Introduction

[W]omenis honore is tendyr and slyddyr,
And raithar brekis be mekil thinge,
As farest ross takis sonest faidinge.
A woman suld ay have radour
Of thinge that gref mycht hir honoure[.]
(*The Thewis of Good Women*, C 8–12)[1]

In habit maad with chastitee and shame
Ye wommen shul apparaille yow[.]
(*The Wife of Bath's Prologue*, 342–3)[2]

How can one know whether a woman is honourable? Such a question raises a number of problems, not the least of which is the definition of honour itself. The Middle English word *honour* encompassed good repute, respectability, and nobility of character, as well as position or rank, but in medieval culture female honour rested most heavily on a single determinant: confirmed sexual continence.[3] Therein lay the *real* problem, for how could one be absolutely sure of a woman's chaste nature? Whether wife, widow, or virgin, a woman's chastity was a function not only of her bodily integrity, but also of her inner thoughts and her outward comportment, only the latter of which could be observed and used as data from which conclusions might be drawn.[4] The fact that women were believed to be inherently bodily creatures (as opposed to men, who were believed to be more intellectual and less bound by their bodily impulses) contributed to the belief that they were less inclined to remain chaste – their bodies were considered porous, pregnable, and governed by the senses and sensuality.[5] Moreover, as medieval authors were quick to point out, appearances could be misleading. Virtuous behaviour could conceal a vicious heart. The precariousness of female honour is captured by the Middle Scots epigraph above, which notes that female honour is 'tendyr and slyddyr [slippery, treacherous]' – it is vulnerable, fragile, and at its worst deceitful,

a quality that cannot be taken at face value.[6] As a consequence, women are compelled to 'ay have radour', to always be afraid of anything that has the potential to 'gref' their honour.[7] If they want to secure their honour, women must *beware*.

The idea that a woman must be continually on her guard against potential threats to her reputation or to her person continues to be invoked today in the context of debates concerning topics such as sexual harassment or rape prevention. Although the subject of female honour may not be raised explicitly in these cases, such debates consistently place female behaviour under scrutiny. This scrutiny stems from the assumption that a woman's extreme vigilance – concerning her conduct, what she consumes, her surroundings, or her appearance – is the surest way for her to prevent her own harassment or assault. As I will demonstrate over the course of this book, this emphasis on female circumspection is shared by medieval texts, which depict honour as something that women must safeguard by cultivating and exhibiting their hypervigilance against the possibility of shame.

This book investigates the practices that underpin medieval understandings of female honour, and literature's role in shaping and articulating those practices in later medieval England. While thirteenth-century texts such as *Hali Meiðhad* (a treatise on virginity) and *Ancrene Wisse* (a guide for anchoresses) had held up virginity and the vowed life as the surest means by which women might hope to perfect their virtue, conduct literature and other texts composed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries suggest that women who were neither virgins nor female religious might achieve a comparable level of spiritual *and* social virtue.[8] I aim to show that conduct texts, courtly poems, classical exempla, and other forms of medieval English literature produced in this later period encouraged women to secure honour by practising behaviour designed to perfect and maintain a specific emotional disposition: a hypervigilance against the possibility of disgrace that was commonly referred to in Middle English as *shamefastness*, and which was believed to safeguard women against the loss of their chastity and their honour.[9] The word *shamefastness* was in use from the beginning of the thirteenth century but has long since become obsolete, transformed via an etymological misinterpretation into the modern English *shamefacedness* sometime in the sixteenth century.[10] It is typically used to describe hypersensitivity to disgrace; to be 'shamefast' is to be modest, hesitant, bashful, and afraid of being shamed. In this respect, it refers not to the experience of

shame, but rather to what Peter N. Stearns has described as 'the *anticipation* aspect' that is attached to shame and enhances its social utility, a subject that has received significantly less scholarly attention from historians than shame itself.[11] The suffix *-fast* is suggestive of both stability and security, a reflection, perhaps, of the idea that a steadfast fear of shame might help to foreclose the possibility of disgrace.[12] But at the same time that later medieval English texts depict the practice of shamefastness as essential for the preservation of female honour, they also depict it as highly problematic. Writing in the middle of what has been described as a crisis of thought regarding the cultivation of virtue, fourteenth- and fifteenth-century English writers persistently return to the idea that, because shamefastness is linked to certain conventions of behaviour and appearance, it is something that can be counterfeited or 'feigned', potentially in order to conceal a woman's lust or other vices.[13] And when a woman's shamefastness *is* genuine, it confirms not only her status as an honourable woman but also her status as a violable subject, someone whose chastity must be conquered by the persuasion, wiles, or violence of men. Assailed on one side by suspicion and on another side by the possibility of violence, female shamefastness remains an unfinishable work-in-progress in medieval literature.

Practice and the history of emotions

Shamefastness is not an emotion, but is rather a disposition towards and susceptibility to shame: a state of vigilance that simultaneously guards one against shame and makes one more sensitive to it. Medieval literature reveals shamefastness to be a mandatory matter of practice for honourable women, something to be interiorized through reflection and mindfulness, and exteriorized through specific conventional gestures and behaviours. As I will show, while it is unclear whether interiorization or exteriorization must come first, neither can be omitted if the practice of shamefastness is to be perfected.

In writing of shamefastness as a practice, I am contributing to a body of scholarship that is attempting to effect a theoretical shift away from the notion that emotions are something that we 'have' (or do not have) and towards the idea that emotions are something that we *do*. Advocates for this shift include philosopher Robert C. Solomon (who has argued that emotions 'are not entities *in* consciousness', but rather '*acts* of consciousness') and historian

William M. Reddy, whose groundbreaking work has shed light on some of the ways that language enables us to 'do' emotion.[14] Reddy contends that we ought to incorporate 'first-person, present tense emotion claims' into a unique category of speech act: *emotives*, which he defines as 'instruments for directly changing, building, hiding, intensifying emotions, instruments that may be more or less successful'.[15] These and related developments in emotion studies have been especially valuable to those scholars of literature who have sought to carve out a place for literary texts and literary analysis within the history of emotions. As has often been noted, literature poses problems for the historian of emotion, since literary texts cannot be read as records of historical experience or as 'straight-forwardly mimetically accurate' in their portrayal of emotions.[16] Medievalist Sarah McNamer is one of several scholars who have attempted to resolve the problems posed by literature for the history of emotions.[17] As she puts it, from the perspective of historians of emotion

> the literary is, by its very nature, thought to be untrustworthy: disorienting in its instability, disarming in its beauty, never meaning what it says – in short, a tease. If the goal is to discover the historical truth through the veils of compromised sources, the less opaque those veils, the better.[18]

The problem McNamer highlights here is that historians of emotion have tended to approach texts for factual evidence of past emotions; under these conditions, literature is often viewed as obscuring the truth – or at least dressing it up in a misleading way. This problem of 'literariness' is one to which McNamer has also drawn attention in her work on the affective impact of the anonymously authored fourteenth-century poem *Pearl*, noting that 'the very features that make this poem so magnificent as art – the lushness of its language, the richness of its wordplay, its formal intricacies, its wildly imaginative departures from the real … – are precisely what make it such a challenge to bring into conversation with the history of emotion as the field is currently configured'.[19] In her study of 'affective meditations on the Passion', she makes a powerful case for viewing these texts as 'iterations of what William Reddy has called "emotives"', arguing that they function as 'mechanisms for the production of emotion' (what McNamer terms 'intimate scripts').[20] Her aim, as she describes it, is to continue 'building a case for a performative model of affect as the default mode' between the

eleventh and sixteenth centuries. The affective meditations composed during this period, she argues, are founded on the assumption that emotions can be 'willed, faked, performed through the repetition of scripted words. It is through such manifest fakery, this genre insists, that compassion can be brought into being, can come to be "true"'.[21]

Both in her study of affective meditations and in her other scholarship, McNamer proposes that it is exactly the ornamental features of literature – its 'literariness' – that enable some literary texts to function as scripts for the performance of emotion. While acknowledging that the word 'script' is often used metaphorically to refer to the role of discourse in shaping the emotional norms of specific groups, McNamer proposes that we approach some Middle English texts as 'literal scripts that vigorously enlist *literariness*' to generate feelings, and suggests that we 'combine the usual forms of textual research with considerations of what is likely to have been seen, heard, touched, even *tasted* at the moment of a text's performance'.[22]

As McNamer is the first to acknowledge, such an approach is necessarily somewhat speculative; but it nevertheless points tantalizingly towards one way we might begin to theorize a link between what is on the page and what comprises lived emotional experience. Further support for such an approach may be found in the work of ethnohistorian Monique Scheer, who has argued for viewing emotion as 'a kind of practice' that is dependent on and intertwined with 'doings and sayings' such as 'speaking, gesturing, remembering, manipulating objects, and perceiving sounds, smells, and spaces'. Scheer terms these 'doings and sayings' 'emotional practices', which 'build on the embodied knowledge of the habituated links that form complexes of mind/body actions':

> Emotional practices are habits, rituals, and everyday pastimes that aid us in achieving a certain emotional state. This includes the striving for a desired feeling as well as the modifying of one that is not desirable. Emotional practices in this sense are manipulations of body and mind to evoke feelings where there are none, to focus diffuse arousals and give them an intelligible shape, or to change or remove emotions already there.[23]

Scheer makes a strong case for viewing emotions as 'practices involving the self (as body and mind), language, material artifacts, the environment, and other people'.[24] Her theory of emotion-as-practice

enables us to explore how emotions might both shape and be shaped by literary and non-literary texts, as well as other cultural artefacts:

> The objects used in emotional practices of the past – images, literature, musical notation, film, or household items – may still be available for direct observation and analysis. Fictional representations in literature, theater, and film can be analyzed as artifacts used by actors in their emotional practices, as providers of templates of language and gesture as well as mediators of social norms. Texts will remain the main sources, not only for discourses and implicit orders of knowledge, but also for emotives and other emotional practices.[25]

By bringing Scheer's concept of emotion-as-practice into conversation with McNamer's account of the performative nature of medieval emotion, I aim to reveal the many different ways that literary and non-literary medieval English texts shape the idea and practice of female honour. As I will show, shamefastness is an emotional disposition and state of emotion-proneness that relies on and is intertwined with emotional practices as Scheer outlines them here, as well as the kind of 'manifest fakery' that McNamer identifies as a key component of performing 'true' emotion. And it is the skillful practise of shamefastness that, in turn, underpins medieval concepts of honourable femininity. In some instances, Middle English texts are written in such a way as to *produce* a sense of shame in female audiences, whether hypothetical or real; conduct texts for women, for example, instruct them to reflect on all they have to lose if they do not safeguard their honour, and advise them how to dress and behave in order to reinforce and broadcast their shamefastness (leading one medievalist to describe conduct manuals as 'shame scripts').[26] In these instances, a sense of shame is something that can be developed and enhanced through reflection and careful behaviour until it becomes a matter of honourable habit. Other texts shape how the practice of female shamefastness is viewed, presenting it as a complication for medical practitioners, an obstacle to would-be lovers, an empty performance that anyone might mimic, or even a potential danger to women themselves. In these instances, texts do not function solely as scripts for emotion (producing feelings *about* shamefastness, or a sense of shame itself), but reflect and shape social norms concerning the practice of shamefastness. Through sustained close reading of a wide range of later medieval genres, I bring these textual mechanisms and strategies into view.

Because of my study's emphasis on the ways that a sense of shame can be consciously honed and reinforced through reflection and behaviour, I set aside terms such as *affect* (which tend to emphasize an automatic, pre-cognitive state of feeling) in favour of *emotion* when referring to mental and somatic states such as shame, fear, etc.[27] In so doing, I am not only employing a word whose precise meaning and scope has long been debated, but also using a term that would have been entirely unfamiliar to medieval men and women, although medieval writings on the subject of emotion abound.[28] In place of *emotion* (a postmedieval term), medieval theological and philosophical texts make reference to categories of feeling such as *affectus*, *passiones*, *affectiones*, and *perturbationes*, among others.[29] Prudentius's *Psychomachia* (early fifth century), discussed in Chapter 3, labels personified feelings *Sensus* (sentiments, senses) and *Furores* (passions) in its description of battle between the virtues and vices. Augustine (354–430), who argued that the emotions are dependant on acts of will, used *affectiones*, *perturbationes*, and *passiones* in his discussion of emotions in *The City of God Against the Pagans*.[30] Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) used *passiones, affectus*, and *animi concitatio* to refer to emotions in his *Summa Theologiae*, and described emotions as the movements of the sensitive appetite.[31] As these various emotion theories indicate, medieval writers differed in their opinions concerning the precise relationship between emotion and conscious or unconscious action.[32] A similar lack of consensus obtains among contemporary scholars, who have been unable to agree on a preferred critical term for emotions.[33] Whereas *feeling* and *affect* have been embraced by different camps of historians and emotion scholars, and although *passion*, *movement*, *sensation*, or *affection* might more closely resemble the Latin terms in use during the Middle Ages, my objective is not to situate honour, shame, or shamefastness in relation to the more learned, Latinate, and/or theological theories of emotion. My interest is rather in the muddier waters of vernacular territory, in specifically lay interpretations of how one might develop and perform one's predisposition to virtuous feelings, impulses, and behaviour that would secure female honour. As a consequence, *emotion* will be my preferred critical term throughout this study. As I will show, however, the importation of Latinate monastic concepts of virtue into the language and literature of later medieval England rendered the practice and performance of virtue potentially suspect. By focusing on the nature of female shamefastness as a practice, I hope to uncover both the ways in which such practices could be

perceived both as 'a means for positive intervention in the ethical production of embodied identities' *and* as potentially misleading performances of feigned virtue.[34]

The problem with practice

While the practice of shamefastness was believed to be the most effective tool for the preservation of female chastity, it was also a potential source of anxiety and even suspicion. The problem with the practice of shamefastness was precisely the fact that it could be *practised* – it could be studied, rehearsed, and imitated. In her discussion of medieval English conduct literature, Claire Sponsler identifies two key problems with the genre that are particularly applicable to the idea of a practice of shamefastness. The first problem relates to the 'supposed congruence between inner and outer forms of behavior'; for if one can change one's behaviour to match whatever is currently deemed acceptable or fashionable, that congruence can no longer be presumed to exist. The second problem relates to the idea that good behaviour can be learned; if this is the case, then it can be learned not only as a means of being virtuous, but also as a means of counterfeiting virtuous behaviour 'as a form of disguise in order deliberately to mask true, inner nature'.[35]

This uncertainty regarding the authenticity of ostensibly virtuous behaviour becomes clearer when considered in the light of contemporaneous shifts in thinking about virtue and *habit*, an emerging, unstable term in later medieval England. Throughout the early Middle Ages, the Latin word *habitus* had designated an internalized virtue that was specifically Christian, and to which only those who *wore* the habit – male and female religious – could ever hope to aspire.[36] These associations linger on in the earliest recorded uses of Middle English *habit* in the thirteenth century (recorded, coincidentally, in the *Ancrene Wisse*), and from that time until the end of the fourteenth century the word was most frequently used to refer to the clothing characteristically worn by male and female religious. During this period, Katharine Breen has argued, '*habit* describes only the relatively small part of [*habitus*] that was visible to lay people, while leaving the senses of *habitus* as internalized Christian ethics, and even settled disposition, untranslated and inaccessible'.[37] But as the fourteenth century became the fifteenth century, authors increasingly used *habit* to refer to 'mental condition,

mental or moral disposition' as well as 'customary practice', as Breen explains:[38]

> the normative behavior of lay people, whether marked by appropriate clothing or a suitable mental disposition, becomes linguistically continuous with the normative behavior of the clergy. Instead of belonging to distinct languages or verbal registers, the two realms began to shade into each other by way of a hard-to-define middle ground occupied by devout anchoresses, corrupt friars, and traveling monks. In the process, *habit* itself spread from narrow, philosophical uses into a broader English moral lexicon.[39]

Breen traces this gradual shift in meaning, the importation of *habitus* into the Middle English *habit*, and then the vernacular term's accumulation of the various behavioural connotations of its Latin forebear.[40] Notably, she observes that the medieval concept of *habitus* is of a *consciously learned or cultivated* 'mental or moral disposition', 'customary practice', and 'innate property'.[41] As well as contrasting with the more contemporary understanding of habit as something unconsciously 'picked up', this medieval concept of *habitus* overlaps with and differs from Pierre Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus' as 'systems of durable, transposable *dispositions* … which can be objectively "regulated" and "regular" without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them'.[42] Key to Bourdieu's theory of habitus is the notion that, because the actions of an individual 'are the product of a *modus operandi* of which he is not the producer and has no conscious mastery',

> they contain an 'objective intention', as the Scholastics put it, which always outruns his conscious intentions. The schemes of thought and expression he has acquired are the basis for the *intentionless invention* of regulated improvisation.[43]

Thus, not only are an individual's actions a series of 'regulated improvisations', but they are also the product of structures of which he is unaware and in the perpetuation of which he unconsciously participates. By contrast, whereas for Bourdieu habitus works in a largely unconscious way, medieval philosophers and theologians viewed *habitus* as 'a conscious tool for reforming or perfecting behaviour'.[44]

Despite its associations with virtue, Latin *habitus* could still be perceived as a slippery concept in medieval England. As *habitus* evolved into Middle English *habit*, this shift was accompanied by a kind of outward conceptual spreading (or, to use Breen's word, 'expansion') of both language and ideas from the Latin, clerical *habitus* into a correspondingly flexible vernacular equivalent.[45] Thus, by the mid fifteenth century Reginald Pecock (c. 1395–c. 1461) wrote in *The Folewer to the Donet* that when a 'disposicioun is comen into þis now seid degre of stabilnes and of vnremouabilnes, þanne it is clepid an "habite"'.[46] However, at the same time that the various meanings of *habitus* were being translated into English, religious controversy within England transformed the concept into 'an important site of moral and religious contest'.[47] Hence a common Middle English proverb warned, 'Abit ne makith neither monk ne frere' (or, in medieval Latin, 'habitus non facit monachum').[48]

The emergence of new vernacular concepts of *habit* in later medieval England helps to explain the admixture of admiration and suspicion that attended the practice of female honour in Middle English texts written during this period. The fact that female honour depended to such an extent on the practice of shamefastness made it a precarious concept, encompassing both a sense of stable interior virtue and a potentially misleading outward appearance of virtue (and scepticism was further exacerbated by centuries of misogynist writing depicting women as temptresses, seductresses, and deceivers).[49] The persistence with which conduct texts for women deploy the language of *habit* in their references to virtuous *customs*, *thewis*, and, as in Pecock, *disposicions*, suggests the extent to which women were encouraged to be perfectly shamefast inside and out. This language requires and repays close attention, which uncovers the uneasy relationship between *habit* and the description and depiction of female shamefastness in later medieval texts. At the same time, as my second epigraph illustrates, the idea of a shamefast *habit* inevitably raises questions concerning 'the supposed congruence between inner and outer behaviour'; in *The Canterbury Tales*, Alison the Wife of Bath describes how she would anticipate and forestall any objections her husbands might raise concerning her interest in wearing beautiful clothing:

> Thou seyst also, that if we make us gay
> With clothyng, and with precious array,
> That it is peril of oure chastitee;
> And yet – with sorwe! – thou most enforce thee,
> And seye thise wordes in the Apostles name:

'In habit maad with chastitee and shame
Ye wommen shul apparaille yow,' quod he,
'And noght in tressed heer and gay perree,
As perles, ne with gold, ne clothes riche.'
After thy text, ne after thy rubriche,
I wol nat wirche as muchel as a gnat.

(The Wife of Bath's Prologue 337–47)

Chastity is the key issue here, and too much 'precious array' is deemed to put it at risk. Alison maintains that her husband identifies a 'habit maad with chastitee and shame' as the only finery to which a woman should aspire, the only ornament that is both honourable and protects the foundation of a woman's honour. The passage's reference to 'the Apostles name' points us to Alison's husband's purported source text, the first epistle of St Paul to Timothy, in which Paul declares that women should clothe themselves in virtue rather than in finery:

[volo] mulieres in habitu ornato cum verecundia et sobrietate ornantes se non in tortis crinibus aut auro aut margaritis vel veste pretiosa sed quod decet mulieres promittentes pietatem per opera bona.

I wolle þat wymmen ben in covenable abite, wiþ schamefastnesse and sobirnesse ournynge hem or makynge fair, not in wriþen here, ne in gold, ne in margery stones, or perlis, ne in precious cloþ, but þat þat bicomeþ wymmen bihetynge pite, bi goode werkis.[50]

In Chaucer's source text, a virtuous habit is a metaphorical garment, a gleaming marker of virtue more precious than cloth interwoven with gold or gems. Such manifest virtue is the highest form of *ournynge* (adornment) a woman can display, and therefore, Alison's husband would claim, is the most 'precious array' a woman should exhibit; it is also the most secure, since it will not imperil chastity.[51] At the same time, however, the passage's emphasis on the importance of 'schamefastnesse', 'sobirnesse', and 'goode werkis' suggests that this garment is the product of a woman's comportment and disposition, a reflection of the alternate definitions of the Middle English word *habit* as one's mental or moral disposition, or customary practice.[52] Alison's use of the word 'shul' ('should', a modal auxiliary conveying duty or a command) plays upon these behavioural connotations, implying that women have an obligation to cultivate a sense of shame until it becomes habit.[53] Being in the habit (*in habitu*) of shamefastness requires more than merely keeping up appearances: it requires the regular practice of particular behaviours

in order to reinforce and demonstrate a virtuous disposition. Yet the passage's opening references to splendid garments gestures towards some of the ways in which the virtue of shamefastness might also be mistaken for something to be put on (and, later, taken off) like an article of clothing or an accessory, serving no other purpose than to temporarily dazzle the onlooker. This poses a significant problem, for how then can we tell one kind of 'habit' from the other?

These questions were especially urgent at the moment when Chaucer was writing. Between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, ideas about female virtue and the practice thereof were undergoing fundamental shifts. Prior to the fourteenth century, a clear hierarchy of female virtue is consistently in evidence in medieval texts: in descending order, the three honourable categories that women could occupy in medieval Europe were those of virgin, widow, or wife.[54] Virginity was the unchallenged gold standard of spiritual virtue for women within this hierarchy, and something to which not many women outside of a nunnery, anchorhold, or beguinage could aspire.[55] Thus, the thirteenth-century Middle English prose text now known as *Hali Meiðhad* informs its readers that 'alswa as a charbucle is betere þen a iacinct i þe euene of hare cunde … alswa passeþ meiden, onont te mihte of meiþhad, widewen ant iweddede' (although it also warns that 'tah is betere a milde wif oþer a meoke widewe þen a prud meiden').[56] Over the last two decades, however, scholarship on late medieval conduct literature produced in England and France has shed light on how this genre transformed the household into a new site for the cultivation of spiritual and social female virtue in the context of the married life.[57] Most recently, Glenn Burger has argued that conduct literature for women redefines 'woman and the feminine such that the benefits of chastity can be made available to a much wider group of women than virgins, martyrs, or nuns':

> It is especially in the literate practices surrounding private devotion that the laywoman, living not in a nunnery or anchorage or beguinage but fully in the world of the married household, can find a space and time where her conduct can most effectively show the full potential of her nature, where the good wife can equal, or even excel, the virgin nun in her excellence as a fully formed ethical subject. Such texts and the practices that they engender open up a space and time for her labor in ways that rework the formerly hierarchized relation of virgin, widow, wife and reconceptualise the good wife's place in that symbolic imaginary.[58]

Thus, just as *habit* was migrating from Latinate, monastic contexts to vernacular, lay contexts, the question of what chaste female excellence might consist of, and of who might practise it (and how), was generating new answers. The discourse surrounding the practice of female shamefastness in later medieval English texts suggests that, in light of these changes, the same issue of authenticity which had dogged *habitus* also attended the habit of shamefastness, not least because it had to be practised, not within a religious enclosure, but in the open and comparatively unregulated spaces of the community.

The Wife of Bath's reference to habit bears witness to the shifts and complications that attended concepts of female virtue in this period. The word *habit* in *The Wife of Bath's Prologue* evokes not only the image of shamefastness as a protective garment, but also the Latin concept of *habitus*, a morally virtuous inner disposition moulded by – and reflected in – consistent, disciplined practice. But Alison rejects 'the Apostles'' idea of habit as outwardly visible inner virtue in favour of material clothing that, in the eyes of many misogynist writers, would be an accurate reflection of women's material priorities. This is unsurprising, given that the Wife of Bath is largely a composite of anti-feminist convention and satire drawn from other texts; but her reference to this passage from the letter of St Paul threatens to reduce the terms habit and *habitus* to nothing more than sartorial signifiers. By extension, this would reduce a practice or 'habit' of chastity and shamefastness to nothing more than an act, the mere appearance of virtue. Such a reduction would, ironically enough, recall shame's etymological associations with clothing and covering: the form of the Old English words (*scamu*, *sceamu*, *scomu*, etc.) from which Middle English *shame* originates derives ultimately from a Proto-Indo-European verb meaning 'to cover', a gesture that has long been associated with the sense of exposure that characterizes shame, and the instinctive response to that sense of exposure.[59] As Sara Ahmed has put it, shame 'involves an impulse to "take cover" and "to cover oneself". But the desire to take cover and to be covered presupposes the failure of cover; in shame, one desires cover precisely because one has already been exposed to others'.[60] In medieval Christian culture, the archetypal image of bodily concealment was also the moment at which shame was believed to have become a part of the human condition: the moment when Adam and Eve realized their nakedness and covered themselves with fig leaves. As I suggest in Chapter 1, the practice of shamefastness involves women in a complex of

antithetical gestures characterized by covering and withdrawal on the one hand and, on the other, the exhibition of this covering and withdrawal as evidence of their chastity. And while this practice is presented as something that can be achieved through discipline and effort, it is perceived as most genuine, most trustworthy, when it appears most artless and effortless to others.

As I hope this study will show, textual treatments of female shamefastness demand in-depth reading not only because they bear witness to the emerging Middle English discourse of habit (particularly as it pertains to female virtue), but also because of the role that these texts played in shaping habit. This role was very familiar to medieval English authors such as Thomas Hoccleve, as David Watt has shown in his study of Hoccleve's *Series* (1420–21). Watt employs the term 'information technology' to describe the function of the *Series*, which he suggests was 'designed to contribute to the re-formation of the English character'.[61] Watt derives his term from the way that writers such as Hoccleve, Gower, and Chaucer use the word *information* in their writings to refer to ways of shaping one's character via the communication of knowledge. As he notes,

> Character development in the early fifteenth century was often understood as a process through which the substance of memory could be informed (i.e., formed inwardly) through the communication of instructive knowledge. The book, which is a technological form, is an important medium in the communication of knowledge.[62]

Watt's interpretation of the medieval concept of 'in-formation' reads it as an active, conscious process of character development, one for which books function as crucial tools. These later medieval beliefs concerning character development owe much to monastic traditions concerning the importance of memory and memory work to the cultivation of moral character, a subject most thoroughly explored in the work of Mary Carruthers.[63] Carruthers has shown that medieval texts characterize memory and cognition as arts or crafts that employ a range of tools including images, meditation, and emotions. According to Carruthers, '[i]n the idiom of monasticism, people do not "have" ideas, they "make" them'.[64] In her reading of Aristotle, Carruthers identifies 'emotional colouring' as key to the formation of a virtuous *habitus*: one's '*hexis* or *habitus* is a matter of custom, particular emotional responses and acts performed in the past and remembered, which then predispose it to the same response in the future. Both vices and virtues are habitual dispositions, formed in this way.'[65] The content and popularity

of medieval conduct texts and exemplary narratives suggest that similar practices could be adapted to the cultivation of virtues such as shamefastness in lay audiences. The strategies employed by these texts seem calculated to inculcate shamefastness by presenting it as admirable and even desirable, or by inviting women to contemplate how shameful it would be to be judged unchaste. In the latter case, medieval texts serve as something like a controlled environment for emotional experimentation, a virtual space within which women might vicariously experience shame through specific characters or scenarios without experiencing shame directly.

By practising shamefastness, women constructed a habit with which they might hope to secure their honour. Literature was a tool for this habituation insofar as it extolled the value of female shamefastness, reinforced the idea that shamefastness lay at the heart of female honour, offered models of shamefast behaviour (and counterexamples of shameless women), and described how a shamefast practice could be developed and reinforced. But what was the honour to which medieval women were being encouraged to aspire, and how could shamefastness help them to secure it?

Understanding shame

Historian Ute Frevert has described honour as 'a lost emotion, or, to be more precise, as a disposition whose emotional power has more or less vanished' even though the word remains in our vocabulary.[66] The inverse might be said of shamefastness: the word is now obsolete, but the degree to which shamefastness still exists today – and the degree to which it has emotional power, or to which it is gendered – might be said to be a function of the social, geographical, or religious context in question. Its association with chastity – one of the more important determinants of female honour in the Middle Ages – is certainly nowhere near as universal today as it would have been in medieval England (not overtly, at any rate, although it still underpins contemporary understandings of female virtue in highly problematic ways). The belief that female chastity was almost constantly at risk reinforced the belief that constant vigilance was needed against the prospect of its violation. A sense of shame was therefore something that women needed to maintain and demonstrate consistently, rather than something acquired or demonstrated on a one-time-only basis.

At the same time, a sense of shame was not *exclusive* to women. Biblical history traced the origins of shame back to original sin

and the fall of man, before which Adam and Eve 'shameden noȝt', in spite of their nakedness.[67] But although shame is a consequence of the fall of man, in it also lies the possibility for human redemption; as Valerie Allen notes, 'Christian morality valorizes shame … because it seeks to compensate for and protect against the spiritual frailty that is our universal condition'.[68] According to the authors of fourteenth-century devotional texts, shame was one of the most effective emotional weapons against sin, particularly the sin of pride. The opening invocation of *Handlyng Synne*, a treatise translated from an Anglo-Norman source by Robert Mannyng (died c. 1338), suggests that shame is fundamental both to moving the penitent to confession and to eventually triumphing over 'þe fende':

> Fadyr, and Sone, & holy goste,
> Þat art o god of myȝtes moste,
> At þy wurschyp shul we bygynne,
> To shame þe fende & shew oure synne;
> Synne to shewe, vs to frame,
> God to wurschyp, þe fende to shame.[69]

And as Walter Hilton's (c. 1343–96) *The Scale of Perfection* shows, shame can also forestall the possibility of pride:

> Thanne yif thou feele a stirynge of pride, or ony othir spice of it,
> be soone waar yif thou mai, and suffre hit not lightli passe awai,
> but take in thi mynde and rende it, breke it and dispice it, and doo
> al the shame that thou mai therto.[70]

Here, Hilton's words deploy shame against pride in a psychomachic struggle over the Christian soul. In this context, shame is a weapon to be used by the reader 'in thi mynde' to combat sin.[71] This redemptive function notwithstanding, in the medieval imagination shame remained linked with the exposure of the human body's most private parts to the eyes of others.

Within the past decade, shame has attracted increasing attention from medievalists,[72] as well as from cultural and literary theorists whose studies have profoundly influenced the history of emotions.[73] These studies have raised shame's profile in medieval scholarship, to the point where Allen has stated that 'we might even call shame the primal medieval emotion, so ubiquitous and various are its applications'.[74] In his recently published history of shame, Stearns begins his chapter on premodern shame by making reference to the Middle Ages, a sign, perhaps, of the extent to which the emotion

and the epoch have become yoked together in the minds of scholars.[75] Yet the concept of shamefastness is often absorbed into discussions of medieval shame without any acknowledgement of its distinctiveness as an emotional disposition, nor of its role in the establishment and safekeeping of female honour.[76]

In the case of medieval English literary studies, one possible reason for this oversight may be the imbalance between the relatively limited availability of Middle English vocabulary for shame and related concepts in comparison with the abundance of such terms in Latin and in continental vernaculars. Thus, for example, Thomas Aquinas used *verecundia* and *pudicitia* to refer to different kinds of shame; whereas *verecundia* refers to 'a recoil[ing] from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance', Aquinas uses *pudicitia* in his discussion of chastity:[77]

> [P]udicitia attenditur proprie circa venerea, et præcipue circa signa venereorum, sicut sunt aspectus impudici, oscula et tactus. Et quia hæc magis solent deprehendi, ideo pudicitia magis respicit hujusmodi exteriora signa; castitas autem magis ipsam veneream commixtionem. Et ideo pudicitia ad castitatem ordinatur, non quasi virtus ab ipsa distincta, sed sicut exprimens castitatis circumstantiam quamdam. Interdum tamen unum pro alio ponitur.

> [P]urity [*pudicitia*] or modesty properly speaking regards sex activity, and chiefly its secondary manifestations, such as looks, kisses, and touches. Usage applies it to these, and chastity rather to the act of intercourse. Purity is ordained to chastity, not as a distinct virtue, but as dealing with what surrounds it. Sometimes, however, the terms are used interchangeably.[78]

Whereas Latin texts such as Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae* might navigate between such distinct terms as *verecundia*, *pudor*, *pudicitia*, and *modestia* (and French texts, for example, between such terms as *vergoigne*, *honte*, and *pudeur*), writers using Middle English were limited almost entirely to *shame* and *shamefastness*, each of which could encompass a number of concepts.[79] The definitions of *shamefast* provided by medieval English–Latin and Latin–English dictionaries and word lists suggest that *verecundia* may have been perceived as the nearest Latin equivalent: in an early Middle English copy of Aelfric's *Grammar* and *Glossary* contained in a thirteenth-century manuscript in Worcester Cathedral, '*Uerecundus*' is glossed as 'sceomefest' (and '*Inpudens*' as 'unsceomefest'), while a copy of the fifteenth-century English–Latin *Promptorium parvulorum* in London, British Library MS Harley 221 defines '*Schamefast*' as 'Verecundus,

verecundiosus, pudorosus'.[80] Alternatively, another fifteenth-century Latin–English vocabulary list contained in Trinity College Cambridge MS O.5.4 presents 'shamfast' as the equivalent of '*Rubescens*', linking the concept of shamefastness to the red of a blushing face.

The Middle English noun *shame* has a particularly wide range of potential meanings, including fear of disgrace; 'the feeling of having done something disgraceful'; modesty or timidity; humiliation; immoral behaviour; nakedness, or the genitals; a verbal insult; loss of virginity; or the sexual violation of a woman.[81] While *shamefastness* has many fewer possible definitions, these meanings still include modesty, bashfulness, and shyness, as well as regret and remorse.[82] Thus, even if at first blush we might be tempted to equate shamefastness very broadly with modesty or humility, the terms are not so easily interchangeable. The translation of concepts between languages, and the evolution of *shamefastness* within the English language, might seem to situate shamefastness among emotions such as *acedia* or *melancholia* or dispositions like honour that Frevert views as having been lost to the past:

> [e]ven if there are signs of *acedia*, *melancholia* and depression that resemble each other, the labeling, framing and contextualizing of those signs are vastly different. Relating the symptoms to diverse systems of reference (magic, religion, arts and sciences, neurobiology) affects the value attributed to them. This in turn affects the appraisal and experience of those states. Seen from this perspective, *acedia* and *melancholia* are indeed 'lost emotions,' lost in translation to a new emotional state called *depression*.[83]

Frevert is right to draw attention to the ways that emotion-words and -concepts fall in and out of use over time, but to refer to them as 'lost' risks obscuring the ways in which they inform and shape successive emotion-concepts, dispositions, attitudes, and identities. Such is the case with regard to shamefastness: whether as *verecundia* or *pudicitia*, a sense of shame was esteemed more highly by medieval Christianity than it had been in classical philosophy. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle argued that shame should not be 'described as a virtue' because 'it is more like a feeling than a state of character'. He defines shame as 'a kind of fear of dishonour' and contends that it is more becoming to youth than to age:

> For we think young people should be prone to the feeling of shame because they live by feeling and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame; and we praise young people who are prone

to this feeling, but an older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense of disgrace, since we think he should not do anything that need cause this sense. For the sense of disgrace is not even characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent on bad actions (for such actions should not be done; and if some actions are disgraceful in very truth and others only according to common opinion, this makes no difference; for neither class of actions should be done, so that no disgrace should be felt); and it is a mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action.[84]

In medieval interpretations of Aristotle's arguments, a sense of shame is increasingly dissociated with masculinity and *associated* with honourable femininity. In book 4 of his *Il Convivio*, for example, Dante glosses Aristotle's *Ethics* when he declares that shame ('vergogna') is 'good and praiseworthy' ('buona e laudabile') 'in women and in young people' ('nelle donne e nelli giovani').[85] Commenting on the distinction between Aristotle's depiction of shame and Aquinas's treatment of *verecundia*, Allen has argued that the latter carries a 'heightened sense of modesty'; it 'protects' rather than 'constrains':

By virtue of its doctrine of original sin, Christian morality valorizes shame, which for Aristotle is a mark of privation and weakness, because it seeks to compensate for and protect against the spiritual frailty that is our universal condition. Doubly frail because she is weaker in reason and body than is a man, woman needs shame to cover and support her.[86]

Nevertheless, even Aquinas debated the question of whether shame was a passion or a virtue, ultimately deciding that it possessed aspects of both.[87]

Over the course of my discussion, it will become clear that the shame and shamefastness I am describing cannot always be thoroughly disentangled from neighbouring emotions such as guilt or embarrassment. As some of the texts considered here suggest, these emotional fields can occasionally blur together, or perform similar work. My aim is not to throw up rigid barriers between these concepts, nor to lay out precisely how we ought to relate them to one another.[88] The practice of shamefastness as I outline it here does not rely on hard-and-fast definitions of isolated emotions, but is rather made up of a network of ideas that were constantly being rearticulated, redefined, and redeployed by those who wrote about them.

Chapter synopses

My emphasis throughout this book is on how Middle English texts shape, enable, and reflect the female practice of shamefastness. Not all of the texts discussed here would be universally recognized as 'literary' (although they have all attracted the attention of literary scholars), but by closely reading literary texts in the broader context of writing for and about women, I hope to demonstrate what discourses and imagery literary texts share with non-literary material, as well as some of the distinctive ways that literary texts in particular shape emotion practices and norms. In generic terms, the texts I examine move from the more practical subjects covered by medical treatises and conduct texts to the more strictly literary realm of courtly poetry, classical exempla, and petitionary verse as my argument unfolds. At the same time, the focus of my argument moves from female honour's grounding in the gestures of the female body, through the effects of shamefast practice on women, and, ultimately, to the staging of a shamefast persona by a male author. The texts I consider shape and facilitate shamefastness in various ways: by articulating the connection between shamefastness and gestures of concealment and exhibition; by functioning as guides for practising shamefastness; by depicting female shamefastness as an adversary of male desire; and by depicting models of honourable female shamefastness. They also reveal the ways in which the idea of shamefastness *as* a practice made it a potentially unreliable sign of female virtue, as well as a performance that might be reappropriated by male authors.

Chapter 1 examines the embodied nature of female honour. Because the chief determinant of a woman's honour was her degree of sexual continence, women's bodies and even their most private parts simultaneously required concealment and direct or indirect scrutiny. In order to show how this paradox both necessitated and complicated the practice of shamefastness, I begin by considering the ways in which the language of shame was applied to women's bodies (most specifically to their private parts or *shamefuls*). I then examine how beliefs concerning the postlapsarian origins of shame contributed to medieval understandings of both pain and shame as universal features of women's experience of childbirth. In the final part of this chapter, I consider how the prologues of two Middle English gynaecological treatises, *The Knowing of Woman's Kind in Childing* and *The Sickness of Women*, point to the social and emotional risks women faced in exposing their bodies even for

the ostensibly innocent purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment. In their efforts to mitigate these risks on behalf of female patients, these prologues reveal the complications that arise in the 'show and tell' of gynaecological practice and even the writing of gynae-cological texts. I argue that this dynamic mirrors that of the practice of female shamefastness, which simultaneously requires the conceal-ment and withdrawal of women's bodies and the exhibition of their shamefast chastity.

In Chapter 2, I turn to conduct literature for women and investigate how Middle English examples of this genre lay out practical advice for the cultivation of female shamefastness. Medieval conduct literature for women was primarily concerned with issues of proper comportment and behaviour, the makings and markers of a 'good' honourable woman. Since incontrovertible sexual continence was the surest foundation of female honour, conduct texts for women inevitably concentrate on promoting the development of a strong sense of shame. As fear of disgrace, shamefastness operated as a restraint on female behaviour which, when properly and regularly practised, helped women to safeguard their good name. This chapter considers *The Book of the Knight of La Tour Landry* (a Middle English translation of the prose treatise *Le livre du Chevalier de la Tour Landry pour l'enseignement de ses filles*) alongside several Middle English and Scottish conduct poems addressed to or concerning women in order to show how these texts valorize shamefastness, which they present as a practice made up of and reliant on patterns of behaviour aimed at producing and communicating a specific emotional state. I propose that we can read texts like these as guides for the development of a strong sense of shame, guides that on occasion harness startlingly literary tropes, devices, and techniques in order to promote the disciplined practice of female shame.

In Chapter 3, I examine the ways that medieval texts also present female shamefastness as problematically 'practised' – that is, as behaviour that might be learned and faked by women hoping to present the appearance of virtue. Suspicion of female shamefastness was exacerbated by anti-feminist literary traditions surrounding courtly erotic desire that presented women as inherently lustful creatures longing to be sexually conquered by men, and which suggested that, if shamefastness did not exist, men would not need to lay siege to women in order to enjoy their sexual favour. Texts such as the *Roman de la rose* and its Middle English translation depict shamefastness as a personified figure hindering men in the

pursuit of their desire, an obstacle who must be overcome at all costs, even if by force. I begin by considering the origins of the adversarial dynamic between desire and shamefastness in influential personification allegories such as Prudentius's *Psychomachia* and, later, the *Roman de la rose*. I then show how the *Roman* and its Middle English translation draw on anti-feminist suspicion of female shamefastness, suspicion that later informs John Lydgate's depiction of Medea's infatuation with Jason in his *Troy Book*. As I show, Lydgate depicts Medea as a figure of both cunning and lust, a woman who exploits the conventions of shamefast behaviour in order to conceal her desire, and a troubling example of the ways in which shamefast practice was an object of potential suspicion as well as a potential source of honour.

Chapter 4 continues to unpick the problematic nature of honourable female shamefastness by turning to two exemplary shamefast women: Virginia and Lucretia. Medieval readers and writers were alternately fascinated and horrified by the stories of Virginia and Lucretia, classical examples of women faced with the prospect of either death or dishonour. Underlying the mixed reader responses to these narratives is an urge to indulge in counterfactual fantasy – to imagine what *might* have happened under different circumstances. But I argue that, at the same time that these stories invite readers to create counterfactual versions, they foreclose the possibility of doing so. This foreclosure is the result of the problematic binary at the heart of these narratives: the assumption that honourable shamefast women who are faced with the possibility of disgrace must endure either death or shame. This chapter takes up the troubling relationship between the model of hardy masculinity set forth in such texts as the *Roman de la rose* and the practice of female shamefastness, and considers its disturbing implications for exemplary female chastity. I argue that, in his retellings of the stories of Virginia and Lucrece, Chaucer highlights and critiques the inevitability of their deaths by aligning it with the tension between the expectations of masculinity and female honour. Building on the arguments I have put forward elsewhere concerning the depiction of honourable women in Chaucer's work, this chapter considers how and why Chaucer's *Physician's Tale* and *Legend of Lucrece* deviate from classical narratives, and from the versions of these stories included in John Gower's *Confessio Amantis* (composed during the same period as Chaucer's stories).[89]

Chapter 5 considers the works of one male fifteenth-century author who was particularly adept at adopting a mantle of feminine shamefastness when it suited him: Thomas Hoccleve (c. 1368–1426).

'Embarrassment' has come to be thought of as a characteristic feature of Hoccleve's poetics, but I argue for closer attention to the role played by the language and imagery of shame and shamefastness in shaping this poetics.[90] I begin by considering the Middle English language of 'manhood' and 'manliness', which frequently contrasts masculine boldness with feminine bashfulness and hesitation. I then explore the ways in which Hoccleve's scepticism concerning the reliability of appearances (articulated in his *Letter of Cupid*) informs his engagement with the binary that links masculinity with boldness and aggression, and femininity with shamefastness. I argue that in his early poem, *La Male Regle*, Hoccleve exploits the nature of shamefastness as a potentially suspicious practice, turning what medieval women were encouraged to make an apparently artless performance of virtue into a performance of conspicuous artifice.

The chapters that follow demonstrate the extent to which the literature of medieval England presents female honour as a matter of *feeling* like an honourable woman.[91] As I hope I will make clear, the idea of 'feeling like an honourable woman' denotes an ethical and emotional construction of gender that is potentially imitable by others, and capable of being reappropriated for other purposes. At the same time, its very imitability, and the potential for its reappropriation, rendered shamefastness a difficult and even dangerous habit for medieval women to acquire.

Notes

1 Quotations from *The Thewis of Good Women* are taken from the editions of the two versions of the poem contained in *The Good Wife Taught Her Daughter, The Good Wyfe Wold a Pylgremage, The Thewis of Gud Women*, ed. Tauno E. Mustanoja (Helsinki: Suomaleisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran, 1948), presented in parallel at pp. 176–95. The poem survives in two manuscripts: Cambridge, Cambridge University Library MS Kk.1.5 (fols 49–53; hereafter referred to as C), and Cambridge, St John's College G.23 (fols 164–67v; hereafter referred to as J). Citations from the text will be taken from Mustanoja's edition, and cited above by version and line number.

2 All citations of Chaucer's works in this study are drawn from *The Riverside Chaucer*, ed. Larry D. Benson *et al*., 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), and will be cited above by line number.

3 *MED*, s. v. *honour*.

4 Throughout this book, I will use 'chastity' to refer to sexual continence, the parameters of which depend on a woman's marital status, as I discuss in Chapter 2.

5 Medieval anxieties concerning the 'openness' of the female body
   contribute to what Caroline Walker Bynum has identified as the
   medieval view that 'the good female body is closed and intact; the
   bad woman's body is open, windy and breachable' ('The Female Body
   and Medieval Religious Practice in the Later Middle Ages', in Michel
   Feher, with Ramona Naddaf and Nadia Tazi (eds), *Fragments for a
   History of the Human Body* (New York, NY: Zone Books, 1989), pp.
   181–238 (p. 212, n. 98). Gail Kern Paster has also explored anxieties
   concerning the 'leakiness' of the female body in *The Body Embarrassed:
   Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early Modern England* (New
   York, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). Misogynist stereotypes
   concerning the sensual nature of women are recorded in many of the
   sources edited in *Woman Defamed and Woman Defended: An Anthology
   of Medieval Texts*, ed. Alcuin Blamires, with Karen Pratt and C. W.
   Marx (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
6 *MED*, s. v. *slider*.
7 See *MED*, s. v. *radnesse* (fear, terror) and *rade* (afraid, frightened
   because of).
8 This shift is discussed by Glenn D. Burger in *Conduct Becoming:
   Good Wives and Husbands in the Later Middle Ages* (Philadelphia, PA:
   University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), in which Burger argues that,
   while treatises like *Hali Meiðhad* had reinforced 'a traditional medieval
   hierarchy of women's roles founded on the absolute value of chastity
   within the enclosed life', the lay spiritual guidance offered by texts
   composed in and after the fourteenth century 'promise a rule for
   devout laypeople that can – at least potentially – come close to that
   achieved by those contemplatives living enclosed lives' (p. 39). Burger
   pays particular attention to the continental origins of this shift in
   texts like the fourteenth-century *Livre du Chevalier de la Tour Landry
   pour l'enseignement de ses filles* and its sources, in which (to quote Anne
   Marie De Gendt) '[l]a chasteté devient donc une vertu non seulement
   morale, mais aussi sociale' ('chastity thus becomes a virtue that is not
   only moral, but also social'; *L'Art d'éduquer les nobles damoiselles: Le
   Livre du Chevalier de la Tour Landry* (Paris: Champion, 2003), p. 158;
   quoted in Burger at p. 217 n. 48, whose translation on p. 95 I have
   adapted here). See also Lynn Staley, *Languages of Power in the Age
   of Richard II* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University
   Press, 2005), who maintains that conduct texts such as *Le livre du
   Chevalier* offer 'a view of the world in which a young woman may
   find in marriage the spiritual fulfilment she might have sought in a
   nunnery' (p. 271).
9 This is not to say that a sense of shame was considered universally
   useful; a number of texts suggest that too much shame could prevent
   one from confessing to sin, for example, as in the account of a woman
   who was damned because she did not confess to having had sex with
   a monk 'for drede of encursinge, dredinge shame and the bobaunce of

the worlde, more thanne spiritual uengeaunce of myn synne' (Geoffrey de la Tour Landry, *The Book of the Knight of La Tour Landry*, ed. Thomas Wright, EETS OS 33 (London: N. Trübner & Co., 1868), pp. 12–13). The Middle English word *shame* is occasionally used to refer to a sense of shame, rather than to the experience of disgrace, but in order to avoid confusion I will use *shamefastness* and 'a sense of shame' interchangeably, and I will clarify whenever a Middle English text is using *shame* to refer to this sense of shame (as in the epigraph taken from *The Wife of Bath's Prologue*, discussed later in this introduction).

10 *MED*, s. v. *shamefast*, *shamefastness*; *OED*, s. v. *shamefaced*. Although *shamefastness* most frequently describes a fixed fear or regular avoidance of disgrace, the word is occasionally used to refer to the experience of disgrace, which may explain the eventual evolution of 'shamefast' into 'shamefaced'.

11 Stearns, *Shame: A Brief History*, p. 8. The body of scholarship on shame is vast; Stearns provides a useful starting point in his list of suggested texts for further reading (pp. 155–8). Although the power of anticipative shame has been little explored in historical studies, it has been the subject of several psychological studies: see, for example, Vanessa M. Patrick, HaeEun Helen Chun, and Deborah J. Macinnis, 'Affective Forecasting and Social Control: Why Anticipating Pride Wins Over Anticipating Shame in a Self-regulation Context', *Journal of Consumer Psychology* 19 (2009), 537–45; Lee Shepherd, Russell Spears, and Antony S. R. Manstead, '"This Will Bring Shame on Our Nation": The Role of Anticipated Group-based Emotions on Collective Action', *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 49 (2013), 42–57; Lee Shepherd, Russell Spears, and Antony S. R. Manstead, 'When Does Anticipating Group-based Shame Lead to Lower Ingroup Favoritism? The Role of Status and Status Stability', *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 49 (2013), 334–43; and T. Bonavia and J. Brox-Ponce 'Shame in Decision Making Under Risk Conditions: Understanding the Effect of Transparency', *Public Library of Science* (*PLoS) ONE* 13 (2018), e0191990, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0191990 [accessed 19 April 2018].

12 *MED*, s. v. *fast*.

13 On the crisis of *habit* and *habitus* (internalized Christian virtue) in later medieval England, see Katharine Breen, *Imagining an English Reading Public, 1150–1400* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), discussed more fully below.

14 Robert C. Solomon, *True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 157; William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

15 Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling*, pp. 104–5; see also his earlier articulation of these arguments in 'Against Constructionism: The

Historical Ethnography of Emotions', *Current Anthropology* 38 (1997), 327–51 (p. 331).

16 Patrick Colm Hogan, 'Fictions and Feelings: On the Place of Literature in the Study of Emotion', *Emotion Review* 2 (2010), 184–95 (p. 185).

17 See, for example, Hogan, 'Fictions and Feelings', which considers the ways that literature encodes and represents emotion; Carolyne Larrington, 'The Psychology of Emotion and Study of the Medieval Period', *Early Medieval Europe* 10 (2001), 251–6, which contends that imaginative literature permits 'access to the protagonists' interior processes, processes which are of course imagined, but not randomly so' (p. 254); and Mary C. Flannery, 'Personification and Embodied Emotional Practice in Middle English Literature', *Literature Compass* 13 (2016), 351–61, which argues for focusing on literary tropes and forms in order to incorporate literature into the history of emotions. (I also make a broader case for the centrality of textual evidence to the history of emotions in my introduction to Mary C. Flannery (ed.), *Emotion & Medieval Textual Media* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2019).) Despite historians' misgivings concerning the potentially misleading nature of literary evidence, several historical studies of emotion have made use of literary texts. Reddy has been foremost among those to do so: see for example *The Navigation of Feeling* and *The Making of Romantic Love: Longing and Sexuality in Europe, South Asia, and Japan, 900–1200 CE* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

18 Sarah McNamer, 'Feeling', in Paul Strohm (ed.), *Oxford Twenty-First-Century Approaches to Literature: Middle English* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 241–57 (p. 243).

19 Sarah McNamer, 'The Literariness of Literature and the History of Emotion', *PMLA* 130 (2015), 1433–42 (p. 1435).

20 Sarah McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), pp. 1, 12–13.

21 *Ibid*., p. 13.

22 McNamer, 'Feeling', pp. 245–7 (original emphasis), referring particularly to metaphorical references to emotion scripts in the work of Reddy on 'emotional regimes' (*The Navigation of Feeling*) and Barbara Rosenwein on 'emotional communities' (*Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006)).

23 Monique Scheer, 'Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (And Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding Emotion', *History and Theory* 51 (2012), 192–220 (p. 209). I remain extremely grateful to Stephanie Trigg for originally drawing my attention to Scheer's argument in 2013. Scheer is also cited (though not discussed) by McNamer in 'The Literariness of Literature', p. 9.

24 Scheer, 'Are Emotions a Kind of Practice', p. 193.

25 *Ibid*., pp. 217–18.

26 Wan-Chuan Kao, 'Conduct Shameful and Unshameful in *The Franklin's Tale*', *Studies in the Age of Chaucer* 34 (2012), 99–139 (p. 122). This reference to shame scripts is made once in passing, and Kao's article does not engage with McNamer's suggestion that literature can function as a script for emotion.

27 Ruth Leys provides an extensive overview and critique of the arguments of Silvan S. Tomkins, Paul Ekman, Brian Massumi, and other scholars of 'affect' in 'The Turn to Affect: A Critique', *Critical Inquiry* 37 (2011), 434–72. Holly Crocker makes a case for thinking in terms of medieval 'affect' in 'Medieval Affects Now', *Exemplaria* 29 (2017), 82–98 (see esp. pp. 83–5).

28 For an overview of the history of *emotion* as a scholarly term, see Thomas Dixon, '"Emotion": The History of a Keyword in Crisis', *Emotion Review* 4 (2012), 338–44. On medieval emotion theory, see, for example, Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004); Piroska Nagy and Damien Boquet (eds), *Le Sujet des emotions au Moyen Âge* (Paris: Beauchesne, 2009); Peter King, 'Emotions in Medieval Thought', in Peter Goldie (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 167–88; and Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy, *Sensible Moyen Âge: Une histoire des émotions dans l'Occident* (Paris: Seuil, 2015). Chapter 1 of Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities*, surveys emotion theory from Plato to Augustine.

29 Thomas Dixon, 'Revolting Passions', *Modern Theology* 27 (2011), 298–312 (p. 300); see also Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), especially Chapter 2; and Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*.

30 See Augustine, *The City of God Against the Pagans, Books XII–XV*, trans. Philip Levine, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), book XIV, chapter 6 (pp. 284–7).

31 See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I–II, quest. 22–48, edited and translated in Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae: Volume 19, The Emotions: 1a2ae. 22–30*, ed. Eric D'Arcy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); *Summa Theologiae: Volume 20, Pleasure: 1a2ae. 31–39*, ed. Eric D'Arcy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and *Summa Theologiae: Volume 21, Fear and Anger: 1a2ae. 40–48*, ed. by J. P. Reid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). On Aquinas's discussions of the emotions, see Nicholas E. Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 2011), and Peter King, 'Emotions', in Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 209–26.

32 On emotion and action in medieval literature and culture, see, for example, Andrew Lynch, '"What Cheer?" Emotion and Action in the

Arthurian World', in Frank Brandsma, Carolyne Larrington, and Corinne Saunders (eds), *Emotions in Medieval Arthurian Literature: Body, Mind, Voice* (Woodbridge: D. S. Brewer, 2015), pp. 47–63.

33 Stephanie Trigg provides a useful survey of the distinctions between such terms as *affect*, *emotion*, *feeling*, *passion*, and *sentiment* in 'Introduction: Emotional Histories – Beyond the Personalization of the Past and the Abstraction of Affect Theory', *Exemplaria* 26 (2014), 3–15. Although she suggests that *affect* might be the best candidate for an 'umbrella term', she maintains that 'the phrase "the history of emotions" suggests a complex and productively layered sense of inquiry into historical change, historical emotions, and the history of the term and concept of the "emotions" themselves', and might thereby encourage 'dialogue and interchange across the network of terms such as feelings, passions, emotions, and affects' (p. 8).

34 Crocker, 'Medieval Affects Now', p. 94.

35 Claire Sponsler, *Drama and Resistance: Bodies, Goods, and Theatricality in Late Medieval England* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 73. A third problem identified by Sponsler is that readers of conduct literature might learn to imitate the wrong models; she goes on to discuss the problematic nature of imitation on pp. 75–103.

36 On the medieval concept of *habitus*, see Cary J. Nederman, 'Nature, Ethics, and the Doctrine of "Habitus": Aristototelian Moral Psychology in the Twelfth Century', *Traditio* 45 (1989–90), 87–110, as well as Breen, *Imagining an English Reading Public*, which traces the construction of an explicitly vernacular *habitus* in later medieval England.

37 Breen, *Imagining an English Reading Public*, p. 16.

38 *MED*, s. v. *habit*; also *OED*, s. v. *habit*. Breen argues that texts such as the Wycliffite Bible and Chaucer's *Boece* were 'early adopters of the word *habit* in part because they attach intrinsic value to Latin syntax and etymology – that is, to Latin grammar as a means of inculcating Christian ethics – and are willing to sacrifice English clarity to preserve it' (*Imagining an English Reading Public*, p. 24).

39 Breen, *Imagining an English Reading Public*, p. 23.

40 See *ibid*., pp. 16–29.

41 *MED*, s. v. *habit*.

42 Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; repr. 1987), p. 72, a translation of Bourdieu's *Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique* (emphasis in original). Bourdieu offers an extended discussion of habitus in the second chapter of this book (pp. 72–95 in this translation).

43 *Ibid*., p. 79 (emphasis in original).

44 Breen, *Imagining an English Reading Public*, p. 8.

45 *Ibid*., p. 17. Breen argues that 'the meaning of *habit*, both as a garment and a newly-minted English term, goes straight to the heart of vernacular textuality and its ability to foster spiritual perfection' (p. 20).

46 Reginald Pecock, *The Folewer to the Donet*, ed. E. V. Hitchcock, EETS
    OS 164 (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 79, lines 28–30.
    Pecock is here discussing the cultivation of moral virtues.

47 Breen, *Imagining an English Reading Public*, p. 27.

48 *Romaunt of the Rose*, in *The Riverside Chaucer*, C 6192. For other
    examples of the Middle English proverb that 'the habit does not make
    the monk', see Bartlett Jere Whiting, *Proverbs, Sentences, and Proverbial
    Phrases from English Writings Mainly Before 1500* (Cambridge, MA:
    The Belknap Press, 1968), H2. On the medieval Latin proverb, see
    Breen, *Imagining an English Reading Public*, p. 51.

49 For examples of the textual traditions that informed medieval misogynist
    writing, see *Woman Defamed and Woman Defended*, ed. Blamires,
    with Pratt and Marx.

50 1 Timothy 2: 9–10. Latin text taken from parallel-text edition of the
    Latin Vulgate and Douay-Rheims versions of the Bible,
    www.latinvulgate.com/lv/verse.aspx?t=1&b=15&c=2 [accessed 21 March
    2017]. Middle English translation taken from John Wyclif, *Select
    English Works of John Wyclif*, ed. Thomas Arnold (Oxford: Clarendon
    Press, 1871), cap. III, p. 193.

51 *MED*, s. v. *ourning*. Elsewhere in *The Canterbury Tales*, Chaucer draws
    attention to the 'mixed signals' that a woman's appearance can put
    out when the Parson notes that, although the 'visages' of some women
    may seem 'ful chaast and debonaire', their clothing reveals their
    'likerousnesse' and pride (*The Parson's Tale* 429–31).

52 *MED*, s. v. *habit*.

53 *MED*, s. v. *shulen* (v. 1).

54 See Ruth Evans, 'Virginities', in Carolyn Dinshaw and David Wallace
    (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Women's Writing* (Cam-
    bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 21–39 (p. 25); Burger,
    Conduct Becoming, p. 39.

55 Among the many valuable studies of medieval virginity that have been
    produced in the last two decades are Kathleen C. Kelly and Marina
    Leslie (eds), *Menacing Virgins: Representing Virginity in the Middle
    Ages and Renaissance* (London: Associated University Presses, 1999);
    Anke Bernau, *Virgins: A Cultural History* (London: Granta, 2007);
    Sarah Salih, *Versions of Virginity in Late Medieval England* (Cambridge:
    D. S. Brewer, 2001); Kathleen C. Kelly, *Performing Virginity and
    Testing Chastity in the Middle Ages* (London: Routledge, 2000; repr.
    2002); and Anke Bernau, Ruth Evans, and Sarah Salih (eds), *Medieval
    Virginities* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).

56 See Evans, 'Virginities', p. 25; *Hali Meiðhad*, in *Medieval English
    Prose for Women: Selections from the Katherine Group and Ancrene
    Wisse,* ed. Bella Millett and Jocelyn Wogan-Browne (Oxford: Clarendon
    Press, 1990), p. 38, lines 20–4. *Hali Meiðhad* cites Jerome's mathematical
    ratio representing the respective heavenly rewards of wives, widows,
    and virgins at p. 20, lines 19–21.

57 See especially Burger, *Conduct Becoming*, but also Staley, *Languages of Power*, pp. 265–338; Sponsler, *Drama and Resistance*, pp. 50–74; and Felicity Riddy, 'Mother Knows Best: Reading Social Change in a Courtesy Text', *Speculum* 71 (1996), 66–86. On the evolution of medieval marriage symbolism, see David D'Avray, *Medieval Marriage: Symbolism and Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

58 Burger, *Conduct Becoming*, pp. 5, 7.

59 *OED*, s. v. *shame* (under 'Etymology').

60 Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004; repr. 2010), p. 104.

61 David Watt, *The Making of Thomas Hoccleve's Series* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013), p. 144. I am very grateful to Sebastian Sobecki for sharing his work concerning the dating of Hoccleve's *Series* (soon forthcoming from Oxford University Press in *Last Words: The Public Self and the Social Author in Late Medieval England*).

62 Watt, *Hoccleve's Series*, p. 145.

63 See especially Chapter 5 of Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture*, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; repr. 2011), as well as her book on *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400–1200* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; repr. 2008), and *The Medieval Craft of Memory: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures*, ed. Mary Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski (Philadelphia, PA: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002).

64 Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, pp. 5, 14. As she goes on to explain, 'The monks thought of *intentio* as concentration, "intensity" of memory, intellect, but also as an emotional attitude, what we now might call a "creative tension," willingly adopted, that enabled productive memory work to be carried on (or that thwarted it, if one's *intentio* were bad or one's will ineffectual)' (p. 15).

65 Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, p. 85.

66 Frevert, *Emotions in History*, p. 10. William Ian Miller similarly defines honour as a disposition in his study of humiliation: 'Honor is above all the keen sensitivity to the experience of humiliation and shame, a sensitivity manifested by the desire to be envied by others and the propensity to envy the successes of others. To simplify greatly, honor is that disposition which makes one act to shame others who have shamed oneself, to humiliate others who have humiliated oneself' (*Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 84. While sensitivity to shame is indeed a significant part of what makes up honour, Miller's definition would be more accurately applied to a masculine sense of honour as depicted in later medieval texts than to female honour, which does not rely on shaming others and is not a matter of desiring to be envied or of envying the 'successes' of others.

67 *The Holy Bible, Containing the Old and New Testaments with the Apocryphal Books, in the Earliest English Versions made from the Latin Vulgate by John Wycliffe and his Followers*, ed. Josiah Forshall and Frederic Madden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1850), Genesis 2: 25; see also Valerie Allen, 'Waxing Red: Shame and the Body, Shame and the Soul', in Lisa Perfetti (ed.), *The Representation of Women's Emotions in Medieval and Early Modern Culture* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2005), pp. 191–210.

68 Allen, 'Waxing Red', pp. 194–5.

69 Robert Mannyng, *Robert of Brunne's 'Handlyng Synne'*, ed. Frederick J. Furnivall, EETS OS 119 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1901), lines 1–6.

70 Walter Hilton, *The Scale of Perfection*, ed. Thomas H. Bestul, TEAMS (Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 2000), 89, fol. 80v.

71 This is not to say that shame was not sometimes viewed as an obstacle to such processes as confession. If felt too keenly, it might prevent a man or woman from confessing altogether. As Thomas N. Tentler has noted, the key was not to be coerced by shame, but to experience the appropriate amount while repenting of one's sins (*Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 108). Similarly, as Robert Stanton points out, revelling in self-righteous shame could also lead to the sin of vainglory ('Lechery, Pride, and the Uses of Sin in *The Book of Margery Kempe*', *The Journal of Medieval Religious Cultures* 36 (2010), 169–204).

72 See, for example, Allen, 'Waxing Red'; Miller, *Humiliation*; J. A. Burrow, 'Honour and Shame in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*', in *Essays on Medieval Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 117–31; Virginia Burrus, *Saving Shame: Martyrs, Saints, and Other Abject Subjects* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Mary C. Flannery, 'A Bloody Shame: Chaucer's Honourable Women', *The Review of English Studies* 62 (2011), 337–57, as well as 'The Shame of the *Rose*: A Paradox', in Jennifer Chamarette and Jennifer Higgins (eds), *Guilt and Shame: Essays in French Literature and Culture* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 51–69, and 'The Concept of Shame in Late-Medieval English Literature', *Literature Compass* 9 (2012), 166–82; Robert L. Kindrick, 'Gawain's Ethics: Shame and Guilt in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*', *Annuale mediavale* 20 (1981), 5–32; Anne McTaggart, *Shame and Guilt in Chaucer* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Stephanie Trigg, '"Shamed be …": Historicizing Shame in Medieval and Early Modern Courtly Ritual', *Exemplaria* 19 (2007), 67–89; and Loretta Wasserman, 'Honor and Shame in *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*', in Larry D. Benson and John Leyerle (eds), *Chivalric Literature: Essays on Relations Between Literature and Life in the Later Middle Ages* (Kalamazoo, MI: Western Michigan University, 1980), 77–90. Shame and embarrassment have

also attracted the attention of several early modernists; see, for example, Brian Cummings, 'Animal Passions and Human Sciences: Shame, Blushing and Nakedness in Early Modern Europe and the New World', in Erica Fudge, Ruth Gilbert, and Susan Wiseman (eds), *At the Borders of the Human: Beasts, Bodies and Natural Philosophy in the Early Modern Period* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 26–50; Ewan Fernie, *Shame in Shakespeare* (London: Routledge, 2002); Werner L. Gundersheimer, 'Renaissance Concepts of Shame and Pocaterra's *Dialoghi Della Vergogna*', *Renaissance Quarterly* 47 (1994), 34–56; and Paster, *The Body Embarrassed*.

73 Prominent among these are the discussions of shame in Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*, pp. 101–21; Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), esp. p. 35–65; and Elspeth Probyn, *Blush: Faces of Shame* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).

74 Allen, 'Waxing Red', p. 192.

75 Stearns, *Shame*, p. 10.

76 One exception is the work of early modernist Robert A. White on the distinction between *verecundia* and *pudicitia* in Spenser's *The Faerie Queene* ('Shamefastness as *Verecundia* and as *Pudicitia* in *The Faerie Queene*', *Studies in Philology* 78 (1981), 391–408).

77 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae: Volume 43, Temperance: 2a2ae. 141–154*, ed. Thomas Gilby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), quest. 143.

78 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae: Volume 43*, quest. 151, art. 4. White discusses Aquinas's distinction between *verecundia* (an 'integral part' of temperance) and *pudicitia* ('a circumstance of chastity' that is a 'subjective part' of temperance) in relation to the dual figures of Shamefastness in *The Faerie Queene*, the first of which he argue personifies *verecundia* and the second of which personifies *pudicitia* ('Shamefastness', esp. p. 398).

79 The multiple valences of shame are discussed in *Histoire de la vergogne*, a special issue of *Rives Méditerranéennes* edited by Damien Boquet (*Rives Méditerranéennes* 31 (2008)), as well as in White, 'Shamefastness'.

80 For the definitions of *verecundus* and *inpudens* contained in Worcester Cathedral Chapter Library MS F. 174, see *Anglo-Saxon and Old English Vocabularies, Vol. 1: Vocabularies*, ed. Thomas Wright and Richard Paul Wülcker (London: Trübner & Co., 1884), col. 553, lines 9–10 (included under 'Semi-Saxon Vocabulary (of the Twelfth Century)'). For the definition of *schamefast* contained in London, British Library MS Harley 221, see *Promptorium Parvulorum sive Clericorum, Dictionarius Anglo-Latinus Princeps*, ed. A. Way, Camden Society 25, 54, 89, 3 vols (London: Camden Society, 1843–65), vol. 3, p. 443, col. 2, line 27.

81 *MED*, s. v. *shame* (n.).

82 *MED*, s. v. *shamefastness*.

83 Frevert, *Emotions in History*, p. 36.

84 Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. H. Rackham, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926), pp. 248–51.

85 English from *Il Convivio (The Banquet)*, trans. R. H. Lansing (New York, NY: Garland, 1990), p. 205 (Book 4, chapter 19); Italian from *Dante Alighieri Convivio*, ed. F. B. Ageno, 3 vols (Florence: Le Lettere, 1995), vol. 3 (second volume of the text), p. 383.

86 Allen, 'Waxing Red', pp. 194–95.

87 See Allen, 'Waxing Red', p. 198; Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae: Volume 43*, quest. 144, art. 1.

88 Stearns observes that the general consensus among emotion scholars is that embarrassment 'is simply less intense and noticeably less durable than shame, and is more quickly forgotten by the same token. … In contrast, shame often lasts longer – up to forty-eight hours – and its sensations can be revived through community pressure, again, in contrast to embarrassment' (although he also notes that this distinction does not explain why 'one person might be merely embarrassed by a miscue that would cause others even in the same culture and certainly between two cultures, to feel shame' (*Shame*, p. 3). For a study that suggests that embarrassment is essentially the contemporary equivalent of shame, see Thomas J. Scheff, 'Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory', *Sociological Theory* 18 (2000), 84–99). Although E. R. Dodds's distinction between 'shame cultures' and 'guilt cultures' (*The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1951)) is now generally considered obsolete, scholars have frequently continued to put them in separate rather than overlapping categories of emotion. Thus, Helen Lynd has argued that shame was related to being, whereas guilt was related to doing and interacting with others (*On Shame and the Search for Identity* (London: Routledge, 1958), 49–56). Gabriele Taylor has argued that '[g]uilt, unlike shame, is a legal concept'; if one feels guilty, one feels responsible for a transgression, whereas if one feels ashamed, one has a damaged sense of self (*Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment* (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1985), p. 85). Ewan Fernie, in his study of shame in Shakespeare, has argued that 'guilt is other-directed; shame comes from within' (*Shame in Shakespeare*, p. 14). Anne McTaggart, writing on shame and guilt in the works of Chaucer, also attempts to draw a clear distinction between the two emotions (*Shame and Guilt*, p. 6).

89 Flannery, 'A Bloody Shame'.

90 Ethan Knapp, 'Thomas Hoccleve', in Larry Scanlon (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval English Literature 1100–1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 191–203 (p. 196).

91 I adapt this phrase from McNamer, *Affective Meditation*, esp. Chapter 4, 'Feeling Like a Woman' (pp. 119–49).