the first concerns the *context* in which theoretical perspectives, including key concepts, acquire purchase among historians. Of course, in practice, theoretical perspectives overlap, continue to have ongoing adherents, are modified and revised over time, and can re-emerge with new force at a later date. It is also important to note that some influential theoretical works, including those of Maurice Halbwachs (the chapter on public history) and Ferdinand de Saussure (the chapter on poststructuralism) were published decades before historians internationally engaged extensively with their ideas. This can be due to delay in translation, leading to a more restricted earlier impact within the original linguistic context. But the use of specific theories in historical analysis may also be the consequence of changing socio-economic and political contexts. One question we would like you to consider is why the theories covered in this book acquire traction among historians at particular moments in time.

This is not an easy question to answer, as Ludmilla Jordanova acknowledged: 'Scholars turn to an idea or approach when it seems apt for that time', but 'it is extremely difficult to explain how trends get started, take hold, and die away'.¹⁴ The philosopher of history, Frank Ankersmit, has suggested that 'there is an indissoluble link between history and the miseries and the horrors of the past'.¹⁵ Ankersmit extends the concept of trauma, defined broadly as a rupture between the individual's internal and external worlds that prevents reconciliation between past and present, to collective Western historical consciousness.¹⁶ There is no doubt that the experience or knowledge of the repression, violence, and war of the twentieth century had a profound impact on the thinking of more than one generation of historians in many different parts of the world. Progressive historians in the United States and Whig historians in England largely retained faith in the positive evolution of mankind in the first half of the twentieth century. But after the First World War, the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Second World War and the Holocaust, and struggles for colonial independence, historians coming to maturity in the post-war period increasingly became less enamoured of theories of progress, less inclined to believe in a trajectory of human betterment.¹⁷ Could human beings continue to be thought of as intrinsically good with the capacity for reason? Increasing scepticism undoubtedly influenced the receptivity of some historians from the mid-twentieth century onwards towards theoretical perspectives that approached the past through the lens of conflict, rather than progress, emphasized the role of unconscious mental drives

rather than rationality, or displaced conscious human agency in favour of determinist linguistic structures and discourses.

It could be argued that this is something of a contextual paradox, particularly in the West. The generation of historians born after the Second World War experienced a period of unprecedented economic growth which led to a rise in living standards that eventually also lifted some peoples in other parts of the world out of poverty. Furthermore Fascism had been defeated and Europeans forced to surrender their colonies, albeit at a terrible cost in human life. The Civil Rights and Women's Liberation movements in Europe and the Americas succeeded in some of their aims, opening up new possibilities for those previously excluded. These achievements, accompanied by relatively full employment and the provision of social security, enabled many people, particularly in the West, to live more secure and fulfilling lives, as the title of the prize-winning British documentary series *The People's Century* suggests.¹⁸ Why, when historians were participating in or benefiting from effective collective action in both domestic and international contexts, were they inclined towards theoretical perspectives that rejected the idea of rationality and progress? Furthermore, what impact does this have upon the way we think about the present and the future? To what extent have these pessimistic post-war perspectives influenced contemporary thinking about the scope of human agency, and our capacity to change or influence the present and the future?¹⁹

A little earlier in this chapter Chakrabarty drew our attention to the role of the educational and institutional environment in shaping the development of historical approaches in India. After the First World War, in a different example, the French *Annales* historians Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre both taught at the University of Strasbourg where the faculty structure, unusually for the time, facilitated collaborative teaching and research.²⁰ Bloch and Febvre were deeply influenced by the social scientists with whom they worked, and rejected the focus upon elites and political history of orthodox French historiography in favour of the study of social collectivities and *mentalités*: 'not the man, never the man, human societies, organized groups' wrote Febvre in 1922.²¹ To understand collective human behaviour and beliefs, these *Annales* historians exhorted historians to be 'geographers. Be jurists too, and sociologists, and psychologists'.²² The interdisciplinary context within which Bloch and Febvre worked during this period of their lives led to an exchange of ideas that had a significant impact upon their approach to historical analysis, and the 'new' history they pioneered had a major influence on historians in other parts of the world.

In the 1950s and 1960s two developments in the rapidly expanding university sector in the West also had an impact upon the spread of interdisciplinary theories within history programmes. First of all, the growth of area studies programmes, in Chinese, Islamic, and African Studies for example, were interdisciplinary from the start. In the United States this development was driven largely by 'a prolonged crisis in American diplomacy which gave added urgency to the development of expertise on African and Asian areas.'²³ Designed, therefore, to educate not only academics, but also diplomats and government experts, area studies programmes reflected the interdisciplinary orientation of the 'new' *Annales* history. The expansion of tertiary education in the West during the 1960s also led to wider participation by the working class, women, and ethnic minorities. Interested in their own histories, these emerging historians contributed to the growth of social history and analyses of class, gender, culture, and ethnicity during subsequent decades.

Turning to the second theme, that of *time and temporal frameworks*, these are at the heart of historical enquiry. Change over time has been one of the consistent themes of historical research, but neither time nor change are understood or measured in uniform ways. At the most basic level, calendars reflect different criteria for measuring time. For example the Christian Gregorian calendar (introduced in 1582) is different from the traditional lunisolar calendars of many other religions and cultures in China, Japan, and Vietnam. The people of the Punjab may use three calendars for different purposes, reflecting processes of rural social change over the past century.²⁴

Do time and change move in one direction and at the same speed? Western historiography is dominated by a linear notion of time, homogeneously moving forward. Recently Noël Bonneuil has argued that Western models of historical time are fatally influenced by this notion of trajectory, and that alternative conceptualizations that 'no longer lead toward just one particular future or that reflect a single past' are needed.²⁵ The historian Charles Beard thought that historians had a choice among three possibilities: 'History is chaos and every attempt to interpret it otherwise is an illusion. History moves around in a kind of cycle. History moves in a line, straight or spiral, and in some direction.' The choice was ultimately an 'act of faith'.²⁶ Change may also be perceived to move at different speeds, as in the model proposed by Fernand Braudel in *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, published in 1949. Braudel's tripartite structure, discussed further in chapter 5, consists of slow environmental cycles, medium-term social and cultural processes, and short-term events.²⁷ Braudel emphasised the greater

significance of long-term historical structures and processes (the *longue durée*) over short-term events, and his conceptualization of time and change has fundamental implications for historical analysis and the role of human agency.

It has been argued that the most significant contribution historians could make to social theory relates to the conceptualization of historical time, or social temporalities. The American historian and political scientist William Sewell outlined the theory of social temporality he believed to be implicit in the analyses of historians, although rarely acknowledged explicitly in historical work.²⁸ The principles of social temporality, he argued, include *fatefulness* (that time is irreversible); that historical outcomes are *contingent* upon a temporal *sequence*, which explains the significance attached to chronology in historiography; the importance of *events* which change the course of history; and *complexity*, that a diversity of temporalities, from the long-run to the sudden, may exist simultaneously at any one time. Consequently time is *heterogeneous*, a mix of continuity and change. This, he concluded, means that historians 'assume that historical temporality is lumpy, uneven, unpredictable, and discontinuous'.²⁹ This understanding of historical time (and of course other historians might well take issue with Sewell's characterization) is not entirely compatible with the explanatory structuralist analyses of social scientists, such as the theories of Freud, Marx, or Saussure. As Sewell noted, when historians 'borrow social-theoretical concepts we often find that the concepts don't quite fit': as you read the chapters, think about how historians adapt, revise or combine different theories or concepts in their analyses of continuity and change in the past.³⁰

One of the major ways in which historians conventionally divide time is by periodization, homogeneous conceptualising categories such as Medieval, Early Modern, or Modern, or those named after ruling elites or individuals such as Meiji Era in Japan or Victorian Britain. These divisions of time are inherited from earlier generations and they always contain 'fundamental assumptions' about major turning points in the past, or attribute a unifying set of values or aesthetics to the period.³¹ The practice of periodization, and the 'mapping of homogenized historical time' is not without critics.³² Kathleen Davis asks why, in a context where teleological and stage-oriented histories are being challenged, 'do the monoliths medieval/religious/feudal and modern/secular/capitalist (or developed) survive, and what purposes do they serve'? She argues, for example, that divisions such as the medieval/modern distort 'the histories of fields such as medicine and philosophy and occlude minority histories such as those of women and the racially or religiously oppressed'.³³ Does

periodization entail a 'politics of time', as Davis has suggested, that sanitizes the past?³⁴

The temporal frameworks adopted by historians are also linked to theories of *causality*, the third theme to keep in mind. What are the causes of events, or the drivers of change, in the past? The answer will depend, in part, upon the temporal and spatial scope of the project. For example, world or global history is much more likely to be approached through an extended period of time, centuries or more, whereas microhistory will focus upon a much shorter period of time, a particular event, community, or the lifetime of one individual. The first is more likely to draw upon explanatory models of long-term economic or other processes, and the latter upon short-term events and immediate cultural or political factors.

In Sewell's model of historical practice, discussed a little earlier, chronology and the 'event' appear to play a significant role in historical explanation. But this is clearly only part of the story: because events happen in sequence does not necessarily imply cause and effect. Drawing upon the notion of different levels of time, the drivers of change in the past may derive from multiple causes that are both slow-moving long-term processes and short-term event-based factors. As we shall see in the chapter on narrative, combining analysis of long-term trends or structural causes with a chronological story is not always easy.³⁵

Historians draw upon a wide range of long-term and short-term factors to explain change in the past.³⁶ A revolution provides a good example of the kind of event arising out of a myriad of causes, from economic relationships and material conditions to the ideas and organizations that gave form to the struggle.³⁷ There is no doubt that historians would agree that causality is complex, and the problem then arises of assigning different degrees of significance to a wide range of causes. If historical analysis simply becomes 'a welter of irreducible historical contingencies', as one historian has put it, there can be little coherent explanation.³⁸ In order to prioritize causes historians may claim that the weight of evidence is the basis for their judgement.³⁹ But another historian will be along shortly to challenge that argument, and it is important to recognize that all historical explanations draw, to a greater or lesser degree, upon either assumptions or more conscious theorization about the relative importance of particular driving forces in history. Some explanatory models are intended to be comprehensive and universal. The historical materialism of Marx falls into this category, as do the psychoanalytic model of Freud and the evolutionary theory of Darwin. But historians may adopt particular concepts without necessarily endorsing the entire theory. For example, the concepts of 'class', or the 'unconscious',

are widely used by historians who do not define themselves as either Marxists or Freudians.

Political and economic factors, in particular, have played a significant role in many historical accounts. First of all, emerging nation states were central to the codification of empirical epistemology in the nineteenth century (chapter 2), and many historians today continue to write within the framework of national and political history. However, the rise of transnational fields of historical enquiry and global history, and the rejection of homogenizing narratives by poststructuralist scholars, have challenged the notional autonomy and unity of the nation state. Are we now in a postnational era? One problem facing historians writing transnational or global history lies in finding ways to avoid teleological (self-fulfilling) or Western-centric models of modernity.⁴⁰ The term 'modernity' will arise in a number of chapters, and is another example of the 'politics of time' referred to earlier. There is no one interdisciplinary definition of 'modernity' and the term is highly contested. It has been used to identify a wide range of historical turning points, including the Reformation, Enlightenment and scientific thinking, industrialization, economic development, and increasing emotional control, among others.⁴¹ It is, however, a linear Western model of progress and has been widely challenged, particularly in postmodern and postcolonial thinking (see chapters 11 and 12).

The final theme is that of *subjectivities*, the mental worlds of those who lived in the past. The 'new history' of Bloch and Febvre included a focus upon what they described as *mentalités*, or the mental tools used by people in the past to make sense of the worlds in which they lived. These mental tools included structures of belief based upon unconscious assumptions and expressed through linguistic metaphors and symbols. The term *subjectivities* is now more widely used than *mentalités*, following criticism that the latter inclined towards cultural stasis and consensus and did not encompass change over time.⁴² *Subjectivities* include cognition and emotion, as well as memory, imagination, myths, ideologies, and desires. This is perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of the historian's task: to understand the mental worlds of those we study. To do so we draw upon discursive, narrative, affective (emotional), and psychoanalytic concepts and theories, among others. The theories and concepts that inform many contemporary analyses and interpretations of historical *subjectivities* are fully explored in later chapters of this book.

The four themes of *contextualization*, *temporal frameworks*, *causation and drivers of change*, and *subjectivities* will enable you to interrogate the assumptions and perspectives, theories and concepts upon which

historians draw to analyse and interpret the past. We have sought to include examples from a wide range of historical contexts, but length and language requirements for an introductory text in English inevitably placed constraints on this process. Each chapter begins with an outline of the specific theory, its strengths and difficulties, and how it has been utilized in the research and writing of historians. The second half of the chapter consists of an article, chapter or extract by a historian, prefaced by a set of questions to guide your reading. For further sources remember to look at the chapter endnotes as well as the concluding list of additional reading. We encourage you to look up unfamiliar terms (even if these are defined within the text) to deepen your understanding of the vocabulary of theory, and historians' names to expand your knowledge of both the context and the focus of their research.

The next chapter outlines the principles of empiricism, the founding epistemology of the professional discipline, and explores the ways in which historians have challenged and modified this theory of knowledge over the past century and a half.

Notes

- 1 Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society* (Ann Arbor, 2005), p. ix.
- 2 George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (London, 1949).
- 3 See: Kathleen Davis, *Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time* (Philadelphia, 2008); and Constantin Fasolt, 'Scholarship and Periodization', *History and Theory*, 50, 3 (2011), p. 415.
- 4 See Simon Gunn and Stuart Rawnsley, 'Practising Reflexivity: The Place of Theory in University History', *Rethinking History*, 10, 3 (2006), pp. 369–90.
- 5 Peter Burke, 'Western Historical Thinking in a Global Perspective – 10 Theses', in Jörn Rüsen (ed.), *Western Historical Thinking* (New York, 2002).
- 6 Aziz Al-Azmeh, 'The Coherence of the West', in Rüsen (ed.), *Western Historical Thinking*, pp. 60–1.
- 7 Hayden White, 'The Westernization of World History', in Rüsen (ed.), *Western Historical Thinking*, p. 118.
- 8 Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'A Global and Multicultural "Discipline" of History?', *History and Theory*, 45, 1 (2006), pp. 101–9.
- 9 Merle Goldman, 'Restarting Chinese History: Review Essay', *The American Historical Review*, 105, 1 (2000), pp. 153–64.
- 10 Arif Dirlik, *Postmodernity's Histories: The Past as Legacy and Project* (Lanham, 2000), p. 113.
- 11 Dirlik, *Postmodernity's Histories*, p. 113.
- 12 Allan Smith, 'Historians and Theory: A Comment', *Rethinking History*, 9, 4 (2005), p. 485.
- 13 Smith, 'Historians and Theory', p. 486.
- 14 Ludmilla Jordanova, *History in Practice* (2nd edn, London, 2006), p. 77.
- 15 Frank R. Ankersmit, 'Trauma and Suffering: A Forgotten Source of Western Historical Consciousness', in Rüsen (ed.), *Western Historical Thinking*, p. 76.

- 16 For definitions of 'trauma', see Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore, 1996).
- 17 Ernst Breisach, *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval and Modern* (3rd edn, Chicago, 2007), pp. 77, 335–43.
- 18 BBC/PBS television documentary series of 26 one-hour programmes on the twentieth century, first transmitted in 1995.
- 19 See the discussion by Inga Clenndinnen, writing in the Australian context: 'The History Question: Who Owns the Past?', *Quarterly Essay*, 23 (2006), p. 66.
- 20 Carole Fink, *Marc Bloch: A Life in History* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 90.
- 21 Cited in André Burguière, 'The Fate of the History of Mentalités in the *Annales*', in Stuart Clark (ed.), *The Annales School: Critical Assessments*, vol. II (London, 1999), p. 409.
- 22 Cited in Peter Burke, *The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School 1929–1989* (Stanford, CA, 1990), p. 2.
- 23 Michael Adas, 'Social History and the Revolution in African and Asian Historiography', *Journal of Social History*, 19, 2 (1985), pp. 335–6.
- 24 Muhammad Aurang Zeb Mughal, 'Calendars Tell History: Social Rhythm and Social Change in Rural Pakistan', *History and Anthropology*, 25, 5 (2014), pp. 592–613.
- 25 Noël Bonneuil, 'The Mathematics of Time in History', *History and Theory*, Theme Issue 49, 4 (December 2010) p. 28.
- 26 C.A. Beard, 'Written History as Act of Faith', *American Historical Review*, 39, 2 (1934), pp. 228–9; cited in Ernst Breisach, *Historiography: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern* (3rd edn, Chicago, 2007), p. 331.
- 27 See also Reinhart Koselleck, who was influenced by Braudel: *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts* (Stanford, 2002) and *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985).
- 28 William H. Sewell, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005).
- 29 Sewell, *Logics of History*, pp. 8–9.
- 30 Sewell, *Logics of History*, p. 5.
- 31 See Jordanova, *History in Practice*, ch. 5.
- 32 Davis, *Periodization and Sovereignty*, p. 20.
- 33 Davis, *Periodization and Sovereignty*, p. 4.
- 34 See the discussion in Helge Jordheim, 'Against Periodization: Koselleck's Theory of Multiple Temporalities', *History and Theory*, 51, 2 (2012), p. 154.
- 35 See David Hackett Fischer's concept of the 'braided narrative', in *Albion's Seed* (Oxford, 1989), p. xi.
- 36 See the range of factors outlined in Martha Howell and Walter Prevenier, *From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods* (Ithaca, 2001), pp. 127–40.
- 37 See R. Bin Wong, 'Causation', in Ulinka Rublack (ed.), *A Concise Companion to History* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 27–56.
- 38 James Holstun, *Ehud's Dagger: Class Struggle in the English Revolution* (London, 2000), p. 10.
- 39 See further discussion in Richard J. Evans, *In Defence of History* (London, 1997), ch. 5, 'Causation in History', pp. 129–60.
- 40 See Lynn Hunt, *Writing History in the Global Era* (New York, 2014); Eileen Ka-May Cheng, *Historiography: An Introductory Guide* (London, 2012), ch. 6.
- 41 See Lynn Hunt, *Measuring Time, Making History* (Budapest, 2008); Barbara H. Rosenwein, 'Worrying about Emotions in History', *American Historical Review*, 107, 3 (2002), pp. 821–45.
- 42 Peter Burke, *Varieties of Cultural History* (New York, 1997), pp. 170–1.