Introduction

Jacobitism is a fertile source of some of the great ‘what-ifs’ of British history. What if William of Orange had been killed at the battle of the Boyne in 1690? What if John Erskine, Earl of Mar, had crushed John Campbell, Duke of Argyll’s, little army at the battle of Sheriffmuir in 1715? Most potent of all, what if Charles Edward Stuart (‘Bonnie Prince Charlie’) had not turned back at Derby in 1745? Of course we can never know the answers to any of these questions because history is not an experiment where one can adjust the variables and repeat the procedure. All historians can do is interpret the maddeningly imprecise data that has survived the vicissitudes of time. Nevertheless, Jacobitism’s power to generate ‘what-ifs’ is thought-provoking. The subject is one on which many other events in British history, such as the creation of a stable polity, the union of Scotland and England, the onset of the industrial revolution, the rise of the first British empire, and so on, have been argued to hinge. This tantalising sense that Jacobitism had the potential to make the history of Britain turn out very differently has consequently resulted in some major divisions among historians of the eighteenth century. For the purposes of this introduction those whose work has been most significant for the historiography of Jacobitism will be grouped under three headings: optimists, pessimists and rejectionists.

None of these labels should be taken as any reflection on the scholarship or theoretical methodology of the historians concerned. The sheer erudition of both Paul Hopkins’s and Paul Langford’s work, for example, was awesome, despite the fact that they were poles apart in their interpretation of Jacobitism; and Marxisant historians like Frank McLynn can be found comfortably aligned on many historiographical issues with more conservative scholars.
such as Eveline Cruickshanks. What follows is thus an attempt to create a shorthand categorisation of modern historians with respect to their attitude to the Jacobite phenomenon that students will find useful. It is worth noting here, too, that many other scholars have dealt with aspects of Jacobitism in their work – among others, Tim Harris, Geoffrey Holmes and Christopher Whatley – and the historians cited below as representative of the optimist, pessimist and rejectionist schools of interpretation are simply my idiosyncratic choice of voices from a lively, and continuing, debate.

The optimists

‘Optimism’, in the sense used below, refers specifically to this school of historiography’s attitude towards the seriousness of the Jacobite threat, not to a belief that anything especially beneficial to mankind might have come out of Jacobitism per se. In a sense, this school is directly descended from the romantic tradition of Jacobitism created by Sir Walter Scott at the beginning of the nineteenth century. By then real Jacobitism was long dead, the monstrous caricatures of Hanoverian black propaganda thankfully forgotten, and from the vantage point of post-Napoleonic Britain it could safely be regarded sentimentally, even fondly, by the ruling elite of the new, industrial Britain.

From the mid-nineteenth century on there was an efflorescence of publishing on the subject of Jacobitism, most of it arguing strenuously for this or that event as the crucial turning point, but always with the underlying conviction that but for ‘x’ or ‘y’ happening, Charles Edward would have regained the throne of his ancestors. The only enduring contribution made to the field by this explosion of interest came in the form of the publication of a great many original documents by semi-antiquarian scholars, among whom Alastair and Henrietta Tayler stand out for the cool empiricism and quality of their editing. Nonetheless, this renaissance of interest in Jacobitism did give rise to one fully coherent statement of the optimist case – in the work of Sir Charles Petrie. Petrie was a devout Roman Catholic, which undoubtedly coloured his judgement on occasion. Nevertheless, he argued powerfully in a series of articles and books that Jacobitism was a genuine political movement (in a twentieth-century sense), with a mass following, and that on several occasions it came within an
ace of overthrowing the post-Revolutionary political order in the British Isles.7

Petrie’s enthusiasm, however, sometimes overcame his scholarship,8 and as a result the optimist school of thought – associated by Petrie with Cavalier reaction and paternalism – was increasingly marginalised after the Second World War as more and more professional historians turned to social history and cliometricism in various forms. By its very nature, Jacobitism, believed at the time to be an almost wholly elite movement, went against the zeitgeist of the historical community of the 1940s and 1950s. The optimist interpretation accordingly remained in the doldrums until 1970. In that year, the History of Parliament Trust brought out two volumes on the House of Commons 1715–54, which included an analysis of the Tory party’s politics in that period primarily written by the then assistant editor Eveline Cruickshanks (later one of the editors of the 1689–1715 volumes). These made a strong case for the Tory party’s deep involvement in active Jacobitism, suggested that in 1743–5 the Tories were certainly ready to rise had a French invasion arrived and that they came within a whisker of doing so as Charles Edward marched south.9 In 1979 Dr Cruickshanks backed up her argument with a book on the 1743–4 conspiracy which was primarily based on previously underused or overlooked French archival sources.10

Her case was reinforced in 1981 by Frank McLynn’s book on the French response to the Jacobite rising of 1745–6, generally known as the ’45, in which he proved that the French did their level best to assemble an invasion force for southern England designed to link up with Charles Edward’s army on its way south, and only missed him by a narrow margin.11 In the mid-1980s Paul Hopkins added to the weight of the optimists’ gathering reassessment of the Jacobite phenomenon by conclusively proving that the Highland War of 1689–91 was not the unimportant little episode most historians had previously considered it to be, but rather a crippling civil war that bankrupted the post-Revolutionary Scottish state morally and financially.12 To round off an exciting decade for the optimist school, Paul Monod’s unsurpassable study of the social history of Jacobitism in England strongly suggested there was a lot of popular support for the Jacobite cause among the lower as well as the upper orders of English society, and that its ideology enjoyed widespread acceptance at all levels.13

Since then further work on specific aspects of Jacobitism has
implicitly reinforced the optimist case. In 1995, and still more strongly in 2009, Murray Pittock demonstrated that the Jacobite army in 1745 was no ragtag collection of wild Highlanders, but rather a national army (in the sense that it drew recruits from every social constituency in Scotland) and was by the time of the battle of Culloden well on the way to becoming a regular military force fully capable of defeating the British army. In the same vein, following through on the re-evaluation of the cultural influence of Jacobitism on Irish-language poetry (and the poetic form known as the *aisling* in particular) by the great Irish literary scholar Breandán Ó Buachalla, David Dickson, Vincent Morley and Ó Ciardha have shown that the Irish Catholic community was strongly emotionally and ideologically committed to the exiled Stuarts until at least the 1760s, and thus constituted a continuing, and very real, threat to the security of the English empire in the British Isles. And one of my own books, *Britain’s Lost Revolution?*, argued in 2015 that the abortive Franco-Jacobite invasion attempt of 1708 probably came within hours of plunging the British Isles into a full-fledged civil war that potentially could have seen Scotland break away from the British state created in 1707. Without doubt the optimist school can now advance a stronger case for the importance of Jacobitism than previously, but the pessimist school nonetheless remains the more influential of the two streams of interpretation.

**The pessimists**

The pessimist school of Jacobite historiography takes a reserved position about the seriousness of the Jacobite threat. In general, they do not deny the importance of Jacobitism in the development of the British polity, nor of its long-term impact on European international relations. The crucial point on which they consistently differ with the optimists is in their evaluation of the power of inertia, the Revolution Settlement and the British state to hold the Jacobites at bay and ultimately to defeat them. The most wide-ranging, empirical statement of the pessimist case to date was published by George Hilton Jones in 1954. Jones considered the subject from a mainly diplomatic perspective, and put forward an interpretation that viewed the Jacobites as self-deluding tools of their erstwhile backers with little agency and correspondingly little prospect of success. As far as many academic historians were concerned, Jones com-
pletely superseded Petrie and was considered to have written the last word on the subject.

Consequently, little further work was done on Jacobitism by historians of the pessimist school until the early 1970s, when Edward Gregg began publishing articles that challenged long-held assumptions on various subjects relating to Jacobitism, most notably that Queen Anne was sympathetic to the idea of a second restoration. In one devastating article, later backed up at length in a full dress biographical reassessment of the queen, Gregg conclusively killed the notion that she ever wished to restore her half-brother, James Francis Edward Stuart (James III and VIII in the Jacobite line of succession; ‘the Old Pretender’ of Whig propaganda).19 Gregg’s revitalisation of the pessimist interpretation was trenchantly reinforced in the mid-1970s by Paul Fritz’s careful dissection of the way Walpole manipulated the political nation’s fear of Jacobitism to serve his own political ends, and the late Gareth Bennett’s reassessment of the career and motivation of one of the most notorious of Jacobite plotters: Francis Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester.20 More agnostic, but overall still pessimist, analyses by Bruce Lenman of the nature of Scottish Jacobitism, Nicholas Rogers of popular Jacobitism in the early Hanoverian period and the present writer on Jacobite parliamentary politics in the last years of Queen Anne, which appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s, created some middle ground between the two schools of historiography but did not reconcile them, thus leaving ample room for future debate.21

Since 1993 two historians outwith the field of Jacobite studies have intervened powerfully to boost the pessimist argument. John Childs, one of the most important military historians of the late seventeenth/early eighteenth century, dissected the great Franco-Jacobite invasion force designed to land in England in 1692 and found it to be smaller than previously thought and unlikely to have drawn sufficient local support to offset its military disadvantages; in other words a disaster in the making. In her highly influential book, Britons, Linda Colley strongly suggested that by the early eighteenth century Jacobitism had become more of a cultural than a political phenomenon, and that even in Scotland most Jacobites were quietly accepting the new order. And Stuart Reid, the author of a series of works on the ’45, has argued that only in their dreams did the Jacobites ever really stand a chance of overcoming the British army and the British fiscal-military state.22
The rejectionists

Even in the eighteenth century there was always a school of pro-establishment thought that found it difficult to believe that any but the most stupid or most desperate individuals would actively support the exiled dynasty.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, some Jacobites, such as James Barry, Earl of Barrymore, made very effective use of this prejudice to cover their tracks. Under questioning about the Franco-Jacobite invasion plot of 1744, Barrymore responded: ‘I have, my lords, a very good estate in Ireland, and, on that, I believe, fifteen hundred acres of very bad land; now, by G[od], I would not risk the loss of the poorest acre of them to defend the title of any king in Europe, provided – it was not my interest.’\textsuperscript{24} His interrogators tacitly accepted his argument and he got off with only a brief period of house arrest. From this incomprehension of Jacobite motives in part stemmed the great Whig, progressivist tradition of historiography in which England, and subsequently the other kingdoms of the British Isles, inexorably progressed towards the constitutional, parliamentary democracy of the present day. Lord Macaulay’s sketch of what he believed the stereotypical Tory/Jacobite squire to have been like – a bigoted, ignorant, drunken philistine – is a telling example of the impatience of the Whig tradition with what they perceived as anti-progressive forces, as well as one of the most brilliantly devastating pieces of fiction ever produced by this school of thought.\textsuperscript{25}

For historians of this ilk throughout the nineteenth century, down to George M. Trevelyan in the twentieth, Jacobitism could only ever occupy the margins of history.\textsuperscript{26} It was defeated; \textit{ergo} it could not have won. And of course, there was little point in studying a seditious movement whose ethos was embedded in pre-industrial paternalism and mystical loyalism when these had both been supplanted by the sturdy individualism and rational self-interest prized so highly by nineteenth-century Whig historians.

Nor was the Whig tradition alone in taking this view of Jacobitism. Sir Lewis Namier, the doyen of the Tory/cynical school of interpretation, had just as little time for the Jacobite cause. In dealing with the demoralised rump of the Tory party in his microscopic studies of the structure of politics at the accession of George III, Namier found no evidence of serious Jacobitism among them and implicitly dismissed the phenomenon as a harmless affectation.\textsuperscript{27} And where the greatest British historians have led, many others, scarcely lesser
in stature, have followed. John Owen’s monumental study of the rise of the Pelhams 1742–46 contains barely a mention of Jacobites, Jacobitism or the ‘45 except insofar as they form the backdrop for the Pelham brothers’ manoeuvrings to rid themselves of their rival, John Carteret, Earl Granville. Paul Langford’s seminal work on the propertied classes of eighteenth-century England by and large ignores Jacobitism, and in his interpretative survey of the mid-eighteenth century he only really engages with the subject in order to condemn it as a ‘historical illusion’ based on ‘highly unreliable’ sources. William Speck’s entire oeuvre and Tony Claydon in his biography of William III and II both implicitly see it as politically irrelevant. Yet there is a sense that the rejectionist school is retreating, at least insofar as rejectionism is now less frequently expressed in print, as opposed to off-the-cuff commentary at academic conferences and the like. In part this is because of the efforts made by modern academic scholars of Jacobitism to adhere to the strictest canons of historical evidence to support their arguments, and in part because of a generational change, in that budding historians of the period have been exposed to those same carefully grounded works on Jacobitism during the course of their university education. Jacobite studies has become more respectable.

New directions in Jacobite studies

History is a dynamic concept not just from the point of view of being constantly in process, but also because historians are always interested in exploring the preoccupations of the present in the past. Every generation wants to know about the origins of the world with which it is familiar. This has particularly begun to affect Jacobite studies in three key areas: women’s history, material culture and the Jacobite diaspora.

Previous cohorts of historians working on Jacobitism (such as they were; Jacobite studies has always been a minority sport) well knew that there were women who were engaged with the Jacobite movement, but they tended simply to pass over them on their way to ‘more important’ aspects of the phenomenon. Late seventeenth-century/early eighteenth-century European women, after all, did not lead armies or sit in Parliament. The explosion of women’s history and now gender history since the late twentieth century, and their general integration into our understanding of the past
have, however, made it embarrassingly obvious that such a one-dimensionally gendered approach not only missed a great many direct contributions to the cause of the exiled Stuarts by more than half the Jacobites who ever lived, but also ignored the absolutely vital role of women in sustaining the Jacobite movement over the long term. There were female political/military activists of all kinds, some operating locally, such as Lady Anne Farquharson (Mackintosh), who raised clan Chattan for Charles Edward when her husband chose to cleave to the government; others at a national level, such as Anne Drummond, Countess of Erroll and the manager of the Scots side of the 1708 Franco-Jacobite invasion attempt; and some even at an international level, such as James II and VII’s widow, Mary of Modena, who became a formidable political actor in her own right. At a lower level the female Grub Street publishers who pumped out Jacobite propaganda of all kinds for decades helped sustain the movement over the long haul. Just as importantly, women were crucial in the rearing and education of three successive generations of Jacobites, and provided moral and logistical support for every one of the Jacobite risings. This vein of Jacobite experience has only begun to be explored by scholars such as John Toffoe, Kathryn King and Claire Walker; there is a great deal more to do and it will without doubt transform our understanding of Jacobitism as a whole.31

By contrast, since the heyday of the Jacobite movement there has always been a good deal of interest in its material culture. Commemorative Jacobite medals, pictures of the royal family and various Jacobite heroes, locks of Charles Edward’s hair and memorabilia associated with the Jacobite risings were just a few of the expressions of what one can legitimately call the Jacobite industry that were eagerly collected by contemporaries of all political stripes. The first four generations of professional historians (other than those specialising in the history of art) did not, however, take much interest in such artefacts except for use as illustrations for their ‘more serious’ works. This changed in the late 1980s when Paul Monod made extensive use of the material culture of Jacobitism as part of his excellent analysis of Jacobite popular culture in England.32 As cultural history became the dominant field among professional historians in the 1990s other historians of Jacobitism were inspired to explore a still wider range of aspects of the Jacobites’ material world, with the result that the field is now taking
Introduction

off. Indeed, pathbreaking work by scholars such as Richard Sharp and Eirwen and Robin Nicholson has recently been reinforced in spades by a magisterial book by Murray Pittock that addresses the entire field and incorporates a theoretical model for the analysis of Jacobite material culture that is likely to remain the starting-point for future work on the subject.33

The study of the Jacobite exiles (i.e. the Jacobite diaspora) is another developing field of great importance. It is a huge subject, given the fact that Jacobites escaped to every corner of Europe and beyond, as far as the Indian Ocean and the Americas, in the aftermath of the Jacobite wars and risings in the British Isles.34 Thousands of Jacobite prisoners of war were also transported as criminals to Britain’s colonies in America and the Caribbean.35 Yet very little work has been done on this aspect of Jacobitism, probably because it often requires a familiarity with foreign languages and overseas archives that is rarely found among native British and American historians and because overseas research is prohibitively expensive at a time of shrinking research budgets. Thus most of what has been written on the subject has been written by continental scholars, among whom stand out Edward Corp and Nathalie Genet-Rouffiac. Corp’s painstaking dissection of the working and functions of the Jacobite courts in exile has given us a superb insight into the emotional, political and social heart of the diaspora, and Genet-Rouffiac’s close analysis of the Jacobite experience in France (unfortunately not yet translated into English) has opened our eyes to the impact of the Jacobite exiles on the European great power that was the hub of the diaspora.36 Beyond France and the court, research into Jacobitism in the North American colonies has really only just begun, and its Spanish, Habsburg, German, Venetian, Dutch, Swedish, Caribbean and Madagascan manifestations are almost virgin territory, at least in the Anglophone world.37 Indeed, the scope for potential research is so vast that it is daunting. Nonetheless it is to be hoped that the ongoing digitisation of European archives will make such research more affordable and that increasingly sophisticated translation programmes will allow the rising generation of Angophone historians access to foreign-language sources, because otherwise the diaspora will continue to be the great elephant in the Jacobite room.

For very different reasons, Irish Jacobitism has until recently been neglected by academic historians of Ireland. This stemmed
directly from the rise of republican Irish nationalism from the late
eighteenth century to 1916, and its consolidation as the ideology of
the Irish republic since then. The problem with studying the history
of Irish Jacobitism for republican nationalists was that it was all
about the adherence of three generations of Irish Catholics (and
a handful of Irish Protestants) to exiled English kings. From the
point of view of many Irish men and women this smacked of their
forbears having been duped into becoming cannon-fodder in an
English dynastic dispute.38 John Simms was consequently one of the
few historians who stood out against this tendency when he began
writing about the Irish Jacobite state of the early 1690s.39 This
general disinclination to study the history of Jacobitism only began
to change with the rise of the so-called ‘revisionists’ from the late
1930s to the 1980s. And though that movement is spent, its legacy
– a more contextualised and nuanced interpretation of the history
of Ireland 1688–1807 – has become integral to all interpretations
of the era.40 I have already mentioned the work of Dickson, Morley,
Ó Buachalla and Ó Ciardha, but there is a great deal more work
related to Jacobite studies going on at present that is in the process
of thoroughly revising our understanding of Irish Jacobitism.41 And,
too, a further reason for the recrudescence of Irish Jacobite studies
has been the reintegration of Irish-language sources into modern
interpretations of the phenomenon. In retrospect it is blindingly
obvious that you cannot get to grips with the subject unless you
can read documents generated by the 50 per cent of the popula-
whose first language was Irish, but for a long time these were
silently ignored by an overwhelmingly monoglot Anglophone his-
torical community.42 This is no longer the case, and Irish Jacobite
studies is correspondingly richer, deeper and more fertile than it has
ever been before.

A final pioneering (but thus far unique) technological develop-
ment within Jacobite historical research must be noticed here.
Databases are increasingly offering new (and sometimes startling)
insights into historical phenomena of all kinds, from the history
of emigration to land use and crop yields, and the database pres-
ently being constructed by Dr Darren Layne is going to enormously
deepen our knowledge of the ordinary men and women caught up
in the ’45. By entering the records of thousands upon thousands
of individual Jacobites gleaned from the archives, he is creating a
database that can be asked all kinds of social and economic ques-
tions. To cite only a few: who was 'out'? Where did they come from? What were their trades? What happened to them afterwards? The possibility of discerning the deep social and geographical patterning within Jacobitism is a truly exciting prospect, and full of promise for future research.43

**Jacobitism and the shape of British history**

At the heart of these disputes about Jacobitism’s prospects of success and its relevance or irrelevance to understanding eighteenth-century Britain lies a fundamental problem of interpretation. If Jacobitism was not marginal to the mainstream of Britain’s political development – as the interpretation embedded in most school textbooks would suggest – then the historical profession in Britain has got a lot of rethinking and reinterpretation of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British history to do. As Jonathan Clark first provocatively suggested in 1986, if we accept that Jacobitism was a force to be reckoned with at all levels of the British polity, then we can find a continuous, deep vein of social and political conservatism running throughout British history at least up to the late 1820s.44 This would radically alter our whole historical perspective on the last four centuries. The Great Civil War becomes little more than a belated attempt to stop an innovating king – something with which a great many medieval barons would have felt a good deal of sympathy.45 The Glorious Revolution, because it went against the grain of this conservatism, likewise becomes a Whig coup d’état with very shaky foundations, and so on. By this interpretation, Britain, rather than leading the world in the attainment of constitutional government and political stability (the conventional view), came to it very late. Maybe as late as the 1830s.46 If this argument can be sustained then many other classic interpretations fall to the ground. For example, Britain’s legendary political stability cannot have helped precipitate the industrial revolution, as is assumed by so many economic historians, if it was not in fact stable but politically volatile. Likewise, if the dream of liberty kept alive by the seamless vein of hidden political radicalism which historians like Christopher Hill detected coursing from the 1640s to the 1790s47 becomes instead the touchstone for a movement which to twentieth-century eyes looks like the polar opposite of political radicalism – Jacobitism – then what are we to make
of working-class agitation in the early nineteenth century. The dialectic of history, in particular the gathering class consciousness of the workers, is broken.

The implications for the shape of British history are, then, momentous if Jacobitism was central rather than peripheral in the development of the British polity in the eighteenth century. The first appearance of such a suggestion therefore drew some heavy fire from those historians who believed its rightful place lay in the marginalia of our historiography. None more incandescently than David Cannadine in his farewell address to British academe in 1986. According to him, there were four great heresies ennervating British history in the 1980s: myopic archive-grubbing, snobbish adulation of the aristocracy and its way of life, politically inspired celebration of Thatcherite individualism and:

the new Jacobite view of history, a wilfully perverse celebration of such obscurantist troglodytes as the Young Pretender, the Tractarians and the Duke of Windsor, which makes even the embittered splutterings of Hilaire Belloc seem models of fair-mindedness and tolerance by comparison.

Scatter-gun personal insults of this kind (which are neither characteristic of Cannadine nor of the canons of modern historical debate) were clearly symptomatic of a sense that the orthodox paradigm was under threat. This was also apparent in some of the historical reflections that accompanied the tercentenary of 1688, and silent (and otherwise) attempts to ignore Jacobitism and its implications down to the present day. No matter the historical evidence, even suggesting, for example, that iconic figures such as the great lexicographer Samuel Johnson had Jacobite sympathies still provokes little short of outrage from some of the scholars in the field.

So how can a student newly arrived at the subject make a reasonably informed judgement on how seriously s/he should treat it? In the end there are no shortcuts. The present author is part of the debate and cannot offer anything but a partisan assessment. Hence the student who wants to move beyond the introduction to Jacobitism offered below must read widely in eighteenth-century British and Irish (not just English) history and make his or her own assessment. But as a final surrender to my own prejudices on the subject I invite every student who comes to the subject of Jacobitism to indulge in a brief exercise in counterfactualism.
Introduction

What if the infant James Francis Edward Stuart had died in the summer of 1688? He was a sickly child in his early infancy, largely, one feels, as a consequence of his anxious parents (who had lost a number of children in infancy by that time) giving in to the doctors’ suggestion that he be fed on gruel laced with Canary wine and other quack remedies rather than breast-milk, so it was perfectly possible that he might have expired before the physicians’ idiocy was rectified. If we then contemplate what might have changed if that one little infant had died, like so many of his late seventeenth-century peers, but everything else followed its natural course, we may be able to glimpse how much of a difference the Jacobites made to the course of British history.

For a start, it seems highly unlikely there would have been a revolution in the autumn of 1688, as the ‘Immortal Seven’ who invited William of Orange were only finally brought round to doing so by the ghastly prospect of a Roman Catholic male heir. If the baby James had died, James II and VII’s oldest and resolutely Protestant daughter Mary would have remained heir apparent. No need then, for William and Mary’s supporters to take the appalling risk of rising in arms against the king; a waiting game would suffice (James II and VII was prematurely old and not in the best of health). Assuming King James died on schedule in 1701, Princess Anne, his sole surviving and devoutly Anglican daughter (Mary died in 1694), would have inherited the throne, just in time for her to join the anti-French Grand Alliance in the War of Spanish Succession. Since Princess Louisa, King James and Queen Mary of Modena’s last child (born in 1692) died of smallpox in 1712, there would still have been a succession crisis in 1714 when Queen Anne died without direct heirs. But since most of the nearer claimants were French or Italian Catholics, in all probability the reliably Protestant Hanoverians would still have inherited the three kingdoms of the British Isles. The net result, then, of removing that infant in 1688 would probably have been to have secured the peaceful, uncontested succession of the Hanoverian dynasty. Thus the crises that punctuate the history of the period 1714–60 would in all likelihood never have occurred. There would have been no ’15, no ’45, no preparations for foreign invasions based on the premise of a Jacobite rebellion to support them, no Jacobite menace with which to keep angry Whig M.P.s in line, no threat of a disputed succession to impel English politicians to bribe, cajole and bully the reluctant
Scots into a political union, no higher justification for the bridling of the Church of England. To paraphrase the great Irish poet W. B. Yeats, the eighteenth-century British Isles would have been changed, changed utterly.

Notes


4 For which see: Sir Walter Scott, *Waverley; or, 'Tis Sixty Years Since*, Claire Lamont (ed.) (Oxford, 1981), and any of the rest of Scott’s Jacobite novels, culminating in *Redgauntlet*. The ‘optimist’ school, however, may be missing Scott’s hidden agenda, for, as Murray Pittock has pointed out, all his Jacobite characters are either anachronisms or dangerous children (Pittock, *The Invention of Scotland: The Stuart Myth and the Scottish Identity, 1638 to the Present* (London, 1991), p. 34.


6 For examples of which see: William Dunn Macray (ed.), *Correspondence of Colonel N. Hooke, Agent From the Court of France to the Scottish Jacobites, in the Years 1703–7* (2 vols, London, Roxburghe Club, 1870); W. E. Buckley (ed.), *Memoirs of Thomas, Earl of Ailesbury. Written by...*
Introduction

Himself (2 vols, London, Roxburghe Club, 1890); Evan Charteris (ed.), A Short Account of the Affairs of Scotland in the Years 1744, 1745, 1746 by David Lord Elcho (Edinburgh, 1907); Alistair Tayler and Henrietta Tayler, Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire (London, 1928); Alistair Tayler and Henrietta Tayler, Jacobite Letters to Lord Pitsligo (London, 1930).


10 Political Untouchables, passim.


12 Glencoe, passim.


15 Professor Ó Buachalla primarily wrote in Irish, but the general flavour of his argument can be seen in his essay: ‘From Jacobite to Jacobin’, in Thomas Bartlett, David Dickson, Dáire Keogh and Kevin Whelan (eds), 1798: A Bicentenary Perspective (Dublin, 2003), pp. 75–96.


19 ‘Was Queen Anne a Jacobite?’, History, lvii (1972), 358–75; Queen Anne (London, 1980).


33 Sharp, *The Engraved Record of the Jacobite Movement* (Aldershot,
Introduction


35 Margaret Sankey, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion: Preventing and Punishing Insurrection in Early Hanoverian Britain (Aldershot, 2005).


37 For a hopeful taste of what is to come in at least one of these areas, see: David Parrish, “Now the mask is taken off”: Jacobitism and Colonial New England, 1702–27’, Historical Research, 88 (2015), 249–271.

38 For an excellent analysis of the historiography of Irish Jacobitism (to which this account is heavily indebted) see: Ó Ciardha, “‘A Lot Done, More to Do’”, pp. 57–81, and particularly pp. 58–63.


42 Ó Ciardha, “‘A Lot Done, More to Do’”, pp. 63–4.

43 See: www.jdb1745.net and Dr Layne’s St Andrews PhD thesis: ‘Spines of the Thistle: Popular Constituency of the Jacobite Rising in 1745–6’, which is also freely available online.

44 Revolution and Rebellion: State and Society in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1986);
In 1932 Sir Charles Petrie described Jacobitism as a ‘definite political movement’, manifestly intending to evoke comparison with such early twentieth-century British phenomena as the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties. He was being provocative, and some scholars still reject out of hand the idea that Jacobitism might have been a modern political movement in any respect. Yet, while it is certain that the Jacobites did not openly advertise their views in the national press, have parliamentary candidates run on a publicly avowed Jacobite ticket or issue membership cards that entitled the faithful to attend special meetings to organise local political action, the absence of these characteristics of a political movement stemmed not from Jacobitism’s antithetical nature with respect to the concept ‘political movement’, but from the fact that (except in exile overseas) it was an illegal, underground organisation. To be a Jacobite was to commit yourself, at least internally, to involvement in a clandestine organisation dedicated to the overthrow of the existing order, and if your involvement became overt and thus publicly known you opened yourself to legal retribution up to and including being put to death by the powers that were. To be a Jacobite was thus akin to being a Communist in Franco’s Spain, a Solidarity member in 1980s Poland or a member of the IRA in Northern Ireland up to 1997. Like all of these underground political movements, despite the illegality of what they were doing and their exclusion from conventional politics, the Jacobites maintained the basics of a political movement in other respects: they had acknowledged, recognised leaders, a mass, popular base, a common ideological vision, a political agenda stemming from that vision and a propaganda output designed to win support in the public sphere.

45 This argument has been made with great force recently by John Adamson, for which see: ‘The Baronial Context of the English Civil War’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 40 (1990), 93–120, and in more detail in The Noble Revolt: The Overthrow of Charles I (London, 2007).

46 Arguably even this late date is only valid if we ignore the course of Irish history since 1798.

47 The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill (3 vols, Brighton, 1986), passim.


