Introduction: strategy in a time of crisis

Does the Russian leadership have a grand strategy? Is there a coherent and consistent strategic agenda? If so, what is it? What does President Putin have in mind? Is he, indeed, a strategic genius – or is he making it up day-to-day? What will Russia do next? And what are Putin’s intentions regarding the West? As French journalists inquired of Putin himself, is Russian strategy ‘on a path of dialogue, or expansion and conquest?’ Since the sharp deterioration in relations between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia following the eruption of war in Ukraine in 2014 and Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, these questions have troubled senior politicians and officials in Western capitals.

Some doubt the idea of a Russian grand strategy. Michael McFaul, a former US ambassador to Russia, is among those who argue that Putin does not know what he wants from the Ukraine crisis, has no grand plan and makes policy up as he goes. Others see him as a tactician, but no strategist. The prominent strategic thinker Lawrence Freedman has argued that although Putin is good at making early moves he has not thought through subsequent developments, and that it is difficult to evaluate what Russian strategy is beyond the most general lines. Indeed, Putin is already failing, according to Freedman, since he is caught in a web in Syria.

Still others have suggested that Putin is a bad strategist, since he does not understand the relationship between military violence and political objectives, and is pursuing a self-defeating strategy that is reducing Russian power and leaving it isolated,
all but ruining his ambition to return Russia to the ranks of great powers. The UK’s House of Foreign Affairs Committee concluded, for instance, that Moscow’s approach to foreign policy is opportunistic and tactical, meaning that Russia has been making strategic mistakes and pursuing short-term advantages rather than advancing a long-term, coherent, sustainable vision for its role in the world.  

Such sceptics draw on a tradition that doubts Moscow’s ability to create strategy, and emphasises the role of contingency, even a tradition of anti-strategy: a Tolstoyan rejection of strategy in which strategic planning is futile because luck plays too great a role and the Russian leadership has too little control over events. Other problems include decision-making processes beset by informality, dysfunction and political infighting. These flaws lead to inconsistent and uncoordinated policies which undermine or even prevent the ability of the Russian leadership to shape a coherent strategy. Celeste Wallander, a prominent US observer who has held senior policy and academic positions, memorably suggested in 2007 that Russian grand strategy is ‘neither grand, nor strategic, nor sustainable’.  

Nevertheless, the view that Moscow has a strategy, even of Putin as a strategic genius, has become an orthodoxy across the Euro-Atlantic community, and a broad consensus has taken shape around the notions of Putin’s complete authority within Russia, his ability to make rapid decisions because of the centralised nature of authority in Russia, and his creation of a ‘vertical of power unlike any we have seen in other great nations’.  

General Adrian Bradshaw, then NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, illustrated this view in March 2017 when he emphasised that NATO was ‘grappling with a spectrum of Russian aggression towards the West, from provocative military measures on Europe’s borders to subversion alongside a tide of digital propaganda and efforts to manipulate the US presidential election’.  Bradshaw’s view that Putin ‘has his hands on all the levers of power’ is widespread among Euro-Atlantic policy-makers and observers, who emphasise Putin’s control of all aspects of national power, military and non-military,
in a seamless linking of state power. Many see Moscow to have increasingly displayed a real focus on the whole of government, a ‘full spectrum approach’ that seeks to integrate fully all activities within a strategic design and drawing on all national means to achieve its ends. This is often known as ‘hybrid warfare’ or the so-called ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’, based on a simplistic reading of an article published by the Russian Chief of General Staff, Valeriy Gerasimov, in 2013.  

Others go further, believing him to be a ‘calculating master of geopolitics with a master plan’ to divide Europe, destroy NATO, demonstrate that Russia is a global power, and, most of all, marginalise the United States and the West. Putin’s actions show a ‘consistent logic and strategic coherence’, as he foments ‘low-level conflict to undermine stability and ultimately promote expanded Russian influence’. Similarly, some suggest that he has launched a ‘chaos strategy’ and has seized the momentum of the unravelling of the Western order, and, having transformed great weakness into considerable strength, to have launched a kind of ‘global imperialist insurgency’ such that he is dictating the ‘mood of the unfolding era’, stirring and guiding the currents of change. For those who emphasise Putin’s KGB background, it is axiomatic that the Kremlin has a strategy: an aggressive, expansive, neo-imperialist central Russian strategy to sustain domestic legitimacy and popularity, and exemplify it by pointing to specific Russian foreign policy moves and matching lists of perceived Russian strengths against known and assumed Western weaknesses and failings.

In Russia, the balance of the debate has been with sceptics who point to bureaucratic problems and incompetence, and the dysfunctionality of the Russian system. Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies in Moscow, has suggested that despite some progress since the 1990s, there is only limited consensus on national goals beyond the desire to be a leading independent, global player. Answers to important questions are ‘often being given “on the hoof”, knee-jerk reactions to whatever challenges, threats or problems the country happens to be facing at any given moment’. Similarly,
Mikhail Zygar, a prominent journalist, suggests that Putin-era Russia ‘lacks logic’, and that there is an absence of a plan or clear strategy on the part of Putin himself or his courtiers. Everything that happens is a tactical step, a ‘real-time response to external stimuli devoid of an ultimate objective’.10

Nevertheless, there are many Russians who advocate the importance of grand strategy. The conservative political Izborsky club, for instance, published a manifesto in 2012 entitled ‘Mobilisation project – the founding premises of a “major breakthrough” strategy’.11 In 2013, Alexander Prokhanov, one of the club’s senior figures, asked Putin directly whether there was a ‘synthetic, integrated project, a large project, a “Russia project” underway’. Putin replied that Russia is ‘not a project, but a destiny’, before outlining Russia’s development plans to 2020, focusing on the development of the military and infrastructure.12

Indeed, Putin and many other senior Russian officials have often stated that Russia has what amounts to a ‘unified action programme’, one that reflects a strategic agenda set out in 2011 and 2012, and that ‘only by mobilising all the resources at our disposal ... will we get results’.13 And, in response to the direct question posed about whether Russian strategy is one of dialogue or expansion and conquest, Putin stated that it was one of dialogue.

Given the sharp deterioration in relations between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, it is important to understand better the question of Russian grand strategy. What does the Russian leadership mean by a ‘unified action programme’ – and what is implied by the emphasis on military modernisation? What are the problems that Russian observers emphasise and how do they undermine strategy? What do the hints at ‘mobilisation’ mean – and how do they relate to Russian grand strategy?

This book explores these questions. It argues that the idea of Russian strategy has been poorly understood, partly because of confusion over what strategy means and partly because of a misdiagnosis of a Russian ‘master plan’ and the notion of the ‘seamless coordination’ of activities against the Euro-Atlantic community, even the international order. The labels ‘Gerasimov
Doctrine’ and ‘hybrid warfare’ reflect a misunderstanding of Russian thinking and actions, at once a partial and simplistic reading and too narrow a focus on specific aspects of Russian activity; indeed, while the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ has become fashionable, it pitches an understanding of Russian strategic thinking and making at the wrong level and misses the bigger picture of Russian grand strategy. At the same time, assertions of a Russian ‘master plan’ often simply amount to joining up some dots of various externally visible activities and deducing that they are driven by a strategic agenda – regardless of the inherent difficulties of strategy-making and any Russian internal complexities.

Furthermore, beyond simplistic assertions that Putin is trying to rebuild the USSR or destroy NATO, Moscow’s strategic planning, along with the assumptions on which it is based, is usually ignored or dismissed. And the focus on Putin, which all too easily subsides into ill-informed and clichéd ‘Putinology’, misses much about how Russia works and instead merely reflects the highly politicised nature of the debate about Russia and Euro-Atlantic security since 2014. It is an easy dysphemism to call Putin ‘merely’ a tactician, and those who emphasise his strategic prowess usually do so to contrast an abstract version of Putin’s decisiveness against the weakness of Western leaders or the lack of Western strategy, rather than illuminate any actual Russian strategy.

Examining Russian strategy sheds light both on how Moscow sees the world and how Russia works, and, importantly, does not. The book argues that Russian strategy is less to be found in Moscow’s plans, and more in the so-called vertical of power. In so doing, it reveals important shifts underway in the Russian political and security landscape and shapes an argument about a missed diagnosis of Russian state mobilisation.

The argument is framed in two parts. First, the broader picture of Russian grand strategy is examined, reflecting initially on Russian strategic planning under Vladimir Putin and then on the leadership’s ability to implement those plans. Since Putin came to power, Moscow has consistently sought to shape
strategic planning, but has often struggled with its implementation. Chapters 3 and 4 then turn to look at the measures that the leadership is enacting to attempt to remedy problems and create strategy. Since the turn of this decade, and particularly since the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, these have appeared as emergency measures to improve the functioning of the system at a time of looming crisis. The most notable aspect of this has been the effort to prepare Russia to face a range of possible threats – to consolidate the body politic and the economy and prepare and enhance the security and military capabilities. Indeed, security concerns have come to dominate Moscow’s agenda, such that it appears that the leadership has prepared to move the country onto a war footing.

Some important points are worth registering at the outset, since Russia and the concepts of strategy and mobilisation are all contentious, especially when examined together at a time of high tension. ‘Grand strategy’ is a term often used but rarely defined in a clear or meaningful way. In the debate about Russia it is often misused, and is seen as synonymous with Moscow’s plans, policies or (often nefarious) goals. Difficult though it is to define in a way that will satisfy all, simply put, grand strategy refers to the art of bringing together and using all of the nation’s resources to promote the interests of the state, including securing it against enemies perceived and real. It is the relationship between military, economic, political and cultural means and political ends – the art, as Lawrence Freedman has suggested, of creating power.

But this requires some further explanation. Importantly for the book’s argument, one point that is universally accepted by strategic thinkers is that strategy is not a plan, nor is it a set of goals or objectives. Instead, strategy is the combination of the formulation of plans in theory and their implementation in practice: it is an executive function and, without it, even good plans come to nothing or fall apart.

If strategy is a ‘bridge’ between plans and action, clearly it should be understood with reference to the people and institutions who formulate and implement the plans. Strategy requires
the careful coordination and balancing of the various interests of those actors – in effect ‘conducting the orchestra’, as opposed to playing the individual instruments. In formulating the plans, this requires matching the necessary degree of political flexibility to square and satisfy divergent internal interests and retain adaptability in the face of events with the clarity necessary for those who will implement them. As Freedman has put it, the problem with strategy is other people – both on your own side and adversaries. Successful strategy requires people to follow the script, and as soon as they deviate, then problems emerge.

Similarly, strategy is a process of dialogue with a changing context, of constant adaptation to evolving conditions and circumstances in a world in which chance, uncertainty and ambiguity dominate. This raises two points. First, the assumptions of the leadership play an important role in influencing strategy. Indeed, as Colin Gray has suggested, assumptions underpin the entire strategic architecture of means and ends: how the leadership sees the world drives their attempt to make strategy, their prioritisation and their actions. Assumptions, he says, ‘are always likely to be crucially important for action contemplated in the future, since reliable empirical evidence about the consequences of future behaviour is certain to be missing at strategy selection time’.15

Second, leaders must balance their resources and attempt to plan for an uncertain future, one that is shrouded in ‘fog’, while simultaneously dealing with the impact of the ‘friction’ of events and opposition that warps initial formulations even as they are being implemented. It is, therefore, both an iterative process and an extremely difficult undertaking. Regardless of how well it is done, subsequent events will require the plans to be revised, assumptions to be reconsidered and new routes plotted.

Strategy, then, is summed up by Gray as a concept that ‘aspires to provide guidance and control over all the assets of a polity for the purpose of achieving a collective effort to meet the overall challenge of the day’. It is the ‘direction and use of any or all of the assets of a security community and, in order to be
grand’, he continues, ‘strategy needs to be capable of mobilising any of a community’s assets’.\textsuperscript{16} It is about the management and the execution of a ‘purposeful set of ideas’ about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world and how it should go about doing so by prioritising finite resources to ensure the security of the state. It requires foresight, despite the fact of uncertainty, and it needs a steadiness of purpose necessary to plan ahead combined with the ability to adapt.\textsuperscript{17}

Mobilisation is a similarly difficult term, one that is highly symbolic with many historical and political connotations. It is often seen as reflecting the idea of a ‘nation in arms’, a Napoleonic \textit{levée en masse}, and the call for mass volunteerism (and conscription) to defend the motherland. It also has connotations of a ‘train timetable’ type of mobilisation of the kind that took place at the outbreak of the First World War, an administrative process that happens \textit{after} the outbreak of war, in which a country’s ability to mobilise is predetermined by logistical structures.

More recently, the term mobilisation has taken on a political flavour, building on traditions with roots in the political left. This understanding has a strong progressive, even revolutionary, feel, related to the emergence of political consciousness and enfranchisement. Indeed, this is how it has usually been applied to Russia (and the other post-Soviet states) in the post-Cold War era, as observers have focused on (democratic) opposition protests mobilising against the (authoritarian) leadership using social media and, to a lesser degree, the attempts of the authorities to counter-mobilise against these protests.

In Russia, although it has some broad historical similarities in terms of volunteerism and conscription in defence of the motherland, and while there is some discussion of contemporary social mobilisation (and counter-mobilisation), \textit{state} mobilisation has a rather different and more specific meaning that is essential to understand for the argument below. It is worth clarifying what is meant here, not least since the argument pursues the line that there is a shift in meaning \textit{away} from traditional forms of mass mobilisation towards a more modern form.
A preliminary point to note is that the term mobilisation is much more prevalent in the public and political debate in Russia than it is in the Euro-Atlantic community. Indeed, in many ways, Western societies are not just demobilised after the end of the Cold War, but increasingly de-militarised. In her stimulating book *War Time*, a reflection on the evolving character of war in the twenty-first century, Mary Dudziak has argued that in the United States, a separation has taken place between war-fighting and the wider population. During the lengthy US commitment to fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, war became ‘normal life’ for the wider US population – there was no wider call to arms to defend the nation, indeed ‘absent was the call to national unity that might be hoped for in wartime’. Rather than sacrificing for the war effort, the population was specifically to continue with daily life. War, she argued, had become the government’s task, not something that the population experienced, and war governance has the character of ‘bureaucratic management rather than crusade’. In many ways, this reflects the antithesis of traditional mobilisation.

In contrast, in Russia the word ‘mobilizatsiya’ often features in discussions about contemporary international relations and security, politics and economics, and about whether the international instability and insecurity, with even the looming prospect of war, means that Russians are living in a time of mobilisation. Senior party politicians and prominent officials have spoken publicly of mobilisation as part of Russia’s anti-crisis plan, and as the means of consolidating society, improving state administration and responding to a challenging, even threatening, international environment. Mobilisation plans have been prepared by the government. The term featured in Gerasimov’s famous 2013 article, and when Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber in November 2015, the Kremlin announced that, in responding to the challenge, the president was ‘fully mobilised’.

The Russian state has a specific definition of mobilisation – ‘a complex of state measures for activating the resources, strength and capabilities for the achievement of military-political aims’. It includes practical measures for the transition on to a
war footing of the country’s military, economic and state institutions at all levels (general mobilisation), or of some part of them (partial mobilisation). Mobilisation can be carried out openly or secretly, and its announcement is the responsibility of the head of state (the president) and the highest organs of state authority. The most important conditions for the successful fulfilment of mobilisation include: having sufficient numbers of trained people to bring units up to strength and create new formations; the provision in peacetime of the necessary arms, equipment, ammunition and fuel; and a clearly structured system for announcing mobilisation and for gathering and distributing the resources associated with it.  

Such a definition is very close to that of grand strategy noted above, and provides a clear basis for the discussion below. It is important to note, though, that there are two main pillars of Russian state mobilisation, economic and military. Mobilisation of the economy is the foundation for wider, general mobilisation, and is reflected in the reorganisation and conversion of industry, natural resources, transport and communications to the service of the armed forces, the activities of the state and the needs of the population in times of war. These economic and military aspects of mobilisation have important historical roots which still echo today, but there are fundamental shifts underway in practice.

Mobilisation is based on two stages. The first stage is defined as ‘mobilizatsionnaya podgotovka’ (mobilisation preparation), which is when an armed conflict could appear and during which state agencies are prepared to deploy forces, mobilise the economy for war and begin negotiating with potential allies and adversaries. If war becomes imminent, the leadership announces the second stage, when it brings all armed forces to full military strength and concentrates and deploys them. This is associated with battle readiness, and today this is known as ‘mobilizatsionnaya gotovnost’ (mobilisation readiness). These definitions illustrate an important point, one emphasised by Gerasimov in his 2013 article, that mobilisation is understood as a peacetime activity, in advance of conflict, a peacetime preparation
of the organs of state power, administrative authorities, economy and armed forces to defend the state from armed attack.

A couple of caveats must be made at the outset. First, understanding Russian strategy requires a degree of empathy – in effect, attempting to see the world through Russian eyes. This is not synonymous with ‘sympathy’, or attempting to argue either for those policies or that disagreements should be overlooked. From the start, therefore, it is important to be clear: the disagreements between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia are numerous, both in terms of values and interests, and in terms of policies. Indeed, in many ways they are fundamental. Senior Russian officials, politicians and observers have often stated their disagreements with NATO and its member states, not least their opposition to NATO enlargement and other alliance activities, and their view that NATO should be disbanded. But these are already extensively and well documented elsewhere and it is not the purpose of this book to reiterate them.

At the same time, if the calls from Bradshaw and other Western senior officials and observers for the need for a grand strategy for dealing with Russia are to be heeded, then so should be the reminder from Western strategic thinkers that good strategy presumes an ability to ‘read’ one’s adversaries and their actions. An empathetic approach highlights the features of Moscow’s thinking, and serves as a reminder how different the world looks to the Russian leadership.

While the debate about international security appears – superficially – similar to the one in the Euro-Atlantic community, Moscow often draws very different conclusions from the same body of evidence – and sometimes from different bodies of evidence. There is much debate in Russia about a ‘new Cold War’ (or ‘Cold War 2.0’), the threat posed by international terrorism and particularly Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, the war in Syria and cyber (in)security. But the premises of these debates and the thrust and detail of the arguments are often so substantially at odds with Western ones that they may appear peculiar to some Euro-Atlantic audiences. That does not mean, however, that such views are not seriously held in Moscow, or that they
are not based on rational Russian thinking. Understanding these differences in detail is important for understanding Russian assumptions (and therefore strategy), and it is at least a partial antidote to the widespread problem of mirror imaging.

We will return to this theme later, but it is worth briefly illustrating some of these differences, and the strong sense of inversion or reflection of arguments. First, since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, much Western attention has been paid to ‘hybrid warfare’ as a new form of Russian warfare. In Russia, however, it is understood as a Western form of warfare. In the article which spurred so much of this debate, Gerasimov was not so much prophesying a new form of Russian warfare, as ruminating on the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ as an example of twenty-first century warfare that is related to forced regime change and ‘colour revolution’ type operations. Others have emphasised the roles of ‘controlled chaos’ and humanitarian intervention in which the Euro-Atlantic community, led by the United States, instigate externally coordinated coups d’état against states that disagree with them.22

Russian foreign minister Lavrov illustrated this when he said that Western sanctions are a tool not just to seek to change Russian policy but to change the regime. He suggested that

It has become fashionable to argue that Russia is waging a kind of ‘hybrid war’ in Crimea and Ukraine ... but I would apply it above all to the United States and its war strategy. It’s truly a hybrid war aimed not so much at defeating the enemy militarily as at changing the regimes in states that pursue policy that Washington does not like.

Tools include financial and economic pressure, informational attacks, the use of proxies and informational and ideological pressure through externally financed non-governmental organisations.23 Such views are shared across the Russian leadership and frequently and repeatedly emphasised. In spring 2016, Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Investigative Committee, called for the creation of an effective barrier against the information war, and stated that ‘over the past decade Russia and a number
of other countries have been living through a so-called “hybrid war”, unleashed by the US and its allies. The war has been conducted on various fronts, political, economic, informational and legal”. 

More broadly, there is much discussion in the Russian policy community about international instability, the possibility of conflict, even the inevitability of war. This began even before the deterioration in relations between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia in 2014. In 2013, Russian observers were suggesting that the world is in systemic crisis – economic and financial stagnation as exemplified by the global financial crisis of 2008, socio-political turbulence, even revolution as illustrated in 2011–12, and instability caused by Western humanitarian and anti-terrorist interventions and the problematic but increasing use of force to solve international problems. They argued that major geopolitical changes loomed. Such arguments have only increased since then, and a particular concern is the role of the United States in international affairs.

These points have been well illustrated by Putin himself in numerous speeches. In December 2013 he said that the world was becoming ‘ever more complicated’ as a fierce battle for resources was taking place and the intensity of military, political, economic and informational competition was only growing. Russia needed to be self-sufficient, with a consolidated society to face this. Moreover, he suggested that the West was ‘uncompromising’ with Russia, forcing Russia into a situation where Moscow had to take measures in response.

The following year, in a speech that deserves to be much better known in the Euro-Atlantic community, Putin stated that ‘today we are seeing new efforts to fragment the world, draw new dividing lines ... and steps of this kind inevitably create confrontation and countermeasures’. ‘Today we see a sharp increase in the likelihood of a whole set of violent conflicts with either the direct or indirect participation by the world’s major powers’, he continued. He also suggested that ‘slogans such as the “homeland is in danger”, the “free world is under threat” and “democracy is in jeopardy” – so everyone needs to mobilise’ reflect what
a ‘real mobilisation policy looks like’. The Russian president appears to believe that some Euro-Atlantic states are mobilising – a point also echoed in some Russian military planning documents. It is perhaps hardly surprising, therefore, that both sides accuse each other of living in virtual realities. But that does not absolve us from attempting to grasp Moscow’s reality, which is the foundation of their efforts to make strategy.

The second caveat relates to a limitation in the book’s scope. Russian grand strategy and mobilisation open up a huge range of specific and complex themes, many of which are subjects worthy of detailed exploration in their own right: decision-making, corruption, Russia’s economic problems, Russian military reform, Russia’s ability to forge international alliances and ad hoc partnerships, and so on. Equally, there is a proliferation of Russian planning documents. The intent here is not to address all these features in depth, but to capture the main features of Russian grand strategy and set a foundation for further debate. Similarly, the intention is to illuminate an argument about broader Russian grand strategy during the Putin era, as opposed to more specific strategies either towards Ukraine or Syria, or the Euro-Atlantic community.

Though some – even many – of the features of Russian grand strategy will be familiar to strategists the world over, no attempt is made explicitly to compare Russian grand strategy to that of other states, nor is there an attempt to contribute to the debate about whether authoritarian states do strategy better than democratic states. Nor, for that matter, does the book reflect on the current state of Russian democracy, which has already been addressed extensively, though it is worth noting tangentially that the argument that the Russian political and security landscape is being transformed as a result of Moscow’s efforts to make strategy is not to suggest any form of liberalisation. Moscow’s priority is security through modernisation.

Instead, the book draws on the work of leading thinkers in the field of strategy to define grand strategy and thus reintroduce some of the core tenets of what strategy is to thinking about
contemporary Russian activity. This refocuses the argument, shifting the balance of attention away from goals and towards the assumptions and processes of the formulation and implementation of plans. As the book argues, it is the vertical of power that is the heart of Russian grand strategy.

The argument also points to a longer trajectory and transition in Russia, rather than attempting to offer a direct answer to the more immediate question ‘what will Putin do next?’ Grasping this transition is becoming all the more important because of the increasing sense of competition between the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, and because the Russian authorities are making progress in some areas of strategy-making.

Notes


M. Delyagin et al., Strategiya ‘bolshovo ryvka’ (Moscow: Algorythm, 2012). ‘Bolshovo ryvka’ is ambiguous in English, and could also be rendered as a ‘big push’ strategy – but still, the emphasis of the project remains on mobilisation.

INTRODUCTION


16 Ibid., pp. 83, 86.


Geopolitika tretei volny: transformatsiya mira v epokhu Postmoderna (Moscow: Granitsa, 2013).


