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Introduction: changing images of Germany

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Just because Germany remains in the middle of Europe, and is again more powerful (but *not* in all dimensions) than its neighbors, is there really no difference between the revisionist imperial Germany in clumsy search of a world role, the rabid revolutionary Germany of Hitler, and the satisfied, cooperative and world-shy new united republic?¹

In November 2016, the *New York Times* contended that under the leadership of Angela Merkel, Germany had become the ultimate bastion of liberal democracy in the world, a bulwark against right-wing populism and autocracy.² That assessment might have been somewhat premature and formulated under the impression of Donald Trump's victory in the presidential election, which had raised fresh doubts over the health of American democracy. Nevertheless, it testifies to a remarkable shift in the external image of Germany. Few countries of the world, if any, have seen their image change as radically throughout the twentieth century. Germany was at least co-responsible for the outbreak of the First World War and unambiguously responsible for the Second World War. It produced one of the most brutal dictatorships in human history that committed a genocide of unprecedented dimensions. Until 1945, German foreign policy was associated chiefly with militarism, territorial expansion and a pronouncedly anti-liberal political culture. Today, the country is widely perceived as a 'civilian power' – an economic giant but military dwarf that is firmly committed to multilateralism, European integration and the peaceful settlement of disputes.³

Situated at the intersection of International Relations (IR) and history, this book has two objectives. One is to analyse and compare external perceptions of Germany during the twentieth century. The second is to use the German case as a prism to refract Western conceptions of international affairs more generally. Images of Germany not only determined the way in which Germans were seen or treated by others in IR; as the

chapters that follow will demonstrate, such images even influenced the very concepts used to describe and theorise IR in the English-speaking world. At crucial moments in the twentieth century, international theorists used the case of Germany as example, contrast foil or cautionary tale when making more general points about the nature and regularities of IR.⁴ According to figures compiled by Richard Ned Lebow (see Chapter 11), only references to the US have been more frequent than references to Germany in IR theory books since 1939. The case of Germany has been of interest to IR scholars in every decade and across theoretical paradigms. Our ambition in conceiving this book was to shed more light on this connection and to interweave two stories that are usually told separately.

Over the past two decades, historical IR scholarship has considerably improved our understanding of the origins of the discipline and its prominent theories.⁵ German intellectual influences and the role of German (*émigré*) scholars in the formulation of IR theories have been uncovered in the process, in particular regarding the genesis of 'classical' realism.⁶ However, changing images and conceptions of Germany in IR theorising have not been studied systematically. IR as an academic discipline was established when its English-speaking founders distinguished their vision of cooperative IR from an inherently aggressive and militarised 'Prussian' foreign policy. Western observers described the country as the uncivilised other, a rogue that thwarted attempts at a peaceful organisation of IR.⁷ In that sense, one particular image of Germany was almost constitutive for the nascent discipline of IR. In the interwar years, the German fight against the Treaty of Versailles allowed liberal internationalist to distinguish the West, multilateralism and the international rule of law from Germany's revanchism and aggression.

As German resistance against the Versailles order became ever more militant in the 1930s and breaches of international law frequent, the German case posed another question to IR that early realists in particular addressed. It epitomised, with great political urgency, the problem of how an international order, imposed by some states in a particular situation and for particular purposes, would be able to accommodate subsequent changes in power relations. Although to different degrees, E. H. Carr and other early IR realists 'normalised' the ruthless power politics that the liberal internationalists had castigated as uncivilised behaviour.⁸ What Germany did, trying to regain its lost status as a great power by all means available, was natural and not an aberration.

On the other hand, during roughly the same period, German intellectual influences became increasingly visible in IR theorising. The allegedly illiberal science of geopolitics, which relied on German sources and the example given by Germany in history, became an accepted part of English-speaking IR.⁹ Many of these influences were carried overseas

by German-speaking emigrants who brought with them Max Weber's sociology of power, the sociological approach to the study of law and Carl Schmitt's ideas about the nature of the political.¹⁰ Regardless of the conflicts and tensions at the political level, Germany's universities and intellectual achievements were still held in high esteem abroad. The rise of the Nazis and the question of how to confront them again brought Germany into the limelight of Western international theory. Was appeasement the right strategy to deal with a nation of discontents whose revisionism was essentially rational and understandable? Or had a bunch of violent madmen and ideologues taken over who could only be deterred from aggression by the threat of war?¹¹

During the Second World War, the German question still loomed large in debates over the post-war order.¹² Should the post-war international organisation include Germany?¹³ Was it possible to re-educate a people and build, with external assistance, a democratic German state after its military defeat?¹⁴ And how should the atrocities of the Nazis be dealt with? The Nuremberg trials after the Second World War remain exemplary to the paradigm of transitional justice, and the West German state a textbook case of successful democracy promotion.¹⁵ The great experiment of European political integration and German–French reconciliation also opened new horizons for international theory. The peculiar semi-sovereignty of (West) Germany triggered scholarly interest.¹⁶ On the other hand, in the Cold War years the central IR debates shifted elsewhere quite quickly, even if the divided Germany, and particularly Berlin, remained a theatre of the geopolitical standoff. As the future of Germany had ceased to be a pressing problem or a potential threat to the West, academics now debated themes such as great power conflict, nuclear deterrence and the dynamics of decolonialisation.

However, with the re-unification of the country in 1990, fears of a relapse into old patterns resurfaced. Worries mounted especially in France and Poland, where memories of German invasion and occupation were still alive. Chancellor Helmut Kohl tried to counter such fears, successfully in the end, with the promise of continuity in the country's foreign relations. In particular, he showed great commitment to European integration and to the State of Israel. United Germany thus continued a course that the Federal Republic had adopted at its foundation in 1949.¹⁷ In the following years, the united country was often characterised as a civilian power (*Zivilmacht*) with a mighty economy, but reluctant to use force in its foreign relations and deeply committed to international cooperation.¹⁸ Germany thus came to epitomise, together with Japan, a type of state that renounces the use of force in its foreign relations, despite its economic and technological capacities.¹⁹ Politically, such a country may be a beacon of hope rather than a rogue to fear, but still an

aberration from what many (realist) IR theorists consider normal state behaviour.²⁰

With some regularity, the country's Western allies urge German governments to do more in terms of military engagement abroad. Domestic resistance to such 'adventures', but also to coercion as political strategy more generally, is still solid in Germany. In 2001, Gerhard Schröder's coalition government of Social Democrats and the Greens refused to join the US-led 'coalition of the willing' that invaded Iraq after the 9/11 attacks. Nor did Angela Merkel's more conservative coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals support the intervention in Libya during the Arab Spring that ousted long-term dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi ten years later.²¹ Together with Russia and China, the German delegation abstained from voting in the United Nations Security Council on Resolution 1973 that authorised military action to protect Libyan civilians. This move infuriated many Western observers, but, in the polls, a solid majority of Germans supported the line of the government.²² The year before, President Horst Köhler had unwittingly violated a taboo when he mused in a radio interview whether safeguarding German economic interests abroad might, in some very exceptional circumstances, require military action. Facing public outrage over that statement, Köhler resigned. The highest representative of a civilian power, it seems, must not even ponder the use of force in pursuit of such mundane ends.

At the same time, the image of Germany as a civilian power is frequently called into question by external and domestic audiences. For left-wing critics, Germany is a highly developed capitalist state whose elite profits from arms export to war-torn regions. In their view, descriptions of Germany as a civilian power are a farce. In particular since 2010, German positions in the financial crisis of the eurozone also triggered much foreign and domestic criticism. Germany is here seen as an irresponsible power because it denies its contributions to the crisis, such as its enormous surplus in trade with Southern Europe. From the critics' point of view, German politicians and central bankers instead impose an austerity regime upon highly indebted countries, thus stifling their economic recovery. The quest for austerity in the eurozone led to a revival of images of 'Nazi Germany', especially in the Greek discourse, along with new fears of German hegemony in Europe.²³

Intellectual engagements with images of Germany thus allow us to review much of the history of twentieth-century IR, and Western academic reflection about it, through the vicissitudes of one country. Many canonical themes of academic IR will make their appearance along the way, such as the relationship between power and plenty, the possibilities and limits of international organisation, the ambiguities of industrial modernity, the (re)socialisation of countries into the international

community, the spread of democracy and the possibility to do justice for crimes against humanity.

Conceptual remarks on the images of states

Images of states are the central concept in this volume and therefore some clarifications are in order. We do not follow Robert Jervis' often-cited approach that relates images of states closely to external expectations about how these states will behave, and thus to strategic decision-making.²⁴ This definition of images is rather narrow and seems to explore the phenomenon through its consequences. At a very general level, an image is defined as a mental representation, impression or idea.²⁵ We understand an image as a mental picture of an entity that identifies its typical, maybe even unique characteristics through audio-visual or narrative representations. Images of states certainly have an audio-visual dimension, as states have territories, capitals and inhabitants. Germany is often pictured through images of its cities and landscapes, the Brandenburg Gate or the romantic valley of the Rhine. In caricatures, persons often come to stand for the country, from the *Kaiser* over Adolf Hitler to the post-war chancellors. In popular culture, the darkest episodes of German history are still visually present. Countless novels and movies still feature blond henchmen in Nazi uniforms who represent Germany as the archetypical evil. Visual images of Germany still include tanks, concentration camps and cities reduced to rubble; ecstatic crowds, geometrically aligned and uniformed that are greeting Hitler at the Nuremberg party rallies; or hailing 'total war' in response to Joseph Goebbels' 1943 'Sportpalast' speech. These visual images have spread around the world and, even if shot in black and white, they proved to be sticky.

Yet images of states also have a narrative dimension that contains ordered storylines with clear beginnings and endings. Historical narratives are often organised around some causal claims about what happened to a country and why.²⁶ Images of states may be created through the aggregation of such narratives, but can also precede more disciplined and coherent story-telling.²⁷ In any event, images of states convey what cannot be observed directly through our senses, and they represent them in a *pars pro toto* fashion. Images of states or nations are often transmitted through education and public discourses. Their public credibility depends greatly on how they interpret shared experiences and events.

The scholar K. E. Boulding, who inaugurated research on national images in the 1950s, argued that such images are shaped by structural, reciprocal and long-term developments, but also by recent events.

Furthermore, he emphasised how academics seize and elaborate on popular images of other nations. He frequently cited images of Germany, as the rogue state that invaded Belgium, the Nazi state or the ally of the US.²⁸ However, the latter image documents that scholars do not always distinguish neatly between images of states or nations and foreign policy role conceptions.²⁹

Talking about changing images of Germany may invoke the idea of a more or less orderly succession in which new images simply supersede their predecessors. Yet this would be a misconception. As many of the following chapters will illustrate, there never was just one image of Germany, but always several standing next to each other, sometimes compatible, sometimes contradictory. Images are created by an audience and external ascriptions usually matter as much as the actions and intentions of those observed. External re-descriptions tend to highlight and essentialise certain traits and aspects from a far more variegated and ambiguous picture. They reflect, as this book will also show, national experiences, anxieties and domestic political debates of the observers. Images of Germany are thus tainted by the interest and political projects of others. In other words, and in awareness of historiographical debates over the importance of historical events for analytical reconfigurations in the development of IR, we suggest that it is not historical events themselves but their stylised representation in discourse that affect academic theorising.³⁰

Even in times when digital texts and pictures flow seamlessly around the globe, local perceptions and interpretations of countries still vary. As new pictures of Germany become available, they will usually find different receptions influenced by national traditions of thinking about the country. For historical reasons, Israel, Poland or Russia may look differently at changing images of Germany than the US, Britain, or France. It is therefore important to underline that this book is limited to discussing Anglo-American perceptions of Germany. This is because the academic discipline of IR, whose transformations over time we also study in this book, is largely an English-language phenomenon. We thus concentrate on the writings of Anglo-American scholars and public intellectuals who had an impact on academic thinking about IR. Some chapters of this book also address the views of political decision-makers and the results of public opinion surveys, but these are not the main focus.

We are aware that the conception of this book does not allow for a truly global perspective on images of Germany. Due to our interest in the history of IR theorising, it is a Eurocentric endeavour and we do not cover perspectives on Germany from its former colonies, from Israel or Eastern Europe. Having said this, we are still confident that this volume can contribute to the decentring and globalisation of IR. It exposes the mechanisms of othering and exclusion, of Western self-assurance to be standing on the side of civilisation and moral progress, while at the

same time distancing itself from the backwardness of others. As Robbie Shilliam has argued, it was precisely this perceived 'backwardness' of Germany that became a long-term driver of German thought on IR.³¹

An overview of the chapters

In the next chapter, Andreas Osiander starts discussing the connection between images of Germany and the notion of power as a key concept of IR. In the eyes of many observers, Germany always had a peculiar and unusual relationship with power politics and, more specifically, power abuses. This was undoubtedly true of the Nazi regime, but there is a body of opinion that sees a tradition of German power being mishandled reaching further back, to the 1871 Empire or even beyond, with the foundations of what is seen as 'Prussian militarism.' To trace the origins of that line of thought, Osiander puts this issue into a historical perspective that is longer still, beginning with the founding of the German kingdom in the tenth century and then taking the story to the early twentieth century. Necessarily, his approach entails discussing what 'Germany' actually was at different stages of its historical trajectory. Its successive incarnations involved much change that necessarily also meant that power played a different and variable role for each of them. At the same time, 'power' is a notoriously multi-faceted concept, which of course complicates the matter further. The Nazi era and its impact on post-Second World War Germany is deliberately left out, not with any view to downplaying its importance, but in an attempt to avoid any temptation of either a teleological or a relativising, exculpatory interpretation of the subject matter at hand.

Chapter 3 takes issue with the rise of liberal internationalism as one of the original theories of IR and shows how it was constructed, at the beginning of the twentieth century, in distinction from a German other. Leonie Holthaus here seeks to reconstruct and contextualise liberal internationalism's image of an autocratic and militarist German adversary. Germany thus became part of the category of 'less civilised societies', which existed in Europe and beyond. The construction of the German other helped liberal internationalists accentuate their own (and Great Britain's) imagined political virtues. L. T. Hobhouse and other intellectuals, who were otherwise rather critical commentators of British foreign relations, strongly supported the official wartime propaganda and the othering of Germany during the First World War. In different social roles as academics or journalists, they distinguished between a Western and, by definition, liberal civilisation, led by Britain and a backward and militarist Germany. Unable to deny Germany's capacity for economic modernisation, which was all too obvious at the time, they nevertheless

contended that Germany was unable to allow for meaningful political self-government. Like later theorists of the *Sonderweg*, they identified Germany's rampant nationalism as the cause of its departure from the Western model.³²

To balance this view, Chapter 4 shows that despite all the othering of Germany, there were also notable German influences on international theory. Lucian M. Ashworth demonstrates that for most political geographers in pre-1914 Britain and America, Germany was a major source of inspiration. The home of Friedrich Ratzel and boasting excellent universities that took geography seriously, Germany was the place to go for lessons in the formulation of geography as a university subject. The early innovators in Anglo-American human and political geography, such as Ellen Churchill Semple, Ellsworth Huntington, Halford J. Mackinder and Isaiah Bowman, all looked to Germany and its universities for inspiration. The outbreak of the First World War was to change all that. The chapter traces how rapidly Germany went from exemplar to threat, but also that there was a period of overlap between these two contrasting views. Mackinder, for example, remained impressed with Germany's advances in geography and spatial literacy, while increasingly seeing that superior knowledge as part of the political and military threat posed by an insurgent Wilhelmine Empire. By the 1940s, though, German geography, through the popular image of Karl Haushofer, had been re-interpreted as a pathological throwback. All of these images of Germany, both positive and negative, were to some extent caricatures that bore little relation to the reality of the German situation. That said, the creation of Germany, first as exemplar and finally as warning, acted as the 'other' against which people like Bowman and Derwent Whittlesey created a contrasting Anglo-American geopolitics that would heavily influence the post-1945 construction of a new global order. In this sense, the vision of Germany and its geopolitics was the foil against which the post-war settlement was framed.

With the same keen sense for ambiguities and latent contradictions, Paul Petzschmann in Chapter 5 explores competing American accounts of the Weimar Republic and their significance for IR during the interwar period. At the centre of his account are two interpretations of the Weimar Republic in the context of German sovereignty and regime change. Johannes Mattern, America's foremost authority on matters concerning German constitutional history and jurisprudence, argued that the Weimar Constitution put an end to the legal debate about the location of sovereignty in the German polity. In his view, destabilising activities of radical political movements that contested the sovereignty of the Weimar republic were nothing but a temporary aberration from a political history steadily evolving towards undivided sovereignty. Rupert Emerson, on the other hand, regarded the revival of German Federalism

as part of an international trend towards fragmented sovereignty and as a potentially positive step into the direction of a new, 'post-sovereign' international order. Both interpretations show in an exemplary fashion how domestic concerns and debates shaped the observers' perceptions of Germany. Petzschmann highlights the importance of the American experience of the state, of contested sovereignty and of the Civil War for shaping academic discourses on sovereignty and IR. The rift between the ideal of legal sovereignty and its political reality prefigures diagnoses made by early realists such as Morgenthau.

In Chapter 6, Jens Steffek and Tobias Heinze continue this discussion. They show how Germany's fight against the Versailles peace settlement left a mark on early American IR realism. Studying transatlantic connections between German and American scholars in the interwar years, they show how an early version of political realism was used to discredit international law and organisations. Realist arguments about the ever-conflictual nature of IR and the inborn weakness of international law naturalised and legitimated German revisionism and the fight against the Treaty of Versailles. The discussion is focused on the international lawyer Edwin M. Borchard, one of the major advocates of neutrality in the US and one of the first American scholars promoting a realist approach to IR. He argued that international treaties, and in particular collective security schemes, were unable to accommodate change. Interwar Germany was his case in point to illustrate this theoretical claim. He developed this argument in a relentless political campaign against the Versailles peace settlement, the Kellogg Pact and military action against Nazi Germany. The chapter also documents how German international lawyers who were busy legitimating breaches of the Treaty of Versailles and trying to discredit American involvement in the Second World War profited from personal relations with Borchard and happily cited his ideas.

Transitional justice and the punishment of war crimes are the focus of Chapter 7, in which Annette Weinke shows how, since the 1990s, a worldwide community of transitional justice (TJ) scholars have taken the case of contemporary German history as a universal model for dealing with perpetrators and victims of state-sponsored violence. She argues that throughout the twentieth century, Germany was at the heart of transatlantic debates about international law, international criminal law and human rights. This discourse entailed a dualistic image of 'two Germanies', one peaceful and civilised, the other militarist and expansionist. The TJ discussions setting in immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall should be seen as part of a long trajectory that started with the First World War. In this chapter, Weinke disentangles these debates in a *longue durée* perspective and analyses their underlying political, ideological and historical assumptions. Given that punitive international legalism is deeply coloured by a dichotomous view on twentieth-century

German history, the chapter also raises the question of how this might have impacted on the evolution of international criminal law and on the emergence of a more robust international human rights regime, setting in immediately after the end of the Cold War.

Chapter 8 takes issue with the impact that German émigré scholars had on the development of IR in the US. This story has been told well in recent years, especially with regard to the classical realism of Hans J. Morgenthau and others. In this chapter, Felix Rösch addresses a puzzle that has received less attention so far. He shows how a distinctively German intellectual socialisation and a German style of argument continued to inform the political thought of the émigré scholars and how that fact became increasingly overlooked. As Rösch argues, it has to be acknowledged that émigré scholars at least partly caused this silencing themselves. After their forced emigration, they were at pains to adjust their research and teaching to the different intellectual and historical backgrounds of their American colleagues and students. They did so not only in order to find employment in the higher education sector, but also to avoid being perceived as enemy aliens. However, Rösch urges us to reverse the perspective and to explore the social spaces in which the immigrants acted and which they, to some degree, also transformed.

In Chapter 9, Brian C. Etheridge studies the nexus of memory, identity and public diplomacy in Cold War America. One of the remarkable phenomena of the Cold War is the rapid reversal of (West) Germany from enemy to ally in American political discourse. Often this reversal has been viewed as a necessary or inevitable expediency of the post-war conflict with the Soviet Union. Etheridge's chapter, and the larger work from which it draws, demonstrates that this process was much more complicated, and incomplete, than typically recognised. Using a framework called memory diplomacy, Etheridge highlights how both American and (West) German actors, both public and private, were involved in the production and reception of images of Germany. This process was messy and contentious as different groups fought over the shaping of American understanding of *Deutschtum* (or Germanness) through the mass media. Another equally important part is how the fruits of these efforts (articles, books, films, television programs, etc.) were interpreted by those Americans who consumed them. When taken together, they illustrate how narratives of Germany were more about the American understanding of self than the American understanding of Germanness.

In Chapter 10, Siegfried Schieder explores the external image of Germany's foreign policy. His starting point is the notion of a 'civilian power' – a state that pursues its foreign policy through multilateral diplomatic channels and economic cooperation rather than military force and that seeks to 'civilise' world politics by strengthening international institutions. According to dominant domestic self-understanding,

Germany is such a profoundly ‘tamed’ and ‘civilian’ power. However, since the 1990s, and especially in the recent crisis-ridden years, Germany has modified its role in light of far-reaching changes in its foreign policy environment. Against this backdrop, this chapter explores how Germany’s foreign policy is perceived from abroad. Is Germany still seen as a ‘civilian power’ from the outside or is the image of Germany’s foreign policy changing in times of crisis? The chapter builds on a constructivist reading of German foreign policy and reconstructs the political, historical and intellectual context in which Germany’s role conception as a ‘civilian power’ has evolved after the Second World War. It also explores whether Germany is still seen as a ‘civilian power’ by using surveys, opinion polls and other data. The evidence reveals a marked dissonance between Germany’s self-perception and outside views, which threatens the country’s credibility both at home and abroad.

In the concluding chapter, Richard Ned Lebow reconsiders the German influence on the development of IR theory. He shows that from the early years of the discipline onwards, the interchange of IR scholars between the Anglosphere and the *deutsche Sprachraum* has been nearly continuous and important for the intellectual growth of those involved, the development of the discipline and the view of Germany in the discipline. To gauge the importance of references to Germany for IR theory, Lebow uses a sample of twenty-one well-known theory books, representative of diverse traditions in the field and analyses the references to countries made in them. Germany’s central role in IR is, in Lebow’s judgement, attributable to several reinforcing factors. Germany was Europe’s dominant power from 1870 to 1945 and for much of that period sought to advance its interests through the exercise of military and economic power. German political and historical thought greatly influenced the realist tradition, and many first-generation realist IR scholars emigrated from continental Europe to the US. Will Germany remain such a central reference point for the future development of IR? In his conclusion, Lebow argues that this is rather unlikely. In recent decades, American economic and political interests have shifted away from Europe and have become increasingly focused on Asia. Academic theorising has also begun to move in this direction, spurred on by the evolution of a discipline that globalises and leaves its traditional focus on the Western world behind.

Notes

- 1 S. Hoffmann, *European Sisyphus: Essays on Europe 1964–1994* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 284, emphasis in original.
- 2 A. Smale and S. Erlanger, ‘As Obama exits world stage, Angela Merkel may be the liberal West’s last defender’, *New York Times*, 12 November 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/world/europe/germany-merkel-trump-election.html.

- 3 H. W. Maull, 'Germany and Japan: the new civilian powers,' *Foreign Affairs* 69 (1990), pp. 91–106; H. Haftendorn, *Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung 1945–2000* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2001); R. Baumann and G. Hellmann, 'Germany and the use of military force: "total war"; the "culture of restraint" and the quest for normality' *German Politics*, 10:1 (2001), pp. 61–82.
- 4 We use the term 'international theorist' to include a wide range of intellectuals who made abstract and generalising claims about the nature and regularities of social and political relations across borders. They were not necessarily affiliated with universities or IR as an academic discipline.
- 5 B. Schmidt and N. Guilhot (eds), *Historiographical Investigations in International Relations* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); D. Armitage, *Foundations of Modern International Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); C. Sylvest, *British Liberal Internationalism, 1880–1930: Making Progress?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009); B. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998); D. Long and P. Wilson (eds), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); A. Osiander, 'Rereading early twentieth-century IR theory: idealism revisited,' *International Studies Quarterly*, 42:3 (1998), pp. 409–32; P. Wilson, 'The myth of the "First Great Debate"', *Review of International Studies*, 24 (1998), pp. 1–15; D. Long and B. C. Schmidt, *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2005); L. M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought. From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2014); D. Bell (ed.), *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); R. Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).
- 6 A. Söllner, 'German conservatism in America: Morgenthau's political realism,' *Telos*, 72 (1987), pp. 161–72; R. N. Lebow, 'German Jews and American realism,' *Constellations*, 18:4 (2011), pp. 545–66; F. Rösch 'Introduction. Breaking the silence: European émigré scholars and the genesis of an American discipline,' in F. Rösch (ed.), *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations: A European Discipline in America?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 1–20; O. Jütersonke, *Morgenthau, Law and Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); R. N. Lebow (ed.), *Max Weber and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
- 7 On the role of the German other in the genesis of conceptions of the West, see R. Bavay and M. Steber (eds), *Germany and 'the West': The History of a Modern Concept* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015); G. Hellmann and B. Herborth (eds), *Uses of 'the West': Security and the Politics of Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
- 8 P. Wilson, 'Carr and his early critics: responses to the Twenty Years' Crisis, 1939–46,' in M. Cox (ed.) *E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), pp. 165–97.

- 9 L.M. Ashworth, 'Mapping a new world: geography and the interwar study of International Relations,' *International Studies Quarterly*, 57:1 (2013), pp. 138–49; N. Guilhot, 'Introduction: One discipline, many histories,' in N. Guilhot (ed.), *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 1–32, at p. 2; N. Spykman, 'Geography and foreign policy, I,' *American Political Science Review*, 32:1 (1938), pp. 28–50; N. Spykman, 'Geography and Foreign Policy, II,' *American Political Science Review* 32:2 (1938), pp. 213–36; H. W. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics* (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries, 1972 [reprint of 1942 edition]).
- 10 Rösch, *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations*; G. Steinmetz, 'Ideas in exile: refugees from Nazi Germany and the failure to transplant historical sociology into the United States,' *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Sociology*, 23 (2010), pp. 1–27; M. Ash and A. Söllner (eds), *Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Émigré German-Speaking Scientists and Scholars after 1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); U. Greenberg, *The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
- 11 On the legacy of the so-called Munich analogy and the problem of uncertainty in foreign policy decision-making, see F. V. Kratochwil, *International Order and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Sketch of Post-war International Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 89–100; J. Record, *The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2006); Y. F. Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
- 12 D. Plesch and T. G. Weiss, '1945's lesson: "Good enough" global governance ain't good enough,' *Global Governance*, 21:2 (2015), pp. 197–204, at p. 199; A. Salter, *Dumbarton Oaks Conference* (London: Chatham House Archives, 1944).
- 13 W. Krieger, 'Die Amerikanische Deutschlandplanung. Hypotheken und Chancen für einen Neuanfang,' in H. E. Volkman (ed.), *Ende des Dritten Reiches – Ende des zweiten Weltkriegs. Eine perspektivische Rückschau* (Munich: Piper, 1995), pp. 25–50; J. Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 165.
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