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## Introduction

Following the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, the so-called 'psychological terrain' was seen as the crucial counter-terrorism 'battleground' where compliance might be created or conflict influenced in Afghanistan and Iraq. Much has been written about the 'hearts and minds' campaigns of the governments of the United States and United Kingdom. Yet this book will illuminate an unseen story, that of the planning behind the propaganda, from the mouths of the key planners themselves. It traces their efforts to adapt propaganda systems that were seen as 'outdated' within a rapidly changing global media environment that defied geographical boundaries and muddied traditional 'targeting'. The book will argue that these counter-terrorism adaptations resulted in initiatives that gave propaganda wider reach and challenged existing structures, 'rules' and practices. Change was not an uncomplicated process, however, and this book examines Anglo-American adaptation and explains how, why, and to what extent the countries were 'successful' in adapting. Documenting changing ideas about propaganda in both countries during this transitional period, the book will point to the active mediation of propaganda strategies into the culture and practices of government departments and military organisations.

Where the operation and systems of propaganda are often discussed as if they were a systematic or unproblematic 'machine', this book demonstrates that the systems of this machine do not always function as governments hope and, like any large bureaucracy, they can struggle to adapt. They are of course formed of people, and propaganda planning can become a site of active struggle, dependent on evolving informal structures founded in relationships and culture. The Anglo-American relationship emerged in this struggle as one element that could sometimes be engaged in the process of propaganda adaptation and exchange. Ultimately the book will show how a structural development of the propaganda apparatus and gradual culture change, particularly in the US, brought a (more permissive) re-definition of 'legitimate' propaganda function, developments that were seen as necessary to shift out old ideas and solidify the changes necessary for operational effectiveness.

The rest of this introduction will provide an entry point into the specialist area covered by the book including debates about security and ethics. It will begin with a short history of propaganda theories, including important definitions and concepts from academic perspectives as well as those dominant in contemporary defence policy. This section will be followed by a brief history of Anglo-American relations and propaganda use to provide valuable context to the contemporary relationship. This will lead into a discussion of how ‘security’ and ‘threats’ were defined and constructed for the ‘War on Terror’. There will finally be a brief note on method.

### **Theoretical and ethical debates on propaganda**

Although this research focuses on the use of propaganda by two particular modern liberal democracies, the use and indeed the study of propaganda is ancient and global. From the early democracies of ancient Greece until the early twentieth century the term most commonly used to refer to what we now think of as propaganda was ‘rhetoric’. Its morality was debated from the first. Although he was generally unhappy about rhetoric’s use, Plato regarded the *motives* of the propagandist to be of great importance. In *Phaedrus* he argues that rhetoric should not be used unless the rhetorician has good motives and a solid knowledge of the ‘truth’. Aristotle appeared to judge the act of using rhetoric by the *ends* to which it is directed, its context and methods, with much being acceptable if done with good intentions (Aristotle, 1984; Triadafilopoulos, 1999). Machiavelli famously claimed in *The Prince* that ends justify means and that deception was acceptable as a means for retaining power, and his description of the Prince reflects an understanding of the need for a leader to occasionally appear to be what he is not (1961: 55–56).

Ethical debates regarding ‘truths’, ‘ends’ and ‘motives’ have continued to be central to the study of rhetoric and propaganda. The prescience of the study of political tools like rhetoric and propaganda has become increasingly apparent into modernity and it is important to understand where the ‘rules’ governing persuasion stem from, since they are integral to societal values and a debate rooted in the very origins of Western democratic culture. Representative democracy raises particular issues regarding the relation between public opinion and policy, and it may be that propaganda is simply irreconcilable with democratic values. Responding to the British government’s lies during the First World War, Lord Ponsonby declared propaganda ‘The defilement of the human soul’ and ‘worse than the destruction of the human body’ (1928, quoted in Taylor, 2003: 1). Robert Goodin echoes this, saying propaganda is ‘the evil core of power’ (1980: 23), which by ‘deceptively subverting’ the recipients’ ‘powers of reasoning’ becomes more objectionable even than force (1980: 21–22). If a person is suffering oppression, coercion or terror they are aware of this and may

be able to take steps to reassert their will. However, the art of propaganda does not allow for this possibility. It attempts to gain willing compliance often unconsciously.

Throughout the early twentieth century, public opinion was seen as essentially unpredictable and susceptible to the influence of external propaganda and marginal interests. Harold Lasswell (1934), for example, saw public opinion as irrational, inconsistent and in need of leadership. Likewise, Walter Lippmann argued that public opinion is not sovereign, nor should it be, for this would create tyranny or failure of government. For him the public are 'outsiders' who should fulfil the role for which they have been prepared and not try and delve into politics when they lack expertise (1954: 51–53). Should we reject such elitism, the model of rational ignorance tells us that, as the public are unable to know everything, they must to some extent trust in information presented to them (Goodin, 1980: 38). A negative conception of public opinion would hold that it cannot be the basis of stable, responsible government. Since democratic government cannot operate outside the pressure of the electorate and public opinion must be seen to be expressed in policy, by such reasoning attempts to adjust opinion to correspond to government policy lose their perception of illegitimacy. This was significant in Edward Bernays' early 'public relations' work, inspired by Lippmann, which used the psychology behind persuasion both to engineer consent to govern and fight wars through propaganda, and to aid consumerism (2004).

As the mass media flourished in the post-war period, propaganda was increasingly viewed as a key characteristic of modern democracy. There developed a highly influential school of thought drawing insight from behavioural psychology and applying this to propaganda. Lasswell, Doob and others saw propaganda largely as a tool that could be manipulated in order to produce desired responses in the audience (Robins, Webster and Pickering, 1987: 3). The study of propaganda revolved around 'audience effects', including experimental studies which have since been denounced (Ellul, 1973: Ch. 4, App. 1). Such theories saw the audience as passively absorbing information, as if injected by a hypodermic syringe. Theorists have since rejected such notions in favour of more sophisticated understandings that account for the wider context through which information is organised, filtered and interpreted. While many still looked at the mechanical aspects of propaganda, thought gradually moved towards the consideration of power and social relations reacting against the less optimistic ideas of public opinion. The mass persuasion and propaganda of Goebbels for Hitler also drove post-war fears of the implications should government fall into the wrong hands. The political and social elements of the use of propaganda came into focus, as well as more sophisticated psychological approaches. Discussion stemmed from the emerging work of the Chicago

School, which saw public opinion as essentially rational and requiring a public sphere characterised by lively debate (drawing on Enlightenment ideas such as those of J.S. Mill) (Robins, Webster and Pickering, 1987: 16). If we are to believe that public opinion is rational (or at least no less so than elite opinion) and the only basis for responsible and legitimate government, then propaganda can surely never be justified? Habermas, for example, was critical of propaganda, which he feared was leading to the destruction of the public sphere, the means whereby public opinion is formed (Webster, 1995: 101–134). This book will return to this debate in Chapter 4.

In the US, while fears about propaganda remained, it was seen as a priority to ensure engagement in influencing global perceptions and debate, and permissions as well as restrictions were established during the Cold War period (see below). While the term ‘propaganda’ was commonly associated with dictatorships and totalitarian regimes (conceived as ‘what the enemy said’), its methods were increasingly recognised as a standard tool of democratic government. Qualter, for example, saw propaganda as acceptable as long as there was the ‘greatest possible degree of free competition between propagandists’ (1962: 148). Fraser stressed that ‘propaganda as such is morally neutral’, and it is the surrounding circumstances or the methods applied that are evil or good (Ellul, 1973: 242). He emphasised that although these methods can be abused, this should not be extended to an ultimate judgement of the use of propaganda (Fraser 1957: 12). Merton (1995) also made a distinction between propaganda that provides facts and that which denies such information, rooting his arguments on morality around this distinction. Even Ellul, despite his highly critical stance towards propaganda (he articulates concern over pollution of our shared knowledge-base, saying that propaganda corrupts those who use it), concedes that it is an inevitable part of any democracy (1973: 242–243; see also Burnell and Reeve, 1984).

Some contend that it is the growth of democracy and mass communication that has confirmed the place of propaganda in politics. Democratic governments must live with a political reality that their citizens have some level of political awareness and come up with a strategy to deal with this. According to Ellul, ‘propaganda is needed in the exercise of power for the simple reason that the masses have come to participate in political affairs’ (1973: 121). The emphasis has gradually changed from the techniques and practices themselves and refocused on those employing them, and social theorists have attempted to scrape away the rhetoric and illuminate and challenge the roles propagandists play within wider social power relations. A great debt is owed here to Gramsci’s work on cultural hegemony, as he developed Marx’s concept of the ‘superstructure’ in his *Prison Notebooks*. Hegemony, for Gramsci, emerged through various competing ideologies, some of which are theories created by academics or political activists, others of which are more ‘organic’, emerging within the

common people's lived experience and articulated through religion, education, family and the media. These were 'functionaries' of a structure, yet 'mediated' by their relation to the rest of society (Gramsci, 1971: 12). Gramsci saw some scope for resistance and 'will' in these 'organic intellectuals' (1971: 129), but this exists alongside their tendency to shape perceptions of institutions and wider society towards the dominant culture. Essentially, for Gramsci, this tension was necessary for the coordination of 'the dominant group' with 'the general interests of the subordinate groups' so that the state could modify any 'unstable equilibria' of interests (1971: 182). This underpinned the illusion that dominant interests were also those of society, and government was 'based on the consent of the majority' as it is expressed through the media (Gramsci, 1971: 80).

Gramsci thus articulated a theory of how the dominant group are able to manufacture consent and consensus in society, while allowing conflicts to be resolved or absorbed. Much of his theory is helpful in considering the way that democracies work today and how the dominance of neoliberal ideologies is maintained through propaganda, both within the state and in its relation to civil society and the public. For Gramsci, more traditional intellectuals and the 'party' reproduced the dominant order most closely; having survived a transition in the mode of production, they falsely retained beliefs that their thought somehow *transcended* social class and had 'independence' (1971: 129). Gramsci described how intellectuals can 'exercise such a power of attraction that [they subjugate] intellectuals of the other social groups; they thereby create a system of solidarity', engineering consensus through psychological and social bonds (1971: 182). McLellan argues this can form an all-pervasive notion of 'common sense' (something we will see illustrated in later accounts in this book); he points to how, devoid of 'feudal' engagement with a peasantry, America's ruling class were still able to exercise a strong hegemony of capitalist values (1998: 203).

Contemporary arguments often still incorporate an ends-means analysis; for instance, Philip Taylor argued that what was needed was 'to redirect any moral judgement away from the propaganda process itself and more to the intentions and goals of those employing propaganda' (2003: 8). Generally, if a strategy successfully achieves a desirable goal the methods employed are quickly overlooked; it is usually when the plan backfires that criticism flows – if, of course, this becomes public knowledge. But too much focus on 'ends' may be dangerous. Ellul points out that the 'truth' about actors and outcomes as we understand them is elucidated through history, and that history is made by the powerful and successful. He highlights a conflict between the principles of democracy and the need for and processes of propaganda (Ellul, 1973: 232–238). Taylor stressed the importance of remaining within the boundaries of certain 'democratic' principles, which he argued evolved during the events of the twentieth century. This led him, after 9/11, to argue for an enhanced US

propaganda effort during peacetime to attempt to counter rumour, hostility and misunderstanding in the international arena (Taylor, 2002: 438). However, the history of democracies' propaganda campaigns during the twentieth century does not support Taylor's idealistic notion that a 'strategy of truth' evolved during this era that can be reasserted now (2002: 438). From Vietnam to Korea, Granada to the Falklands, the US and Britain (as well as other democracies) have utilised extensive propaganda campaigns that have bypassed such principles to support foreign policy goals. The conduct of the democracies of Britain and America today should not be seen as exceptional. They are a reflection of a perception of heightened tension and a perceived 'need' to address this. Political actors were no more ethical in the past, yet today the scale of access to information and therefore the growth in its status as a powerful commodity has increased the visibility of propaganda efforts, requiring us to prioritise this debate.

Taylor also argued that US and UK governments' use of propaganda 'is not incompatible with toleration of minorities, acceptance of the "other" or respect for law and order' and that what is important in the debate over propaganda is 'how this should be done' (2002: 439). Both he and US academic and former USIA official Nancy Snow (2003) claim that the pursuit of an 'ethical' propaganda is possible. A 'democratic propaganda' would be essentially truthful and restrained, with respect for the individual. Democracy recognises that there may be other truths (allowing 'competing propagandas', as Snow (2003) advocates). Ellul concludes that debate renders democracies' propaganda ineffective; respect for the individual denies the propagandist sufficient monopoly over the mind (1973: 238–242) and the search for an *effective* propaganda is therefore an essentially corrupting force. Fraser argues that, although propaganda is not necessarily lies, those who do lie may sometimes win over the truth. This means that a liberal democracy must on occasion choose between upholding its moral principles and winning a propaganda war (1957: 12–13). This goal was seen as justification enough for British and American Second World War activities (explored further below). R.K. Merton observes that a propagandist might be driven to cynicism or desperate attempts to justify their actions by the outcome of such a dilemma (1995: 270). Where covert propaganda is used it is difficult to imagine how any individual might secure true freedom of thought.

The dominant position inhabited by those in power ensures that propaganda seems incompatible with a truly democratic culture. Herman and Chomsky's 'Manufacturing Consent' (1988) and their later work has been highly regarded both popularly and in academic circles. It is critical work that struggles against the mainstream. Noam Chomsky, recognising the key role of propaganda in modern democracies, has provided a consistent stream of work that has inspired many to take a more questioning stance towards contemporary propaganda. Chomsky rejects the idea of the irrationality of public opinion, which is

used to justify propaganda, as a myth propagated by the elite to serve its interest (1991: 17–19). Chomsky gives us a convincing account of how, in democracies, corporate power and the state influence the media and therefore the nation. He famously stated that ‘propaganda is to a democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state’ (2002: 23). He has argued that the model of media organisation that is natural in an advanced capitalist democracy is a ‘corporate oligopoly’ (1991: 21), in which the public have a minimal level of democratic participation and where participation is marginalised to areas such as community radio. Debate is encouraged, but only within the boundaries defined by the elite (1991: 59). Anything that might spread dangerous ideas among the people excluded from political participation is censored. The development of this system, Chomsky argues, coincides with increasing individualism and private enterprise, the decline of political parties and the elimination of unions (1991: 21).

A similarly critical analysis is presented by another contemporary academic, David Miller, much of whose work looks at counter-terrorism propaganda in the UK context (e.g. Miller and Sabir, 2012). He recognises the importance of the US and UK working to achieve ‘interoperability’ in propaganda, and the present book provides additional evidence to support this idea. Some of Miller’s writing draws attention to the tensions and cultures within propaganda systems; on these dynamic elements his work on Northern Ireland is particularly strong (1996).

### **Censorship and media freedom**

Debates around the ethics of propaganda are inextricably linked to discussions about democracy and its foundations in open debate. Classical liberal arguments underpinning media freedom in democratic culture include those of Jeremy Bentham (1843) who considered accountability and openness to be of the utmost importance and wrote at length about the benefits of publicity, which he felt would prevent the abuse of power. John Stuart Mill, similarly, argued that

complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for the purposes of action: and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. (1989: 23)

Herman and Chomsky (1988) and others have pointed to the contradictions of a capitalist democracy as corrupting this freedom. For example, Robert W. McChesney’s significant work argues that the US corporate media system prevents true democracy, limiting debate around the interests of corporate power (2000). Keane’s work also illustrates an inherent contradiction between

economic and political liberalism through what he calls 'market censorship', a tendency for economic liberalisation to lead to the restriction of the circulation of information, a claim also made by James Curran (Curran and Seaton, 1988; Keane, 1991).

Censorship has historically been considered crucial in any propaganda system. It enables a propagandist to ensure that an audience's critical assessment of propaganda is undermined by a lack of contesting perspectives. It thereby increases audience vulnerability to persuasion. The British government has a long-held reputation for secrecy of this kind. On the grounds of 'national interest' this policy is underpinned by the Official Secrets Act of 1911. Section 2 contained a 'public interest' defence, which was repealed in 1989. This Act allows an official request – a 'Defence Advisory Notice' – to be made by the government to oblige newspaper editors not to publish certain information. Recent UK legislation has included the Terrorism Act in 2000, which made it an offence to possess information likely to be of use to a terrorist, and in 2006 a far-reaching law made it illegal to 'glorify' terrorism. Goodin warns how secrecy can corrupt and argues that usually when censorship is justified in the name of 'national security' this is to cover up personal advantage (1980: 51).

Over-classification can also act as censorship, as Arendt warned; the dangers of over-classification find those with top clearance ignorant of many important facts as they neither have the time nor will to seek them out, while those who would benefit most from this information remain ignorant of it (Goodin, 1980: 21–22). Goodin warns of 'co-optation', as those privy to certain sources of information can begin to bend their own ethics or moderate their demands in order to retain this privilege (1980: 52–56). Information overload can have the same effect as secrecy and certainly in the short term and for democracies today it might be considered more effective. This is the practice whereby the audience is flooded with so much information that it is unable and/or unwilling to digest it independently to form criticism. Today governments make a wealth of information available to the public online – through Freedom of Information releases for instance – although few people, even journalists, sift through everything. Governments simultaneously produce press releases that detail those facts they consider most 'important' for the public to know – a framework for interpreting the data. This conforms to their own preferences and downplays or frames any negative aspects of the information from the government perspective. Anomalies later discovered by the audience are often put down to personal error, a process that shifts responsibility away from the propagandist or their organisation. However, the propagandist can end up viewing the world through their own interpretive framework (Goodin, 1980: 60). In this case it is questionable whether, despite 'informational advantage', they are any more able to make 'objective' or 'rational' national security decisions than the audience they manipulate.

### Defining propaganda

The definition of propaganda has been contested by many and often given a politically weighted slant. Some prefer a neutral definition, others a more loaded one, some define more broadly and some narrowly. Some even consider the concept so complex and contested that it is somehow beyond definition, or too difficult to define (Ellul, 1973; Fraser, 1957: 14). Lasswell defined propaganda broadly, as ‘the technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations’ which can take ‘spoken, written, pictorial or musical form’ (1934: 13). Doob defined propaganda as ‘the attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behaviours of individuals towards ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time’ (1949: 240). It has generally come to be accepted that, although propaganda can involve lies, it can also be based on fact or ‘truth’; indeed the most effective and persuasive propaganda is based largely, or wholly, on fact. Even the Pentagon accepts that enemy propaganda may contain truth: ‘These propagandists attempt to mix truth and lies in a way that is imperceptible to the listener’ (US Army, 2003: 11–3). More recently, government propaganda has come to be popularly referred to as ‘spin’; this negatively denotes political information, and the term ‘spin doctor’ has also developed to refer to those advisers who attempt to present information in a favourable light. Although other authors have used many different terms in speaking of these kinds of communication, here the term ‘propaganda’ will be applied, as it is the most accurate and appropriate term for the very specific type of communication discussed. For the purposes of this book, propaganda will be defined as *the deliberate manipulation of representations (including text, pictures, video, speech etc.) with the intention of producing any effect in the audience (e.g. action or inaction; reinforcement or transformation of feelings, ideas, attitudes or behaviours) that is desired by the propagandist.*

### Categories of propaganda

Different classifications of propaganda have been used to aid theoretical analysis and such categories can be helpful to further distinguish between forms and styles of propaganda use.

#### *White, black and grey propaganda*

The first classification drawn on here is that between white, black and grey propaganda. White propaganda is that where the use of the propaganda is overt, its source being known to the audience and the information being largely accurate. Black propaganda is often lies; it is covert and it may be attributed to a false source. Grey propaganda encompasses the majority of propaganda and

occupies the territory between these two extremes. It is characterised by uncertainty regarding either the source of the information or its accuracy (Jowett and O'Donnell, 1992: 11–15).

#### *Internal and external propaganda*

Internal propaganda is that used within a group upon its members or by a country upon its citizens and is normally used for the purposes of integration or to build morale. External propaganda, on the other hand, is directed outside of the group or country being examined. This would include propaganda used by Britain against the citizens or administration of another country such as Afghanistan.

#### *Vertical and horizontal propaganda*

Vertical propaganda is made by a propagandist in a superior position or a position of authority who wishes to influence an audience below; for example, propaganda produced by a government and used to target its own people or the people of another country, or even those in a parallel position in another country who might be placed at a lower level by a lack of knowledge of the propagandist's subject matter. Horizontal propaganda, on the other hand, occurs between a propagandist and another person on the same level. Ellul only observed this as occurring between members of a group, for example members of a political party or organs of government which all promote their own activities (Ellul, 1973: 79–84). This form of propaganda is clearly important in building the psychological adherence of the propagandist to the information being distributed and the goals he or she is pursuing as part of a collective.

Horizontal propaganda is useful in an analytical sense as a theoretical ideal type, where we can distinguish activities as having horizontal characteristics. Promotional material within a government agency such as the MoD directed internally to staff to positively reinforce the work undertaken might be an example of this. It may be instigated from the top of a hierarchy, but the knowledge levels of the target audience and production team are sufficient to qualify this as having horizontal elements.

#### **Propaganda understood by the state**

In an attempt to make the discussion of propaganda more acceptable, euphemisms are often used by governments with reference to these practices, including 'information' and 'communication'. These are very broad umbrella terms that could encompass a wide spectrum of activities, which is one of the benefits of using them. This language is also being employed increasingly in

academia, but as Taylor suggests, euphemisms merely obscure the reality of propaganda and are a result of the confusion that has developed over what propaganda really is (2002: 437). The acceptance or rejection of state-centric definitions of security means that there has been a disparity between how propaganda has been studied within political and social theory, and how it has been considered operationally and by academics with a background in defence. David Miller and Tom Mills (2010) argue that since 9/11 increasing numbers of what they call ‘terrorologists’ have emerged in Britain: a community of security ‘experts’ or academics who lack independence and have connections to government or contracting. This community has strengthened state-centric definitions of security, terrorism and propaganda. For clarity, in discussion of specific policies/documents/departments, this book will use the ‘official’ terminology explained in this section, but otherwise euphemisms, for reasons of academic rigour, have been avoided in analysis.

The Pentagon defines propaganda as ‘intentionally incorrect or misleading information directed against an adversary or potential adversary to disrupt or influence any sphere of national power – informational, political, military, or economic’ (US Army, 2003: 11–3). The definition specifies that it is *what others do*: ‘This information is normally directed at the United States, U.S. allies, and key audiences in the [Joint Operations Area] or [Area of Responsibility]’ (US Army, 2003: 11–3). In the past, commentators with professional ties have distinguished their own propaganda and censorship as activities within the wider area of *information warfare* (or an ‘information campaign’ when speaking more specifically about actions within a particular conflict or time frame). The definition offered by the Institute for the Advanced Study of Information Warfare is

the offensive and defensive use of information and information systems to exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary’s information and information systems, while protecting one’s own. Such actions are designed to achieve advantages over military or business adversaries. (Goldberg, 2004)

Information warfare reaches out more widely to include interception and re-broadcasting of messages across existing enemy radio stations as well as activities involving infiltration of enemy computer systems and censorship (Tatham, 2006: 7; Interview: Taverner, 18th July 2004).<sup>1</sup> The term has been largely replaced by Information Operations (IO). Also an umbrella term, IO is used to encompass a number of activities, including Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and electronic warfare, computer network operations and deception. During the 1990s IO transformed from being largely focused on ‘state-sponsored hackers’ to a ‘full-spectrum’ joint doctrine fully utilising the information component. Former IO Officer Joel Harding described a range of possible activities in IO:<sup>2</sup>

honestly ... the objective of what you are trying to do, is limited by your imagination and special forces tends to think a little differently ... Information can be used to terrorise somebody, or create conditions where someone doesn't wanna do something, or all kinds of things ... Information Operations is supposed to be a military operation ... 'Is my idea to create your combat force to be combat ineffective?' 'Is it to create chaos?' 'Or ... discontent where you don't trust your leaders?' ... there's a million things that you could do to get a military force to stop fighting. (Interview: Harding, 15th January 2013)

Media Operations (in Britain) or Public Affairs (PA) (in the US) and Public Diplomacy (PD) – targeting domestic or international propaganda audiences largely through mass media – are distinguished from PSYOP – propaganda used for an international, largely enemy audience during military operations or in peacetime. A defining characteristic of military categories of propaganda is the continually evolving terminology used in an attempt to escape negative connotations. For example, in late 2010 in the US, PSYOP was renamed Military Information Support Operations, or MISO. Joel Harding stated that both terms are used: 'They're still within the Psychological Operations branch in the military, but the units themselves are called MISO' (Interview: 15th January 2013). Rear Adm. McCreary argued that 'it is a disingenuous term to start getting the word PSYOPS out of the taxonomy ... because of the negative connotation' (Interview: 15th October 2013).<sup>3</sup>

Ministry of Defence doctrine defined Media Operations as

That line of activity developed to ensure timely, accurate, and effective provision of Public Information (P/Info) and implementation of Public Relations (PR) policy within the operational environment, whilst maintaining Operational Security (OPSEC). (MoD, 2002: Glossary-5)

PSYOP is designed to support military action in the theatre of war. It is defined, within British military doctrine, as 'Planned psychological activities designed to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives' (MoD, 2002: Glossary-5). Col. Ralph Arundell clarifies that, for the UK, 'Media Operations is delivered by *overt* means *via* a communications channel to an audience. IO is delivered by *non-attributable* means *direct* to an audience' (Interview: 18th April 2013; original emphasis). Recently he noted

As social media evolves at an exponential rate it is increasingly important to be able to communicate direct to audiences and the information age makes that faster and more flexible thereby blowing the edges off traditional distinctions. (Interview: 20th February 2014)

US Department of Defense (DOD) doctrine defines PSYOP more specifically, as

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and

ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003: 10)

This is the strongest propaganda form and its diverse methods include ‘psychological manipulation and direct threats’ (DOD, 30th October 2003). As with all such propaganda, ‘the purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives’ (DOD, 8th November 2010). As regards scope of use, PSYOP is targeted towards affecting foreign political, economic and social structures as well as military targets (Whitley, 2000: 6). The three ordinarily applied ‘levels’ of PSYOP shown in Figure 1.1, drawn from US doctrine, are also applied readily within British PSYOP.

America defines Public Diplomacy as ‘engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences’ but it ‘is practiced in harmony with public affairs (outreach to Americans) and traditional diplomacy’ (US Department of State, 2004).

The scope of this book includes strategy in both countries concerning all activities defined within the realm of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and PSYOP, yet it recognises that such concepts are institutionally defined and politically motivated. IO, as state propaganda, must be examined as an element of the wider goals of the foreign policy and defence strategy of the country, to which it acts as a force multiplier and political tool. As such the book examines propaganda strategy through an analysis informed by interview data and insights drawn from debates in the traditions of propaganda theory discussed above.

Strategic Level PSYOP (Long-term goals)	Conducted both during conflict and in peacetime by government agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behaviour in favour of strategic goals and objectives.
Operational PSYOP (Intermediate goals)	Campaigns conducted both in peace and war within a geographically defined operational area across the range of military operations to support the campaigns and strategies of the responsible commander.
Tactical PSYOP (Near-term goals)	Conducted within an area assigned to a commander across the range of military operations to support tactical missions against opposing forces. This form of PSYOP is conducted on the battlefield to attain tactical objectives to support the campaign.

**Figure 1.1** Levels of PSYOP.

The morality of the use of persuasion in foreign policy, counter-terrorism and conflict is not black and white. Persuasion is an innate communicative element of human nature. It could be argued to be inevitable and indeed is not necessarily negative in society (we may be persuaded to eat more healthily, to try and alleviate the poverty of others, to act on environmental concerns and so on). Attitudinal and behavioural change – the ultimate aims of propaganda – can become problematic in the hands of power and, particularly, when conflicts of interest exist. This book does not claim to be the ultimate arbiter of the morality of the use of persuasion during times of conflict, or even in the context of the conflicts discussed here, but merely encourages the debate.

Within the theoretical perspectives above, these techniques are usually evaluated in relation to the context in which they are used; how and why they are used and whether or not the particular conflict or purpose is considered a ‘just’ cause. Popular understandings often take a negative view of *all* military attempts to persuade, regardless of context. Ralph Arundell explained his own views on Information Operations which he felt had

[a pejorative tone] attached to it in people’s minds. Propaganda. Psychological Operations. People have this image of a bunch of guys sat in darkened rooms. You know. Messing with people’s heads. Psychological Operations. They’re not. They were influence activities for all very noble intentions. You know, to get people to understand, to educate, to shift perception, shift behaviour, build confidence. And ultimately, a lot of the activity that we were conducting in my time, particularly in Afghanistan, was about building Afghan self-belief. (Interview: 18th April 2013)

The academic and consultant Dr Lee Rowland (from British contractor Behavioural Dynamics Institute) here explains a point of view that my research found most practitioners share, referring to his colleague:

[Nigel Oakes] wholeheartedly believes that using information/communication/psyops is a better way to resolve conflict than is murdering people. He thinks the moral arguments are nonsense. It is Machiavellian in the sense that the end justifies the means – yet he would argue that the means must be favourable ones, for all concerned. (Email: 7th May 2013)

Similarly, UK former Commanding Officer 15th Army PSYOP Group Steve Tatham stated that ‘the UK should use whatever technology it can to avoid the horror of conflict wherever possible’ (Email: 11th February 2013). It is not an unreasonable argument that, in the context of war, persuasion might save lives, is preferable to taking lives, and may determine the outcome of the conflict. Increasingly, propaganda is recognised as a powerful tool of ‘limited’ war.<sup>4</sup> This claim seems increasingly dominant in justifying approaches that weaken restrictions to coordination between propaganda forms. For example, Adm. William Fallon spoke of ‘influence’ as one positive way to ‘save yourself incredi-

ble waste of human life and treasure' (i.e. resources) (Interview: 21st July 2009). Conversely, Graham Wright observed a popular and alarming military perception that discussing Abu Ghraib might 'inflamm' criticism and 'put soldiers at risk on the ground' (Interview: 1st June 2009).

Col. Ralph Arundell warned that this claim (the moral argument that IO limits the human cost of/need for war) can be overlaid by those who believe that somehow

if you increase your emphasis on soft power somehow that will offset the requirement to have hard power. I'm afraid there is a harsh reality in some areas of activity that ultimate force is the only option and no amount of clever activity is going to get them to behave a certain way.

However, he said that asymmetric warfare requires this element and 'no amount of guns, bombs, planes and tanks is going to stop some of that asymmetric threat'. In his opinion 'most sane, right-minded human beings in Britain would go "well I'm bloody glad we're doing stuff like that, I'd be a bit worried if we weren't"' (Interview: 18th April 2013). Furthermore, Arundell said, 'Everybody does it. Advertising.' He pointed to the public's imbalanced response to military activities and commercial advertising:

I think generally speaking if the public realised the levels to which PR agencies, advertising agencies ... the lengths to which they will go to sell a product to you, they would be astonished. But if you explained it in the terms that are attached to equivalent military activity ... Psychological Operations ... black this, grey that, people would just be up in arms about it. But they're quite prepared to accept product placement and adverts in television programmes, or films – in whatever it may be. All of it at the end of the day is subliminal messaging and that's what we're in the business of doing. Is that sort of messaging to people to effect change. (Interview: 18th April 2013)

The moral debate must engage with the reasons *behind* the conflict, and if these are questionable, any action, violent or otherwise, is unjust.

The harsh reality of 'ultimate force' in warfare, of course, includes, in recent history, global assassination policies, pre-emptive detentions and torture. It is important to remember the 'hard power' context in which 'soft power' is used. The justifications too are invariably subject to propaganda, as occurred in relation to Iraq. Of course, the very nature of propaganda is such that to be effective it must be hidden – it is essentially secretive or obfuscatory at best, which makes enquiry in this area problematic but not impossible. At the very least, any rules *governing* propaganda use should, in a democratic society, be transparent and subject to enquiry. Whether or not a democratic society will ultimately support the propaganda use domestically or externally, it is imperative that such issues as the rules which govern it (when, how, if and where it is used) are debated, particularly at times when they are being rewritten to

respond to the changing nature of contemporary conflict and the changing media environment, as we shall see in subsequent chapters.

The ethical position of propaganda and press freedom is often treated as long ago decided. We are complacent about the protections in place, assuming that the matter is resolved in our existing laws and traditions, and seeing these for the most part as reliable (save for a few isolated incidents where the powerful overstepped their authority). It is true that Western democracies enjoy a large amount of freedom of debate. But our freedoms are not decided. Our rapidly evolving media environment bypasses territorial borders, leading to an increasingly globalised culture, a connected world. This in turn is changing the way in which modern warfare is conducted, the way 'threats' are dealt with. And with rapid transformation such debates need to be revisited. To do so, both individuals and governments must understand the historical conditions in which our current traditions have been cultivated. We must take from the past that which will inform this current debate, recognising the significance of evolving historical contexts upon political thought. The following section therefore gives a short introduction to recent US and UK history, including the origins and power politics of a relationship in which propaganda played no small part.

### **Anglo-American relations and propaganda histories**

Propaganda is often neglected in the large body of work on the Anglo-American relationship; its role in the defence, intelligence and diplomatic relationship has not previously been singled out for systematic academic research.<sup>5</sup> The Anglo-American propaganda relationship often emerges in a piecemeal way in propaganda texts in relation to government agencies, studies of particular conflicts, or as an aside in books on propaganda generally.<sup>6</sup> Propaganda was part of the engineering of Anglo-American relations across two world wars. The balance of power between the US and Britain is also important in understanding how this operates; by comparison with other strong US ties, the relationship may be weakening today. Yet it is certainly notable in the fact that it has been maintained, despite Britain's decline as a world power, and propaganda has played an intriguing role from the start. The relationship emerged amid a historical US 'Anglophobia' (Moser, 2002: 55–65) and, beyond the oft-cited economic and defence relationship, was crafted through a persistent British propaganda campaign, which sought to shift American elite neutrality towards intervention in the First World War (Snow, 2003: 33–34). Cultural transfer has been bound up with propaganda and both countries helped secure the cultural bonds that have maintained this tie.

From earliest US history, a preference for isolationism in foreign policy was deeply rooted in ideology. George Washington's farewell address laid the foundation for this tradition, declaring European interests to be 'foreign to our

concerns'. He also considered it 'unwise' to 'implicate ourselves' through 'artificial ties' in European politics (in De Toqueville, 1839: 21). President Thomas Jefferson further entrenched these ideas in his inaugural address, stressing 'peace, commerce, and honest friendship' internationally and 'entangling alliances with none' (in Fromkin, 1970). Woodrow Wilson made a first challenge to the dominance of this thinking, and after securing presidential re-election with the slogan 'He kept us out of war', he promptly, though reluctantly, intervened in the First World War (Conlin, 2008: 612). This has been attributed largely to the effects of British diplomacy and propaganda. Peterson argues that Wilson, 'like most other articulate Americans of that time, believed so many of the British propaganda arguments that he would have regarded himself "pro-German" if he had not acted as he did' (1939: 180). But it was still seen as a threat to US sovereignty to have foreign policy decisions taken in alliance with other states, and the US Congress rejected Wilson's commitment to enter into the 1920 League of Nations (the predecessor to the UN).

Early British propaganda bodies, including the Milner Group<sup>7</sup> (a loose, though powerful network) stepped up efforts, targeting the media and intellectual debate (Quigley, 1981: 3–14). America began using the 'Creel Committee'<sup>8</sup> and feeding its emergent PR industry. This continued between the wars during a comparative lull in British efforts (Snow, 2002: 36–38). Walter Lippmann, along with the 'father of public relations' Edward Bernays, both worked together on the 'Creel Committee'. President Roosevelt was sympathetic to British concerns, but Congress fought US involvement in any potential war, passing the 1936/1937 Neutrality Acts. America's economic crash in 1929 had led to a public climate of resistance to foreign political concerns and a focus on domestic American needs. Gallup polls in 1939 revealed that 94 per cent of the public favoured isolationist responses to war (Gross, 1990: 20).

Isolationism was only really challenged as a policy as a result of the Second World War. The British Embassy, the Ministry of Information and the Milner Group, building on existing Anglo-American ties, helped bring America into the war (Cull, 1994; Kirby, 2000: 390; Quigley, 1981). Peterson argues that 'American newspapers of those years should be viewed not as a mirror reflecting American reactions to the war, but as the principal medium through which the British influenced Americans' (1939: 159). According to the head of the Associated Press, Kent Cooper, because the British controlled Reuters during the war they were able to control news about the US *internationally*: 'Reuters sent only the news the British wanted us to read, and sent to the rest of the world only the news about us that the British wanted others to read' (1944). As Britain and France declared war on Germany, Roosevelt recognised this as he warned: 'Passionately though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that *every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought, does affect the American future*' (Roosevelt, 1939; emphasis

added). Once France fell, Britain was the only remaining democracy between Germany and the US. America was divided between isolationists and interventionists who feared German invasion (or coexistence with a fascist European bloc). Economic fears remained, so despite a Foreign Relations Committee dominated by isolationists, Roosevelt established a compromise through which the US could be seen as economically benefiting while staying politically non-committal (Adler, 1957: 282). Building economic ties with the British and French (through a fourth Neutrality Act in 1939 and the Lend-Lease Act of 1941), on which the US economy now depended, established an American position alongside the Allies in their fight against Nazi Germany. These first contracts also established a US military industrial complex that eventually became a powerful and independent political force with an interest in extended interventionism. In December 1941, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, intervention became unquestionable policy; fear dominated American public opinion and focused it on the defence of America's Pacific interests.

The intelligence-sharing that began during the First World War deepened during the Second World War, and cemented the foundations for a long history of Anglo-American propaganda. The 1943 BRUSA Agreement facilitated cooperation between the US War Department and the Code and Cypher School at Britain's Bletchley Park. Smith claims that 'Never before had sovereign states revealed their vital intelligence methods and results even to their closest allies' (1992: vii). Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) (thought superior to the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) or MI6), and its sister propaganda body the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) (from 1941), worked closely with the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the war on propaganda activities (Foot, 2002). Bradley Smith argues that as British intelligence was far more advanced than American systems, 'along with acquiring valuable secret information, and learning many tricks of the trade ... the American intelligence partners ... had the benefit of being deeply immersed in a professional and traditional intelligence system and culture for the first time' (1995: 62). The professional culture of the organisations thus has similar roots, which gave a long-established precedent for cooperation despite their structural dissimilarity. Reynolds (2000) documents extensive concern to ensure a harmonious relationship and facilitate US activities in Europe. Cooperative propaganda by both countries worked to this end, particularly as the war intensified, to ensure that the influx of American GIs in Britain from 1942 produced agreeable perceptions on both sides. An Anglo-American organisation, the Psychological Warfare Division, was established to manage propaganda during and after D-Day, headed by US propagandist Brigadier-General Robert McClure and bringing together staff from the PWE, OSS and SOE (Paddock, 1982).<sup>9</sup>

The Second World War also made close economic ties with America seem indispensable to Britain, and confirmed the latter as no longer a rival to the US.

The Lend-Lease agreement, crucial to Britain's success in the war, ensured continued British military commitment to America and American leverage in all post-war global planning. After the war, as the varied resources it had taken from its empire and commonwealth declined, so did Britain's world role and the power of the Milner Group (Nicholas, 1963; Quigley, 1981). Finally, on 28th July 1945 the Senate formally approved US membership of the UN. President Harry Truman argued that 'It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures' (Truman, 1947). Mainland United States had been left undamaged by war and became the premier industrial and military power. The post-war period also saw US concerns about expansionism by the Soviet Union ensure Britain's continued importance. While some in London feared that US interventionism would provoke conflict with Russia, others feared US isolationism and withdrawal (Aldrich, 2002: 65) – so much so, Anstey notes, that 'British officials had been advised by their US counterparts to persuade Americans that the way of life in which they placed so much faith was in all fundamental aspects "much the same as the British way of life"' (in Kirby, 2000: 396). Successive UK governments sought to retain a global position which could only be envisioned alongside the United States. Britain's world role was renegotiated over subsequent decades, mediated within the ideology, culture and propaganda of a relationship that was now perceived by both countries to be in their mutual interest.

After the war, the SOE was absorbed into the SIS, under the Foreign Office, in part inspired by America's centralised wartime OSS (a prized facility by this time), so that these capabilities came to the core of British foreign policy (Aldrich, 2002: 74, 86). British intelligence was not subject to such severe post-war austerity measures as defence; in 1947 the Cabinet Defence Committee stated that 'the smaller the armed forces the greater the need for developing our intelligence services in peace' to provide 'adequate and timely warning' (in Aldrich, 2002: 74, 67). The Americans dismantled the OSS in 1945, with a few key facilities (including a London office) relocated temporarily to other departments. Relations continued with difficulty, and in 1946 they were formalised in Signals Intelligence for the Cold War through a secret treaty – the UKUSA Agreement. While FBI founder J. Edgar Hoover saw the SIS as 'basking in the self-generated light of their own brilliance' and 'basically unsuccessful', his attempt to contest it as a model for the new Central Intelligence Agency failed (Tamm, 1945). Jimmy Byrnes, US Secretary of State, believed that 'the British Intelligence Service was the best in the business' (Byrnes, 1945) so the new CIA in 1947 forged strong ties with the SIS that remain today (Jeffrey, 2010: 720–721). The Anglo-American relationship would always be a public mask for differences in policy, and an agreeable framework within which each state saw that their national interests could either be guided invisibly, or negotiated

quietly. Kirby cites many examples where the image of the relationship was cooperatively constructed during the early Cold War years to allay fears and create favourable attitudes and approaches on either side of the Atlantic (2000: 391). Meanwhile the relationship acted externally as important propaganda to suit joint interests. The ability to manage opinions about the alliance externally, and within the alliance (both domestically and by the partner), has been crucial to the relationship's stability from its inception.

The Marshall Plan and the development of NATO in 1947, in a defensive gesture based on the fear of Russian communism, formally committed America to a role in European and world affairs across subsequent decades. However, the form of intervention was subject to some debate. Truman rejected pressure from Kent Cooper to make it a requirement for Marshall Plan aid that recipients establish a free press (Truman, 1945). An outcome of debate about the US global propaganda role and the appropriate degree of foreign intervention was the Smith-Mundt Act (1948) which enabled the State Department to take a stronger role in promoting America's image internationally. The US Information Agency (USIA) was then established in 1953.

During the following period of virulent US anti-communism, it is notable that domestic fear and political events led to domestic US propaganda 'rules' becoming more codified in a way that they were not in the UK. This shifted the US to more 'indirect' forms of propaganda such as PR and enhanced the role that commercial media, advertising and film played in constructing the American image at home and abroad. From the 1960s McCarthyism, urban unrest, the Vietnam War and Watergate built greater distrust of government in the US and contributed to concerns about propaganda. Some members of Congress fought for curbs to be placed on propaganda for 'domestic use' in the Smith-Mundt Act:

In 1972, Sen Fulbright, who was known at the time as The Dissenter, virulent in his opposition to what he viewed as constant USG [US government] misinformation and lies, changed the definition of S-M, both its legal construction and in the minds of anti-Gov / can't trust Gov folks ... (Email: Armstrong, 16th June 2013a)

What came after, Matt Armstrong argued, was that the 1980s became more about selling US material interests than idealism and promoting values: 'the 1980s was more about convincing people [that Pershing missiles] were good for Europe than the truth about the western political system and aspirations and the communist system and goals' (Email: Armstrong, 16th June 2013b). Senator Zorinsky in 1985 pushed this further, and was successful in securing domestic curbs on Smith-Mundt.<sup>10</sup> Some today see the 1980s as a 'golden age' of Public Diplomacy. Others, like Armstrong, were very critical of this period; he argued that during this period the US

shifted from 'what do we do that people will support?' to 'this is what we want, give them a nice story'. We were supporting anyone against the soviets regardless of what the leader did at home. The idealism of [Kent] Cooper and Truman were long gone. We were not projecting our values by our foreign policy so our messaging changed accordingly. (Email: 17th June 2013)

Coordination of each country's image and that of the relationship can be evidenced by the relations of Britain and America throughout the Cold War, despite occasional policy differences (Indo-China/Vietnam for example: see Page, 1996; Parsons, 2002). British intelligence remained hugely prized by America, and was one means by which Britain held on to relative power as its military capability and economic strength reduced. Exchanging intelligence was an acceptable way of 'spying upon each other, as much as upon common enemies', giving each an understanding of the other (Aldrich, 2002: 84). This 'insight' was subject to propaganda, since both countries doctored documents intended for the other's eyes, especially at the top levels, to create the right perception. Aldrich describes how the Cold War brought an 'intelligence gathering revolution' and expansion of 'covert action' and propaganda in both countries, which enabled them 'to maintain the liberal fiction that democratic states did not commit aggression against other democratic or popular' states (2002: 641).<sup>11</sup> Weiner documents some key examples of the ongoing collaboration, including a 1957 CIA/SIS campaign to make Syria 'appear as the sponsor of plots, sabotage and violence directed against neighbouring governments' (2008: 159). Stonor-Saunders also gives an illuminating account of CIA activities in Europe through the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which included a sometimes antagonistic relationship with the SIS (2000). According to Aldrich, this often-romanticised relationship was kept going after the war 'based on carefully calculated realism rather than mawkish sentiment' and could be 'prickly' especially when policies clashed (2002: 81). In the UK anti-communism was not nearly as strong as in the US, but it was balanced by the need to maintain this key ally. The British Information Research Department (IRD) work during the Korean War in particular helped to build the relationship between London and Washington; it is clear from this the extent to which it became a relationship with accepted internal parameters and a negotiated external image. For example, when the issue of whether to use nuclear weapons arose, Britain required that it be consulted first. Due to domestic concerns the countries cooperated directly and agreed that the American public statement would be worded strategically to discourage the perception of any threat to US sovereignty. It was *publicly* pledged that Britain would only be 'informed', but this was for propaganda purposes only – the unwritten understanding was that full consultation would occur (Parsons, 2002: 105). Likewise, during serious animosity over Suez, strong Anglo-American exchange/cooperation continued in intelligence and propaganda (Lucas and Morey, 2000).

Responding to its broadening security interests, America adopted massive global interventionism. The Thatcher–Reagan era and the birth of neoliberalism defined one of the strongest periods of the Anglo-American relationship, before, according to Dumbrell, ‘the end of the Cold War removed much of the security underpinning’ (2001: 224). After the 1980s dedicated ‘media relations’ and informational capabilities were seen as a necessity for all government departments in both the US and Britain, and an important role was being played by PR industries (Miller and Dinan, 2008). From the 1990s the explosion in global media meant that ensuring the consistency of the propaganda message became a huge area of activity, particularly for the US. By 1999 the sheer scale of bureaucracy and the global reach of each agency of US government led to a belief that one body, the USIA, could not perform the propaganda function. ‘Cross-government’ integration and the increasing recourse to the private sector allowed the propaganda apparatus to become a normalised part of government bodies. As Britain’s Graham Wright (former Ministry of Defence Director of Targeting and Information Operations) pointed out, having a centralised propaganda entity also ‘makes it sound sort-of suspicious’ (Interview: 1st June 2009).

Security concerns consolidated Anglo-American relations following 9/11. As Riddell points out, committing troops ‘in such crises has been at the heart of Britain’s relationship with America’ since 1950 (2004: 291). Today Britain still has a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and provides reliable support to the US. It also provides the US with secure military bases and key sites for intelligence-gathering. It was over this intense period of time that the important changes that are at the heart of this book occurred. A closeness persists today between America’s National Security Agency (NSA) and the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The UKUSA community is still the central structure of collaboration, with facilities in Australia and Canada forming ECHELON, a global intelligence-gathering system (Bomford, 1999). Johnson argues that this enables members to request that a partner spy on their domestic population, where this would otherwise be prohibited (2004: 165). The CIA has targeted US citizens repeatedly during its history. The recent revelations from Edward Snowden demonstrate reciprocal spying (Hopkins and Ackerman, 2013), but these were preceded by domestic activities under Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and George W. Bush (see Weiner, 2008: 223). UK intelligence officials are particularly driven by concern over the implications should there be an attack on the US by British citizens. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer now leading Barack Obama’s Afghan strategy, has stated that ‘The 800,000 or so British citizens of Pakistani origin are regarded by the American intelligence community as perhaps the single biggest threat environment that they have to worry about’ (in Shipman, 2009). Therefore, while UKUSA

members are prohibited from spying on each other without agreement, permission is often given (Bower, 1996: 90). While US concerns about Britain meant some tension, they also rejuvenated the relationship as a crucial security – and propaganda – concern for America. According to Grey, since the Second World War ‘the [CIA] London chief and his staff ... serve on some of Whitehall’s key intelligence committees’ and are granted an advisory role in the British Joint Intelligence Committee. And Grey suggests that Britain’s own exclusive broad access to US intelligence is given ‘in return for preserving the special relationship’ (2003). Ultimately, for the alliance to be seen as credible, both countries must be perceived internationally, and within the alliance, as being committed to cooperation. This means that the communication of the alliance and its propaganda is in both governments’ interests.

To give an idea of the imbalance between the two countries, US defence spending in 2001 was \$385,142m compared to the UK’s \$46,099m (SIPRI, 2010). Despite this, some point to the UK’s diplomatic weight in a globalised world: Dobbs (2003) argued that in Iraq, ‘Britain remains the indispensable ally for it provides international cover’ for an otherwise all-American operation. While the decision to invade Iraq was widely opposed, many others besides Tony Blair held a misplaced belief in the merits of the invasion (Azubuike, 2005: 124; Riddell, 2004: 291–292). This reflected not only a faith in the general superiority of Anglo-American intelligence, decisions and assumptions that is characteristic of the relationship, but also a commitment to ‘sticking together’, which has important cultural underpinnings. A romantic notion of the ‘special relationship’ has long been an aspect of shared culture that remains within horizontal propaganda, as sugar-coating on bitter economic imperatives. This propagandised history and culture enabled the Anglo-American relationship to survive and even thrive, as other powerful states rose to take positions important to US interests and as economic and security concerns have brought disagreements.

While many in the UK argue that a material imbalance with America cripples British autonomy in foreign policy, Blair saw Britain as a bridge between America and Europe. The former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook sarcastically noted that ‘a bridge cannot make choices’ (2003: 133). The United States is the UK’s largest single export market, buying \$57 billion worth of British goods in 2007. Within any examination of Anglo-American relations, the effect of an imbalance of power must be considered. Kimball notes that ‘common histories, common institutions and ideologies, a common language, and a common enemy can facilitate cooperation, but nations continue to pursue their interests even within a close partnership’ (1994: 117). Through the lens of a realist analysis, in close relationships ‘when an imbalance occurs, one nation sees opportunities while the other worries more and more about protecting its interests’, and Kimball notes that ‘rough equality’ in Anglo-American relations

occurred ‘only in the early stages of World War 2’ (1994: 117). McKercher notes how dominance began to move from British to American hands, when America began to contribute greater assets to the final stages of the Second World War (1999: 343). Lundestad agrees that ‘Anglo-American relations became “special” only when, after 1945, Britain became so clearly inferior’ (2005: 28). While heightened British insecurity regarding its global position is undoubtedly an element which has impacted greatly on both countries’ conduct of the relationship, a ‘relative gains’ analysis as suggested by Kimball fails to fully account for the continued importance, longevity and depth of this tie. While some said Blair was Bush’s ‘poodle’, obediently pandering to the patronage of a stronger power, others conceded that Britain can be the ‘brains’ to guide US brawn (Sharp, 2003; Whitaker, 2003). The ‘poodle’ theory is certainly an oversimplification, but, according to Riddell, opposition to the Iraq War such as that of the French (and as demanded by British public opinion) was ‘inconceivable’ given the Anglo-American ties (2004: 290). It would involve the reversal of a culture in foreign policy-making built on ‘60-year-old foundations’, and Britain’s nuclear power status is also dependent on privileged access to US technology and intelligence (Riddell, 2004: 290; see also Baylis, 1984; Dumbrell, 2001). This also benefits the United States of course, since that is where Trident’s missile delivery systems are manufactured and maintained. The British–US trade relationship is strong in defence: arms exports from the US to the UK between 2001 and 2012 were £4,498m; US exports to the UK were worth \$2,445m (SIPRI 2013).

Certainly, Britain could not have ‘become a “reliable” partner of the United States until it was no longer powerful enough to be a serious rival’ (Skidelsky, 2004). But its long history and traditions, combined with commonalities in culture and language, means the Anglo-American relationship is sustained beyond hard power politics through an expectation of permanence. Since the Second World War, through the participation of successive elites, a supporting concept of the relationship developed over time to solidify and institutionalise a privileged ‘community’ that could be engaged as required. Chapters 5 and 6 will return to this, showing how it accompanied planning for campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq and could be drawn on by governmental cultures for planning in propaganda and beyond. The relationship is therefore still a reliable tool for propaganda, both externally in communicating alliance, and in terms of propaganda cooperation to achieve limited national and shared goals within the alliance’s power constraints. ‘Threats’ and evaluations of security are also defined not just in relation to external actors but within the ideological framework of this community.

### Security threats during the Anglo-American ‘War on Terror’

As the preceding sections demonstrate, it is important to study propaganda use in its context. The ‘war on terror’ propaganda context must consider the state-defined concept of ‘security’, and how ‘threats’ and the range of ‘solutions’ are defined in relation to this. After 9/11 some commentators claimed a rise in ‘anti-Americanism’ or hostility towards Western policies and some pointed to ‘ineffective’ propaganda post-USIA (Cull, 2012; Datta, 2014; Nye, 2004; Parmar, 2008; Pilon, 2007). Taylor, for instance, linked increases in hostility in the Middle East and a worsening terrorist threat to a perceived down-grading of the US propaganda apparatus (2002: 439). A brief examination of US and UK governments’ use of the term ‘terrorism’ during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests that terrorism was assumed to be an uncontroversial and homogeneous concept.<sup>12</sup> US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s former Chief of Staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, referring to a Cold War Western audience, described how he and Powell often discussed how much easier it was when there was a ‘distinct “other”’ (Interview: 23rd June 2009). He said:

you always need an enemy, you need an ‘other’ ... we’ve always had ... within our own minds, Western minds ... in both our countries, we’ve always had the majority with a very distinct impression of the ‘other’ and it was easy to manipulate ... propagandise and so forth. (Interview: 23rd June 2009)

State-defined threats were now diffuse and often asymmetric – heterogeneous networks with loose ties that no longer corresponded to territorial boundaries or traditional organisational structures. As Kevin McCarty (former National Security Council Director for Global Outreach)<sup>13</sup> observed:

the bad guys in our mind were Al Qaeda, which is a very loose term for a whole bunch of bad guys doing different things. I mean, there wasn’t really an Al Qaeda, there just were a lot of different bad guys. Some of them used the name, some didn’t. (Interview: 13th March 2013)

Publicly there was a need to demonstrate a homogeneous ‘other’ as a threat to unite the public against and to declare ‘war’ on, so in 2001 President Bush made his battle-cry ‘either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’ (in Kean and Hamilton, 2004).

The difficulty associated with defining terrorism has resulted in flexibility in the term’s usage, and thus its being represented as ‘surging’ or ‘falling’ according to political motive (Deutch, 1997: 10). Kibbe (2004) notes the change in Bush’s rhetoric during the early days in Afghanistan which can be attributed to the conceptual and structural changes in the country’s approach to its foreign policy. Initially, following 9/11, Bush referred to the attacks in criminal terms, reflecting existing precedent in dealing with acts of terrorism by non-state

actors. However, he quickly began referring to acts of war. Bush first stated in his address to Congress on 20th September 2001 that 'Our War on Terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated' (Reynolds, 2007). Through analysis of discourse, van Dijk demonstrates how this term 'terrorist' has become synonymous with the Arab as 'other' through positive and negative evaluations of 'us' and 'them' (2000: 39). The broader 'war on terror' rhetoric accompanied efforts to authorise measures such as covert action by the military.<sup>14</sup> Governments can use a crisis such as a war to create a symbolic threat, respond such that they are perceived as acting to defuse the threat, and then declare a symbolic victory (Chermak, 2003: 12). The 'war on terror' depicted in the media bore no relation to the reality of the threat; rather, Lewis suggests that media coverage *responded* to an increase in political rhetoric. A massive increase in coverage occurred during a period when, despite occasional peaks, the number of terrorist attacks was the lowest in twenty years (2004: 19). Yet from 2005 (the time of the London bombings), it has been observed that BBC coverage has largely 'avoided the dialogue of fear' still common in the US and in much political rhetoric (Oates, 2007). By 2007 Tony Blair was trying to move away from Bush's expression 'war on terror', a move later shadowed by Obama (Reynolds, 2007). However, this phrase has now so saturated discourse that it persistently threads through global understanding of twenty-first-century American, and Anglo-American, foreign policy.

The British government definition of terrorism is contained within Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000; it encompasses the use or threat of 'action' (violence or endangerment, serious damage to property, or serious interference with an electronic system). This, combined with 'use of firearms or explosives', is sufficient to constitute terrorism. Otherwise, this 'action' must be intended 'to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public . . . for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause' (Lord Carlile, 2007). As Philo argues, 'ideology and the struggle for legitimacy go hand in hand' (2007: 178). Terrorism is, by this official definition, what others do; it has often been defined thus. Since it was first used by the Jacobins to describe the French 'reign of terror', the use of the term 'terrorism' has always been relative, and politically motivated. All this means that terrorism has been popularly misunderstood. According to Held, terrorism itself 'is not always or necessarily more morally unjustifiable than war' (2004: 59). It seems appropriate that instead 'debate should focus on the justifiability or lack of it or the aims sought' (Held, 2004: 59). This approach is obviously a helpful guide in our approach to the truly horrific terrorist attacks prompted by Islamic fundamentalism on the American mainland and internationally. However, it should likewise be extended to methods of 'countering' terrorism or insurgency being employed globally, the

doctrine of 'pre-emptive war' in Iraq<sup>15</sup> and indeed the propaganda systems used to generate support.

At the start of this period *state* concepts of security and responses were often still formulated in terms of global competition between sovereign states. These foundations, on which security was traditionally understood, have become seen as problematic in the absence of a clearly definable enemy. With a diffuse multitude of 'global' insurgent targets, traditional military solutions were seen as inadequate, and through their failures and collaborative efforts, Britain and the US began to seek out 'more tools' (Interview: Armitage, 21st July 2009). As Nagl points out, 'if the only tool in your toolbox is a hammer, all problems begin to resemble nails' (2005: 203). Counter-insurgency (COIN) or counter-terrorism was seen as a solution that would bring together force and coercion with propaganda to change behaviour and counter global perceptions of the West. Sir Robert Thompson's book *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966) drew on his experiences of fighting the 'Malayan Emergency' (a British colonial war to oppose the Malayan independence movement), and has defined subsequent British and American doctrine. It distinguishes five 'principles of counter-insurgency' which identified the political nature of this form of conflict with propaganda as a key component.

- 1 The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable.
- 2 The government must function in accordance with law.
- 3 The government must have an overall plan.
- 4 The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.
- 5 In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first. (Thompson, 1972: 50–60)

Thompson's fourth 'principle' has helped enshrine propaganda as a form of political warfare, and an important tool for counter-insurgency operations and planning, though he was far from the first to propose this. The increasing prominence of terrorism within contemporary foreign policy has led to an emphasis in defence on asymmetric warfare. And the ideological component of this struggle brought corresponding calls to consider what Joseph Nye and others said the US had neglected (2004). Galula's classic text argues that

The insurgent, having no responsibility, is free to use any trick [and] is not obliged to prove; he is judged by his promises, not what he does. Consequently propaganda is a powerful weapon for him. With no positive policy but with good propaganda, the insurgent may still win. (2006: 9)

Crucially, Galula's 'first law' of counter-insurgency is therefore that 'the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent' (2006: 52). Propaganda has thus been incorporated into contemporary US and British counter-insurgency doctrine and the US army's recent counter-insurgency handbook also states that

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations require synchronized application of military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions [as] the political issues at stake are often rooted in culture, ideology, social tensions and injustice. (DOD, 2007: 5–1)

Defined and organised in relation to governments' accepted definition of terrorism, rhetorically insurgents and terrorists become one and the same. In contrast, Kilcullen's definition sees terrorism as a *tool* that can be used by governments or insurgents; the use of 'politically motivated violence against civilians . . . conducted with the intention to coerce through fear' (2004: 15). He pointed to this frequent conflation of the terms, arguing that 'the current campaign is actually a campaign to counter a globalised Islamist insurgency'; he argued that insurgency is 'a popular movement that seeks to change the *status quo* through violence and subversion' whereas 'terrorism is one of its key tactics' (Kilcullen, 2004: 15). Counter-insurgency (and all components thereof) is thus, *by definition*, conservative, in that it seeks to ensure the integrity of existing social structures, preventing challenges to these as well as preventing the violence and 'terror' that insurgents might bring (see also Miller and Sabir, 2012).

Rarely were the Western economic and foreign policies that were attracting such hostility interrogated; the problem was necessarily located outside the West or in its ineffective propaganda. Notably, former CENTCOM Commander Adm. Fallon related security to economics and growing awareness of inequality through images of the West being seen in economically disadvantaged areas of the world. He argued that

in Iraq, the economics they know is 'I have a camel that gives milk and people buy it' . . . most people know 'I want' and it's very difficult I've found in . . . developing countries, to proselytise for . . . the long term – 'you gotta save', and they look around and they . . . see particularly the TV and cinema version of things – 'All we can see is you guys have *everything*, this material stuff and if you can have it why can't we?' (original emphasis)

Security is necessarily defined by material, and often locally defined, human realities when survival is at stake. Fallon's response was that the local population's reaction represented 'huge disconnects' in understanding, and it all goes 'back to messaging. It's all back to information, and assumptions, and perceptions.' Fallon's response clearly shows us that 'huge disconnects' in understanding do exist, but in the *West's* assumption that discontent stemming

from material inequalities can be countered through changing ‘perceptions’ (Interview: 21st July 2009).

While the media has gone global, people’s *concerns* have often stayed local, including in the US: Fallon argued that the American media has sparse content and ‘the only reason people look at these things is to find out about local stuff and advertisements’. With increasing commercialism comes change in focus. Fallon argued that in the West, during the Cold War, public awareness of threat

became part of the culture ... the mind-set was it [the threat] could come ... at any time. That’s all gone now. Our young people have no clue ... One full generation has no experience along these lines. They don’t know. So security is related to ipods ... things now that are very, very important to people. They’re all related to economics.

Economic issues, while dominant in security concerns, are still not seen as an acceptable motive for war, and economic pacification is the only permissible answer within the institutionalised capitalist ideology of the West. Yet images of Western opulence cannot be confined. As Fallon notes, ‘You have to play to multiple audiences. You can’t just focus on one’ (Interview: 21st July 2009).

Beyond its physical effects, terrorism demonstrates the conditional nature of the sovereign state and interrogates perceptions of its legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of those who have genuine grievances about material inequalities. Terror is defined and fought in the name of ‘national security’, a concept treated as fixed by governments, yet which is essentially contested. State security goes beyond the traditional notion of ‘anarchy’ within the state system that has dominated the field of international relations; beyond this it is the fear of the unknown future and the unknown populace, the embodiment of which is public opinion. Rear Adm. Frank Thorp identified a general US military fear that ‘if we talk about it the enemy will take advantage of it’ – a Vietnam-era prejudice that has proved persistent among US personnel (Interview: 24th August 2009). In writings that have been hugely significant in influencing planners from President Barack Obama to Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye has emphasised the relative power of media compared with government information sources:

Editors, filters, and cue givers become more in demand, and this is a source of power for those who can tell us where to focus our attention. Power does not necessarily flow to those who can produce or withhold information. Unlike asymmetrical interdependence in trade, where power goes to those who can afford to hold back or break trade ties, power in information flows goes to those who can edit and authoritatively validate information, sorting out what is both correct and important. (2002b)

Such analyses define the national security ‘threat’ of media and unfettered public debate. They underscore the sense of threat and common identity within the defence apparatus, marking out within ideological and institutional structures of government both a territory of conflict and one of containment. It is this contested cultural framework through which propaganda is legitimated within many of the accounts discussed below.

### **A note on method**

The research on which this book draws analysed the evolving Anglo-American counter-terror propaganda strategies that spanned the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as reconstruction, between 2001 and 2008. The book offers insights into the transformation beyond this period, tracking many key developments as much as possible up to the time of writing (2013) and providing a retrospective on the ‘war on terror’. Using empirical data located within multiple spheres (military, commercial, cultural, political, strategic), the book draws on sociology, political science and international relations, developing an interdisciplinary analysis of political communication in the international system that brings a crucial contribution to literature in this area.

The primary method for data gathering was exploratory elite face-to-face and telephone interviews, of which 66 were conducted with Public Relations professionals, journalists, and foreign policy, defence and intelligence personnel. Where interviews were not possible information was obtained by email correspondence (45 emails contribute to the book). The 75 US and British participants included 40 UK participants (37 UK interviews and 8 UK emails) and 35 US participants (28 interviews and 36 emails including 1 Iraqi-American and 1 Egyptian-American). I also included one Australian email participant who worked closely with UK/US personnel. In addition to these, several high-profile interviews were also conducted which were off the record. These examined how domestic dynamics, and the current state of diplomatic and defence relations between the US and the UK, shaped the nature and development of British and American information strategies and their planning in a shared theatre of war. Finally, I also carried out a detailed analysis of a large number of British and American documentary sources.

As Croft observes, the construction of a ‘war on terror’ narrative ‘was an elite project’ involving not just government but ‘many other social institutions, in the media and in popular culture’ (2006: 2). It is thus important to note that this is not a study of media production, media coverage or the content of propaganda output in either country. Rather it is a study of the interstate and domestic dynamics involved in decision-making and planning of propaganda strategy.

For methodological reasons the scope of the research is drawn quite broadly. The difficulties of gaining access to elite sources and in obtaining information

freely once in interview has meant the selection of appropriate examples was inevitably influenced by opportunity. While it was initially intended to focus on 'defence' propaganda in a limited way, in restricting scope to the military alone it quickly became apparent that the nature of how the information war was being fought (seeking cross-governmental solutions) rendered this an artificial distinction. Initial research findings also demonstrated that globalisation was making the 'target audience' an increasingly arbitrary and meaningless distinction. The erosion and maintenance of these understandings of propaganda distinctions became an important element of the analysis. They prompted a critical rethinking of:

- a) how the structure of government ensures propaganda concepts retain the strength of their analytical stature; and
- b) how they can come to be conceptually and institutionally shaped through the agency of those involved in its processes.

The scope of the research was ultimately focused on demonstrating the often 'messy' informal mechanisms and relationships through which the Anglo-American propaganda 'structures' – those involved in planning and shaping – operated or faltered. By way of clarification, the term 'Anglo-American relations', as used frequently here, encompasses many forms of interaction ranging among the interpersonal, structural and bureaucratic relationships. It includes relations operating informally in friendships, or relationships formally laid down in protocol; even these are often sustained despite the formal divergence of often varied careers. It potentially included all forms of interaction across each country's structural hierarchy involved in the cross-government organisation and implementation of the propaganda war. The interviewees were approached about their own experiences of working alongside colleagues from across the Atlantic, and asked for their observations of policy and practice from an 'insider' perspective during campaigns. These interviews built a picture of the more informal and indirect ways that Anglo-American relations and propaganda policy development occurred.

### **Conclusion**

This introduction has presented some of the numerous perspectives and histories that offer essential context for the discussions of Anglo-American propaganda that follow. Debates about ends, means and motives, the balance of Anglo-American power, democracy, and the nature of public opinion will be developed throughout the book. It has introduced both academics' and practitioners' approaches to propaganda and considered both ethical arguments

and those of utility and necessity (particularly in war), before problematising the notion of a 'democratic' use of propaganda and defining the term. Through examples, Chapter 2 will show how rapidly evolving media technologies presented legal, structural and cultural problems for what were seen as rigid propaganda systems defined by their emergence in an old media system of sovereign states with stable target audiences. It will detail the adaptations and initiatives that gave propaganda wider reach and challenged the existing structures, rules and practices. Subsequent chapters will demonstrate the planning involved: they show how these changes in response to the new environment were less a reliable product of a well-oiled propaganda machine than a happy accident for these governments, delivered by proactive elements within them. Chapter 3 will describe how the formal structures failed to coordinate effectively amid government urgency to impose strategic control on a sprawling apparatus. Propaganda successes and advances were an inconsistent by-product both of malfunction and of relationships, cultures and rivalries, both domestically (as argued in Chapter 4) and between the partners (as argued in Chapter 5). The differing social relations of planners and propagandists to wider society create tensions within the 'machine', however leaders may want it to function. The book will demonstrate that the 'messy' nature of bureaucracy and international systems as well as the increasingly fluid media environment are all important in shaping what actually happens. In a context of initial failures in *formal* coordination, the book will stress the importance of informal relationships to planners in the propaganda war. This situated Britain in an important yet precarious position within the Anglo-American propaganda effort, particularly in Iraq, which is the focus of Chapter 6.

### Notes

- 1 Interviewees' full titles are given in the list of interviews on pp. 254–258.
- 2 Harding claimed to have been a central part of this movement, 'My contribution was the fact I was pushing within the Pentagon, pushing for IO to be full-spectrum. And not based fully on computer network operations *or* electronic warfare *or* whatever, and now it's finally progressed' (Interview: 15th January 2013). Miller utilises a concept of 'information dominance' in explaining US and British propaganda strategy in Iraq as part of a greater US strategy to achieve the 'total spectrum dominance' (2004a). Former Executive Director of the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, now Chairman of the US Broadcasting Board of Governors, Matt Armstrong noted that a more fluid media environment necessitated a change in approach for those in government: 'The terms [information] superiority, dominance, etc reflect dated and/or obsolete and/or naive views of the communication environment . . . the heyday of [Public Diplomacy] as people today look back, was marked by the ability to control narratives. (Interview: 29th April 2013). It is important not to assume when we use such concepts that propagandists have a naive, deterministic understanding of persuasion and audience reception: this is not always the case.

- 3 According to one angry US PSYOP operative who commented on a *Small Wars Journal* blog about the recent terminology change to neutralise PSYOP into Military Information Support Operations (MISO): ‘some of us joined Psychological Operations because it sounded awesome’ and the ‘intimidation factor brought on by the words alone are what attracts many recruits’ (Anonymous, 2011).
- 4 This is the notion that, in a nuclear age, belligerent states may demonstrate through international agreements that they will refrain from using the full extent of their weapons capabilities, in order to preserve those systems or in order not to escalate conflict to a point deemed unwinnable or otherwise unacceptable.
- 5 For instance, Scott questions why scholars examining the intelligence agencies largely focus on comparatively well-researched ‘information gathering’, rather than ‘clandestine diplomacy’ and the ‘secret intervention’ function that is crucial to exposing hidden political agendas. This is very true of the literature discussing the Anglo-American relationship (2004: 322).
- 6 For instance, see the work of Kirby (2000), Miller (2004b) or Peterson (1939).
- 7 What has become known as the Milner Group was an informal elite network including Cecil Rhodes and Lord Milner, and every editor of *The Times* was a member from 1897 to 1945 with only three years’ exception (1919–22) (Quigley, 1981: Ch. 1). Members often held senior government positions and worked behind the scenes to enhance the interests of the British Empire, including building support for the Boer War. It had influence in both Liberal and Conservative Parties (Quigley, 1981).
- 8 The Committee on Public Information, also known as the Creel Committee after its chairman George Creel, was an agency of the US government set up by President Woodrow Wilson to influence domestic public opinion regarding participation in the First World War.
- 9 Some personnel from the Anglo-American collaboration took the skills developed through Second World War forecasting and propaganda and moved on, Peter Zellner and Dr John Dollard among them. Dollard’s ideas and skills came to the attention of the DuPont corporation, and then Jody Moxham at advertising firm PhaseOne (which later became a ‘war on terror’ propaganda contractor). Moxham brought Zellner’s expertise in to establish PhaseOne, and also worked with DuPont on developing the ‘Dollard System’ (Interview: Stelloh, 23rd June 2009).
- 10 In the UK historically there has been less distinction made between the foreign and domestic audience; the world was always more ‘connected’ for the British through empire, whereas US imperialism through capitalist expansion was kept more at arm’s length from the US public.
- 11 Recent US history, however, proves this to be a shallow claim: Public Diplomacy was modelled on CIA covert propaganda under the lead of William J. Casey and Walter Raymond Jr within Reagan’s National Security Council. Staffed by CIA and Pentagon propagandists, it was used to target *domestic* American perceptions during the Iran-Contra affair (Parry and Kornbluh, 1988). It was headed by Otto Reich; he and Richard Armitage (interviewed here) were among several of those implicated in the Iran-Contra scandal who were returned to government by George Bush (Roff and Chapin, 2001).
- 12 This unity was demonstrated by the support of Israel against Palestine (Held, 2004: 59).
- 13 According to the website of ‘Sherpa Analytics’ for whom McCarty is a Chief Strategy Officer, ‘Prior to the National Security Council, Kevin served in the Intelligence Community where he created and stood up new capabilities and programs to assist in

counterterrorist efforts' ([www.sherpaanalytics.com/kevin-d-mccarty/](http://www.sherpaanalytics.com/kevin-d-mccarty/)).

14 See Chapter 3.

15 This policy of preventive war came to be embraced in the media's flexible use of the term the 'Bush doctrine', which had more widely included a belief in America's right to secure itself against foreign regimes that support terrorist groups; see Krauthammer (2008).