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Introduction: thinking about America in the world over the longer run

For all their bragging and their hypersensitivity, Americans are, if not the most critical, at least the most anxiously self-conscious people in the world, forever concerned about the inadequacy of something or other – their national morality, their national culture, their national purpose. This very uncertainty has given their intellectuals a critical function of special interest. The appropriation of some of this self-criticism by foreign ideologues for purposes that go beyond its original scope or intention is an inevitable hazard. But the possibility that a sound enterprise in self-correction may be overheard and misused is the poorest of reasons for suspending it.¹

There are, perhaps, times in political history when public reflection, the role of ideas and the life of the mind seem less well starred than others. If so, the middle months of 2016 in the North Atlantic world offered a distinctly depressing constellation. From the extraordinary purveyance of spectral evidence and attractive falsehoods in the campaigns for the US presidency and the UK membership of the European Union to the awful massacres perpetrated on continental Europe in the name of religious zealotry, much of the ‘global North’ looked and felt darkened by a pall of militant anti-intellectualism of a type so vigorously deconstructed by Richard Hofstadter half a century earlier. And yet, when reviewed even superficially, much of the rhetoric, many supposed ‘facts’ and a great deal of the ostensible reasoning related to the ‘rest of the world’. This included those considerable portions of planetary space occupied by people of Muslim faith, the population of Mexico, refugees from war-torn Syria and other victims of the ‘War on Terror’, which persisted after a dozen years even if its title had been disowned by the administration of Barack Obama, who signally failed to close down the extra-territorial detention and punishment camp in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

In the United States a spate of killings of African Americans – some in their place of private worship; others in public by officers of the state – raised

acute issues about the very parameters of citizenship that predated the era of Civil Rights and revived views on race associated with the pre-Civil War republic. The impact of killings depicted so vividly by contemporary telephony brought into the twenty-first century visceral sentiments and conceptual constructions associated with an era of human bondage. And that reaction was not just inside the United States; it was amply registered in the world abroad. In Great Britain, a state that had gone to war in 1939 in defence of the territorial integrity of Poland, citizens of the latter country became prime targets of a xenophobic campaign concocted with appreciable appetite and minimal disguise by a section of the political elite supported by a powerful yellow press. One Member of Parliament, Jo Cox, who in the campaign for the referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union had deployed a language of solidarity and unity more redolent of North America than England, was assassinated.

The immediate impression was of a bewildering interaction of 'post-truth politics' and 'collective memory', conducted in a hybrid manner that exploited popular sentiment and sought to strengthen state managerialism. What once, in a firmly Protestant register, used to be denoted a lie had become 'Bullshit', knowingly and purposefully untrue, almost designed to be reinforced by rebuttal and fortified by falsification.² In this regard the trajectory of Donald Trump far exceeded that of, say, Barry Goldwater, in a stream of vulgar assertions that did not stop at the seashore, but teased the ruler of Russia and abused the people of Mexico in a manner that requires recourse to the ideas of Nietzsche and Foucault as much as those of Diderot for its proper understanding. Simultaneously, Boris Johnson, the lead vocalist of the 'Brexiters' in the UK, and a man vainly proud of his classical education, ratcheted up such tendentious associations on matters domestic and international – Turkey's impeding membership of the EU was his preferred artifice – that he seemed set for a positively Ciceronian fate, only to be appointed Foreign Secretary upon a victory that was possibly as consequential as Britain's loss of its thirteen North American colonies in 1783.³

These were the ugly politics of the political elite, but they bore down heavily on the everyday lives and world visions of each populace at large. At the time of the US Republican Party Convention majorities in several 'rustbelt' states, formerly proletarian and safely mortgaged members of 'the middle class' embraced an *enragé* denial of the extended inequities foisted upon them by the neoliberal elite against which Trump so angrily and artlessly inveighed. That political class was, in turn, temporarily flummoxed by a proven liar who repeatedly assailed his opponent as 'Lyn' Hillary', so that the Democrats increasingly relied upon ethnic identity to do their ideological heavy-lifting for them, whilst a rump of 'Vichy Republicans' simply disowned the more base invective. With the signal exception of Trump's

criticism of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners, they stopped well short of that fabled salt-water bipartisanship on foreign policy. Only some Republican Party foreign policy specialists, such as Robert Kagan, whose work Obama much admired, were brave enough to become public turncoats.⁴

The term 'isolationism' was widely heard anew in 2016, and in a national and international context comprehensively distinct to that of the 1930s. 'Populism' seems too superficial a term to capture such a phenomenon. Yet the 'Washington Consensus', so associated with free market restructuring of Latin American economies in the 1980s and the 'pink tide' anti-American backlash of the early twenty-first century, was also applied in key ways to the US domestic economy. When screened for long-standing national tropes, the Trump election campaign of 2016 is usefully compared with that of 1998 by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. Their rhetoric, indicting the lords of misrule and heralding the armies of deliverance, offers reward to an international history of ideas.

Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in the 1830s, believed that foreign affairs were an intrinsically aristocratic pursuit: 'Foreign affairs demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of those in which it is deficient ... A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, preserve it in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles.'⁵

Personal interest and practical experience, however, are rather distinct from intellectual capacity. For Thomas Jefferson, serving as American minister in pre-revolutionary Paris, the matter was less hierarchical: 'State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.'⁶

Perhaps, indeed, the dichotomy between 'intellect' and 'common sense' is too starkly drawn in times of crisis? Certainly, the debate over US foreign policy at the end of the second Obama term was as modulated as could be expected with such low levels of cooperation between the executive and a Republican-controlled congress. The latter made little headway in impugning the nuclear agreement with Iran, despite breaking all protocol in providing Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu a platform for bitter criticism of US policy. Equally, Obama's restoration of diplomatic relations with the communist regime in Havana excited far less outrage than might be expected after forty years of Cold War quasi-blockade and a vociferous émigré community in the politically vital states of Florida and New Jersey. Congress alone had control of the future of the trade embargo, but even there significant Republican sectors responded to corporate interests that sought

access to a market out of which the United States had shut itself, rather like Jefferson and Madison had done with Europe during the Napoleonic conflict.

There was next to no popular concern about Obama's visit to Hiroshima in May 2016, when he repeated his call for the voluntary surrender of nuclear weaponry. As we will see, assessing the balance between continuity and rupture in US foreign affairs is a matter of considerable importance and interpretative controversy, even when periodisations familiar to the popular mind are involved. In 2016 very few recalled that US public opinion in August 1945 had been strongly in favour of yet further bombing. Equally, the nativist instincts reflected and ignited by the Trump campaign had plenty of precedents, not least in the elective ignorance of the 'Know-Nothings' of the 1850s who sought to 'purify' Anglo-American society by halting Irish and, remarkably, German immigration.⁷

For Hofstadter, it was McCarthyism that 'aroused the fear that the critical mind was at ruinous discount in this country'. Writing a decade after McCarthy's fall – tellingly triggered by a call to 'decency' made on television not unlike those made about Trump's invectives against the parents of the late Captain Humayan Khan – Hofstadter came to a plausibly modulated conclusion: 'The greater part of the public, and a great part even of the intelligent and alert public, is simply non-intellectual; it is infused with enough ambivalence about intellect and intellectuals to be swayed now this way and now that on current cultural issues.'⁸

'The intellectual' and intellectuals in public life

All the contributors to this book are intellectuals, but they all also hold academic positions. Academics, of course, don't always fulfil the common desiderata for 'independent' and informed reflection on public life, and, as Jefferson's declaration shows, 'intellectual' serves equally well as adjective and noun. None the less, for the modern age Christopher Hitchens had a point when he adopted the term 'public intellectual' as a 'term that expresses a difference between true intellectuals and the rival callings of "opinion maker" or "pundit", especially as the last two are intimately bound up with the world of television'.⁹

Like many others, Hitchens traces the dismissive or abusive connotations of 'intellectual' back to the Dreyfus affair of the 1890s, even as he noted in 2008 that the species had become such an object of 'celebrity' that rankings were regularly being published.¹⁰ *Foreign Policy* in that same year listed a 'Top 100', provoking Russell Jacoby, arguably the originator of the term 'public intellectual', into a renewal of his view that the traditional role of an independent thinker orientated to the mainstream public

had become marginalised by escalating academic specialism and attachment to Marxism, the rise of the internet and the expansion of African American and female intellectuals. In a sign of the waspishness that often obtains in such circles, Jacoby noted that the ‘decline of public intellectuals correlates with the rise of Richard Posner’. Posner, a judge on the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, had recently published *Public Intellectuals: A Study in Decline*, which did a great deal of counting itself (of citations and website hits) as well devoting much space to the ‘Jeremiah School’ with an affinity for cultural pessimism (Lasch; Himmelfarb; Putnam; Bork; Kristol).¹¹

Here the politics is pretty close to the surface. For Hitchens, the ‘decline’ in Posner’s title owed much to the fact that his choice of top intellectual was Henry Kissinger. Posner himself is not greatly interested in politics, still less foreign policy, but his own least favourite intellectual appears to be Noam Chomsky:

[T]he most influential figure in modern linguistics and probably in cognitive science as well. In book, pamphlet, lecture and interview, he repeatedly denounces the United States for violent, lawless, repressive, and imperialistic behavior as black as that of Hitler’s Germany ... Not that Chomsky’s dozens of books and pamphlets contain no useful interesting information and interesting half-truths, as when he calls Theodore Roosevelt a ‘racist fanatic and raving jingoist’. But the tone and the one-sidedness of this characterization are all too typical.¹²

Hitchens had an indirect response to this:

An intellectual need not be one who, in a well-known but essentially meaningless phrase, ‘speaks truth to power’. (Chomsky has dryly reminded us that power often knows the truth well enough.) However, the attitude towards authority should probably be sceptical, as should the attitude towards utopia, let alone heaven or hell. Other aims should include the ability to survey the present through the optic of a historian, the past with the perspective of the living, and the culture and language of others with the equipment of an internationalist.¹³

Meeting even these provisional requirements is a tall ask, and it was not one that Hitchens himself always managed. For Tony Judt, a historian at New York University, Hitchens was one of ‘Bush’s Useful Idiots’ (along with Michael Walzer of Princeton; Todd Gitlin of Columbia; Michael Ignatieff of Oxford, Cambridge and Harvard) for supporting the military response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks as ‘liberal hawks’. Not unlike Posner, Judt made a backward-looking analogy:

Like Stalin’s western admirers who, in the wake of Khrushchev’s revelations, resented the Soviet dictator not so much for his crimes as for discrediting their

Marxism, so intellectual supporters of the Iraq War ... in the North American liberal establishment ... have focused their regrets not on the catastrophic invasion itself (which they all supported) but on its incompetent execution. They are irritated with Bush for giving 'preventive war' a bad name.¹⁴

Some of the discussion in David Milne's chapter on Paul Wolfowitz suggests that this polemic might usefully be seen in a wider context – one, for instance, in which successful Western military intervention and the notable absence of it (or significant liberal calls for such) during the Rwandan genocide could be cast as a renovated anti-fascism (Hitchens) and the supersession of interests by human rights (Ignatieff).¹⁵

One prior step in this history – a history that might possess something of a 'tradition' – adduced by Judt was the full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* of 26 October 1988 rebuking President Reagan for treating the term 'liberal' with opprobrium. Signed by sixty-three prominent writers, businessmen and intellectuals (including Daniel Bell, J. K. Galbraith, Felix Rohatyn, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, Irving Howe and Eudora Welty), the petition upheld liberal principles as 'timeless. Extremists of the right and of the left have long attacked liberalism as their greatest enemy. In our own times liberal democracies have been crushed by such extremists.'

Nor, as we have seen, was the stage left to the 'centre'. In 1967, during the darkest moments of the Vietnam War, Irving Kristol and Noam Chomsky pitched openly antagonist claims from right and left as to the role of American intellectuals and foreign policy. For Kristol:

No modern nation has ever constructed a foreign policy that was acceptable to its intellectuals ... It is among American intellectuals that the isolationist ideal is experiencing its final, convulsive agony ... since there is no way the United States, as the world's mightiest power, can avoid such an imperial role, the opposition of its intellectuals means that this role will be played out in a domestic climate of ideological dissent that will enfeeble the resolution of our statesmen and diminish the credibility of their policies abroad.¹⁶

Perhaps Kristol had been goaded by a piece published by Chomsky that February in *The New York Review of Books*, where he argued:

Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of governments, to analyse actions according to their causes and motives and often hidden intentions. In the Western world, at least, they have the power that comes from political liberty, from access to information and freedom of expression ... Arthur Schlesinger, according to the *Times*, February 6, 1966, characterized our Vietnamese policies of 1954 as 'part of our general program of international goodwill'. Unless intended as irony, this remark shows either colossal cynicism, or the inability, on a scale that defies measurement, to comprehend elementary phenomena of contemporary history ... The long tradition of naiveté

and self-righteousness that disfigures our intellectual history ... must serve as a warning ... as to how our protestations of sincerity and benign intent are to be interpreted.¹⁷

Such exchanges must have exasperated Daniel Bell, a co-signatory of the 1988 petition and author of a 1960 essay 'On the End of Ideology', which, resting on the notion of 'post-industrialism', contended that sensible people should now eschew social dreaming and focus on practical, technical issues. Anticipating Francis Fukuyama's 'End of History' by a couple of decades, Bell's maximalist optimism might usefully be seen as a Cold War endorsement of the core conviction that, in all its timeliness, liberalism was no ideology. However, subsequent developments almost inevitably condemned him to the kind of jeremiads that justified Jacoby and Posner's depiction of intellectual decline. By 1992 Bell was declaiming:

There is no longer any intellectual center in the United States. And, for that matter, very few intellectuals remain, if by intellectuals one means those socially unattached individuals devoted solely to the search for truth ... The United States today is a *bourgeois society but not a bourgeois culture* ... The *culture* of the United States today is permissive in its ethos (especially on moral and sexual issues) and modernist in its willingness to accept new and innovative and trendy expressions in the arts and literature. It is, to use the phrase of Lionel Trilling, an 'adversary culture', in opposition to the prevailing societal attitudes.¹⁸

Bell rejected Kristol's notion of a 'new class', an intellectual stratum of elites from the media, universities and publishing, as being a conceptual muddle rather than a cogent category. However, responsive to the role of agency and the evidence of change, he admitted Kristol's wry definition of a neoconservative as 'a liberal who has been mugged by reality'.¹⁹

Few of the thinkers mentioned above engaged directly in consultancy over foreign policy, still less serving in official state and government positions to advise and promote ideas. Aside from the obvious case of Kissinger, Schlesinger is the most prominent 'in-and-outer' moving between the academy and government, serving as speechwriter for the Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson (arguably the most 'intellectual' person to gain that nomination) and then the Kennedy administration, where his role in the Bay of Pigs invasion was understandably criticised by Chomsky. Other names who rose to prominent public positions in foreign policy formulation during the first decades of the Cold War – either going on from university posts or retiring to them – include George Kennan, Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow. Less publicised were members of the RAND Corporation – the think-tank run by the air force – and the

‘May Group’ at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government – which made a detailed analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis – studied by Bruce Kuklick.²⁰

Perry Anderson has identified a similar set of bodies for the contemporary period: the Council on Foreign Relations; Kennedy School at Harvard; Woodrow Wilson Center, Princeton; Nitze School, Johns Hopkins; Naval War College; Georgetown University; the Brookings and Carnegie Foundations, among many others: ‘Think-tanks, of central importance in this world, dispense their fellows from teaching; in exchange they expect a certain public impact – columns, op-eds, talk-shows, best-sellers – from them; not on the population as a whole, but among the small, well-off minority that takes an interest in such matters.’²¹

Moreover, we should recognise that policy as formulated and enunciated in office can be very different to policy as implemented on the ground, especially overseas, and in many more ways than indicated by Chomsky’s partisan perspective. Well before the information overload of the internet, primary source material (often with allied ‘feedback loops’) from the field emanated not only from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department and the military but also Peace Corps organisers, missionaries, anthropologists, urban planners and a range of professionals either formally on foreign service, seconded to the federal government or simply open to debriefing on their research. On occasion, particularly in the case of anthropology, this caused controversy at home.²²

The problem of continuity and rupture

In his assessment of the work of Walter Russell Mead, Anderson identifies a problem that extends well beyond this particular author – the extent to which modern or current US policy might be explained by the past, and how direct or interrupted such a lineage of origin might be. Anderson adeptly synthesises Mead’s explanation as to why the US was free of European traditions of geopolitical realism and much more attached to the policy drivers of economic interest and moral calling: ‘the policies determining these ends were the product of a unique democratic synthesis: Hamiltonian pursuit of commercial advantage for American enterprise abroad; Wilsonian duty to extend the values of liberty across the world; Jeffersonian concern to preserve the virtue of the republic from foreign temptations; and Jacksonian valour in any challenge to the honour or security of the country.’²³

The first two elements might be characterised as elite preferences, the third one of intellectual inclination and the final one more related to folk ethos, something close in tone to the populism that dismayed de Tocqueville and the Republican opponents of Donald Trump. More important than this, though, for Perry Anderson is the deceptive

smoothness of the single-surname associations: ‘Analytically ... it rests on the *non-sequitur* of an equivalence between them, as so many contributors to a common upshot ... the reality is that of the four traditions, only two have had consistent weight since the Spanish American Conflict; the others furnish little more than sporadic supplies of cassandricism and cannon-fodder.’²⁴

Although more variegated, Mead’s genealogy suffers from a similar flaw as that identified by Ian Tyrrell in the highly influential work of Louis Hartz, ‘where the liberal “fragment” derived from Europe’s more complex social structure determines the nature of political debate. The fragment becomes frozen and loses its dialectical relationship with other fragments to produce a self-perpetuating “tradition”. All major political and ideological developments can be explained in terms of such a national pathology.’²⁵

Dorothy Ross advances an alternative explanation for the nature of the American polity that is methodologically richer than Hartz’s, because it contains more than one variable and they can be supposed to vary over time:

[T]he consensual framework of American politics that developed in the late 18th and early 19th centuries formed out of the intersection of Protestant, republican, and liberal ideas around the idea of America. Inscribed in the national ideology were not only liberal market values, but Protestant and republican ambivalence towards capitalist development and historical change. It created not a stable liberal consensus, but a continuing quarrel with history.²⁶

A similarly tripartite approach to explaining the arc of US foreign policy over the history of the republic has been proposed by David C. Hendrickson, who deploys the familiar markers of union, nation and empire to symbolise ideas of internationalism, nationalism and imperialism that have interacted throughout the ages, albeit in differing strengths. Hendrickson’s method is based on a *pointilliste* narrative, and so is more allusive than rigid. It may still be too determinist for Tyrrell’s taste, but it addresses three familiar grand narratives of US foreign policy: a post-Second World War multi-lateral constitutional system (or union) led for the world by America; the United States as a realist and exceptionalist nation making instrumental alliances for the purposes of security; and the United States as an empire with dependents, protectorates and satrapies, either on account of the need for unbridled capitalist expansion or through a civic culture ‘enthralled by the use of force’.²⁷

Hendrickson’s account ends with the US entry into the Second World War and so is focused on providing a kind of ‘pre-history’ of more familiar modern and contemporary debates and practices. He sees all of these are being raised in the debates of 1787 and 1788 over the Constitution, and brings something of the sensibility of an ‘originalist’ to the discussion of US

foreign policy. This, though, does not impede him from challenging some favourite received beliefs:

Far from being indifferent to the security problems that have drawn the anxious attention of internationalists in the Twentieth Century, Americans were obsessed by them from the American Revolution to the Civil War. They did not enjoy the alternative of withdrawing from 'the state system' because they were squarely in the middle of one. This condition helps explain why their 'domestic' discourse was filled throughout with language of a decided internationalist tenor, why there emerged doctrines of the balance of power, of intervention (and non-intervention), of the equality of states, of defense against aggression. That the greatest war in Western Civilization from 1815 to 1914 was fought in North America gives some idea of the conflict that lay embedded within the American union.²⁸

In short, at least until 1865, think of the United States itself in international as well as national terms.

Space is not the only variable that deserves reconsideration; time can also usefully be reviewed in terms of direction and inference. When after the Cold War Fukuyama pronounced 'the end of history', he was in one sense simply restating a traditional motif, for, as Ross notes, 'in classical republican discourse, time is the enemy of the life of the republic, the bearer of decay and usurpation'.²⁹ During the Cold War itself, this negativity was encased in an existential claim of the highest order, as vividly explained by Anders Stephanson:

Whereas the Soviet Union, representing (it claimed), the penultimate stage of history, was locked in a dialectical struggle for the final liberation of mankind, the United States *is* that very liberation. It is the end; it is already a world empire, it can have no equal, no dialectical Other. What is not like the United States can, in principle, have no proper efficacy. It is either a perversion or, at best, a not yet.³⁰

A state of perfection knows no race, but where did it come from? Here there are some variations in the familiar voicings of what we might term the exceptionalist historiography, both 'intellectual' and more popular. According to Ross, after the War of 1812, which put an effective end to open Anglo-American enmity (if not cultural recrimination):

American writers often linked their national history to the account of Anglo-Saxon liberty developed in England. American self-government was attached to a continuous inheritance that went back to the Teutonic tribes that vanquished Rome. Its institutions were carried by the Saxons to England, preserved in Magna Carta and the Glorious Revolution, and planted in the colonies, where it reached its most perfect form in the American Revolution and Constitution.³¹

These proclaimed ethnic qualities of national descent were certainly present before the Revolution and readily accepted by a white population that was perhaps 80 per cent of British origin. They were still more sharply projected in the nineteenth century, with liturgical Protestantism being overtaken by an evangelical ‘Manifest Destiny’, which in the 1840s justified westward movement at the expense of peoples to be declared inferior in the voice of science from the 1870s.³² As Andrew Saxton has argued, racism is, amongst other things, a theory of history.³³

Yet if the ascription of inferiority continued apace, the claimed virtues of the Anglo-Saxon/Teutonic/Caucasian bloodline had to be mediated in the face of rising immigration. As shown in the case of Andrew Carnegie discussed here by Duncan Bell, such virtues were to be energetically upheld into the twentieth century (and would, of course, reinvigorate trans-Atlantic discourse once the United States entered both World Wars). None the less, even before the Spanish–American War of 1898 the triumphalist fission of vertical descent was being leavened by the virtues of fusion, with the term ‘melting pot’ placed centre-stage by Israel Zangwill’s 1908 play of that name.³⁴

These were the identity politics of what we might term the dominant bloc, and they did little or nothing to alter what W. E. B. du Bois termed the international colour line. Indeed, until very recently the academic discipline of international relations displayed a massive deficit with respect to racism, and yet just two years after Zangwill’s play opened the *Journal of Race Development* was founded, mutating into the *Journal of International Relations* in the wake of the Second World War. As Robert Vitalis has recently shown, there existed a vibrant school of black analysts of international politics at Howard University in the inter-war years, when their conceptual innovations (such as Raymond Leslie Buell’s ‘complex interdependence’ of 1925) suffered from ‘the norm against noticing’: ‘As far as I have been able to determine ... in the 1920s and 1930s no white international relations scholar argued on either principled or pragmatic grounds for the restoration of black citizenship right, the dismantling of Jim Crow in the United States, and self-governance, let alone independence, for the colonies.’³⁵

Several decades later, decolonisation had advanced and black African diplomats were being accredited to Washington. The scandals caused by their expulsion from the still segregated diners on Maryland’s Route 40 threatened to undermine all pretence at republican universalism, spoiling the Kennedy administration’s ‘soft power’ outreach to the Third World. The essence of the contradiction was neatly captured by Secretary of State Dean Rusk: ‘Let me say with a Georgia accent, that we cannot solve this problem if it requires a diplomatic passport to claim the rights of an American citizen.’³⁶

Precisely because of the ‘norm against noticing’, the historical interaction between religious belief, intellectual outlook and international politics was the subject of much greater mainstream academic controversy, not least in the twentieth-century debates over the influential interpretations of Vernon Parrington and Perry Miller.³⁷ Few would dispute the fact that in the colonial era religious ideas travelled as fast as any other by dint of advanced institutional support, or that key amongst such experiences was ‘The Great Awakening’ of the 1730s and 1740s and the doctrinal propositions of Jonathan Edwards. An intellectual history of America prior to the mid-nineteenth century must place Puritan theology close to its core. At the same time, any supposed lineage from Edwards through to, say, Billy Graham, has to pass through the era of Transcendentalism and the veritable force-field exercised by Reinhold Niebuhr (a telling influence on Obama), as well as the arrival of the non-Protestant diasporas on the continent.

For Andrew Preston there has been a significant deficit in the understanding of US foreign policy from a religious perspective. He suggests that this might be explained by partisanship and advocacy (even if quite similar foreign policies have been pursued by presidents of distinct denominations); secularisation; and the empirical and methodological challenges presented by these barely cognate fields. The putative separation of politics from religious faith, and the lack of an American war specifically to extend the Christian faith, have also acted as disincentives. ‘Why do they hate us?’ was not such a frequently posed question before 11 September 2001, and it cannot be addressed without a much greater appreciation of the sacred than US social science has habitually embraced.³⁸ Even Perry Anderson notes that: ‘America would not be America without faith in the supernatural. But for obvious reasons this component of the national ideology is inner-directed, without much appeal abroad, and so now relegated to the lowest rung in the structure of imperial justification.’³⁹

Finally, when reviewing these ideational ancestries and any allied path dependencies over 250 years, we do need to be mindful of what J. R. Pole rightly called the ‘inelegant’ term of ‘presentism’, which is not just teleology but also condescension.⁴⁰ It is worth noting, for instance, that the State Department was nowhere mentioned in the original Constitution, and that when James Madison took its helm in 1801 his staff amounted to no more than one chief clerk, seven clerks and a messenger. Even a quarter of century later – after the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ had proclaimed Washington’s refusal to countenance new European colonies in the Western hemisphere – Henry Clay had less than double Madison’s establishment to support correspondence with just fourteen US ministers, two claims

agents and 110 honorary consuls overseas. The Department's principal tasks were issuing passports and sea-letters, and compiling lists of passengers entering the country.⁴¹ The population was less than thirteen million, and the electorate in the first popular vote for the presidency (1824) was 356,000 – all white males. The entire armed forces of the republic on its fiftieth anniversary were one-third the size of the Mexican army. Even at the outbreak of the Civil War, the US Army numbered a little over sixteen thousand men, with 183 of its 198 companies stationed on 79 posts on the Indian frontier. It was not until 1912 that all of continental territory west of the Mississippi had achieved statehood.⁴² Through to the 1880s the United States enjoyed what C. Vann Woodward called 'free security' courtesy of the Royal Navy, funded by the British taxpayer.⁴³ Notions of 'full spectrum dominance', so unremarkable in the second half of the twentieth century, would have been utterly incomprehensible in the Age of Reconstruction.

Even closer to the present, the extent and pace of change can be disconcerting. Although the US economy overtook that of the UK in the 1880s, and by 1913 its output exceeded that of the UK, France and Germany combined, the real 'quantum jump' took place during the Second World War.⁴⁴ Between 1938 and 1945 gross national product (GNP) doubled, so that at the end of hostilities, when nearly a third of GNP was devoted to defence, the US economy was three times larger than that of the USSR and five times that of the UK, and accounted for half of global industrial output. This economic superiority did not continue to accelerate at the same rate, but post-war institutional 'deepening' certainly did not revert to the status quo ante. Between the presidencies of Truman and Reagan the staff of the White House multiplied tenfold; today the staff of the National Security Council is over two hundred – four times that in 1990. Since 1960 the budget of the CIA has risen tenfold, to over US\$44 billion.⁴⁵

In terms of the academic domain in which ideas about America in the world are taught and debated, the pattern of growth has been equally impressive but rather differently paced. In 1890, when the frontier was declared closed and the total population was 63 million, Frederick Jackson Turner obtained one of only 149 PhD degrees awarded by US universities, which issued 15,500 BAs. In 1950, at the end of the first post-war student cycle, 432,000 first degree and 6,600 PhDs were awarded (population 151 million). By 2009 1.6 million students were graduating with a first degree and 67,000 with a PhD out of a population of 307 million. It cannot, of course, be assumed that the quality of ideas relates directly to the number of people receiving them, but the range of spread in both absolute and relative terms is not an insignificant factor.

To the Wisconsin School and beyond

The temptation offered by David Hendrickson to consider the sections of the Antebellum Republic as treating each other as if they were foreign, for our purposes, is best seen as a corrective against easy teleological attribution. None the less, there are some significant precursors to note beyond the putative lines of descent from Hamilton and Jefferson.

Addressing the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Harvard in August 1837, Emerson exhibited impatience with the mental inertia of Jacksonian America, looking forward to an age ‘when the sluggish intellect of this continent will look from under its iron lids and fill the postponed expectation of the world with something better than the exertions of mechanical skill’.⁴⁶ Yet the following year it was only after much popular agitation that he penned a protest letter – ‘hated of me’ – to President Van Buren about ‘this tragic Cherokee business’, describing the prosecution of the Native Americans in Georgia as ‘like dead cats around one’s neck’.⁴⁷ Thoreau was younger and more resolute, refusing to pay taxes that might fund the Mexican War ten years later, and paying with his liberty for a few hours. In his final years Gallatin denounced that same war with resonant authority and to no effect. On the other hand, George Bancroft, fabulously wealthy author of a ten-volume history of the United States, was not only a fervent Jacksonian, which made him something of a pariah in Massachusetts, but also served as Secretary of the Navy and issued the orders for the taking of Veracruz. Bancroft’s history never entered the nineteenth century; but if it had done, his depiction of the Revolution may even have been exceeded: ‘The heart of Jefferson in writing the declaration ... beat for all humanity ... and ... astonished nations, as they read that all men are created equal.’⁴⁸

So, well before the Civil War something of a pattern of intellectual criticism of and support for government policy existed in both high and low registers. However, it would be hard to disagree with Robert Beisner that Gilded Age ‘anti-imperialism’ was ‘never a movement before 1898’.⁴⁹ The expansionism that discomforted Emerson was territorial: the peoples removed from their traditional lands had been in a form of ‘domestic dependency’ and, however imperfectly respected, treaties had been signed with them. In an argument that Perry Anderson picks up approvingly from Franz Schurmann, there is a qualitative difference between expansionism and imperialism, with the former exciting limited intellectual disapproval and extensive popular support, not just in the latter half of the nineteenth century but also through the first decades of the twentieth century:

Expansionism was the step-by-step adding on of territory, productive assets, strategic bases and the like, as always practised by older empires, and continued

by America since the war through a spreading network of invasions, client states and overseas garrisons on every continent. By contrast ‘imperialism as a vision and doctrine has a total, world-wide quality. It envisages the organisation of large parts of the world from the top down, in contrast to expansionism, which is accretion from the bottom up’.⁵⁰

Following through with this logic, Anderson identifies a ‘crystallisation’ in the 1940s of an American World Order that had hitherto been developed only within regional enclaves (the Caribbean archipelago) or essayed in unsuccessful fashion on a world scale (by Woodrow Wilson). In this he draws on a second important argument from Schurmann – that such a universalism could only secure both international compliance and domestic endorsement through its modelling on the New Deal of the 1930s: ‘What Roosevelt sensed and gave visionary expression to was that the world was ripe for one of the most radical experiments in history: the unification of the entire world under a domination centred in America.’⁵¹

This view, which explicitly repudiates the notion that US imperialism was ‘the natural outgrowth of a capitalist world market system which America helped to revive after 1945’, goes against the grain of much critical historiography, especially that emanating from within the United States.⁵² It is not that free enterprise was a minor element in the ‘wider arc of American power projection’, but that it – rather like religion – could not be a central leitmotif, and the underlying reason for this is that the logics of state and capital, which arise from distinct origins, are different. It is one thing to attribute either the general needs or precise turns of foreign policy to some ‘capitalist logic’, and it quite another to see these, from the early twentieth century onwards, as realised within ‘the monochrome ideological universe in which the system is plunged: an all-capitalist order, without a hint of social democratic weakness or independent organisation by labour’.⁵³ However, an extra element in the US foreign policy lexicon and imagination did emerge in the post-war period – the increasingly vital profile of ‘security’. Here Anderson agrees with both Schurmann and John Thompson that security evolved – principally though the continuous exaggeration of threats – into an entire ideology: ‘Masking strategies of offence as exigencies of defence, no theme was better calculated to close the potential gap between popular sentiments and elite designs.’⁵⁴

Of course, that is not a congenial appraisal for many liberal analysts, whether this is because it seems to diminish the role of ideas *tout court* or because it shares none of the ideational traffic of US foreign policy as enunciated, practised and often interpreted, or because it does not provide great granularity of explanation between specific decisions and broad objectives.⁵⁵ From a more radical perspective, it deviates from what has become known

as the ‘Wisconsin School’, which has more recently been associated with the work of William Appleman Williams from the late 1950s. Further back stands Frederick Jackson Turner, who offered sociological explanations for the distinctiveness of US development and civic culture in rejection of the ‘germ thesis’ of his PhD supervisor Herbert Baxter Adams which promulgated a genealogical descent from Teutonic civilisation of the type noted by Dorothy Ross. The progressive alternative lineage stems from the 1890s, with the Battles of Wounded Knee and San Juan Hill bracketing that decade as apparent instances of a closing territorial expansionism and an opening saltwater imperialism. The year 1898 – the year of the Spanish–American War – is very extensively taken as a watershed in American foreign policy and a landmark in its role as a Great Power/Empire.

Here, though, historians need to be mindful of the calibrations between events and processes. Turner provided more of an allusive than tightly illustrated bridge in his influential ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’ (1893). That essay attributed US social, developmental and political strength to the experience of its westward expansion, which increasingly severed (white settler) communities from enervating European ideas and institutions:

According to Turner, the West was a place where easterners and Europeans experienced a return before civilization when the energies of the race were young. Once the descent to the primitive was complete, frontier communities underwent an evolution which recapitulated the development of civilization itself, tracing the path from hunter to trader to farmer to town. In that process of descent and revolution – as the frontier successively emerged and vanished – a special American character was forged, marked by fierce individualism, pragmatism, and egalitarianism.⁵⁶

Initially voiced in rejection of European ‘entanglement’, this positive isolationism was later converted by Turner into a confident internationalism, even after the failure of Wilson’s efforts at Versailles: ‘The nation which [Washington] founded has become a great nation – so great that the question turns upon whether its economic and moral force is not strong enough to impress an American system and American ways upon Europe rather than to submit to fear from the influence of Europe upon itself.’⁵⁷

If the frontier experience had progressively freed you from Europe at home, now it has closed, such a history may – or even must – enable you to repeat the experience overseas. Who better to illustrate this essentially romantic thesis than Theodore Roosevelt, whose roughness was Jacksonian, whose corollary was Hamiltonian and whose domestic progressivism promoted a Jeffersonianism for the industrial era? Yet William Jennings Bryan, Teddy Roosevelt’s near-contemporary and Democratic opponent, shifted

within months of enthusiastically seeking service in the war against Spain in the spring of 1898 to a vociferous critique of imperialism in the summer of 1900. Drawing down not just Jefferson's repudiation of 'conquest' but also the distinctive reaction and treatment of the peoples of Cuba, liberated in a matter of days across the narrow strait from Florida, and those of the Philippines, who resisted swapping one imperial master for another across thousands of miles of ocean, Bryan underscored the difficulties of declaiming grand universal ideals for a complex and variegated world:

The right of the Cubans to freedom was not based upon their proximity to the United States, nor upon the language which they spoke, nor yet upon the race or races to which they belonged. Congress by a practically unanimous vote declared that the principles enunciated at Philadelphia in 1776 were still alive and applicable to the Cubans. Who will draw a line between the natural rights of the Cubans and the Filipinos?⁵⁸

Robert Dallek makes the key point that popular enthusiasm for the war against Spain in Cuba was couched not just in the jingoism of the yellow press but also in a widespread popular support for a speedy and triumphant national liberation.⁵⁹ Two years later, however, sixty thousand troops were required to contain the Filipino revolt, British operations in the Boer War had demonstrated the exceptionally high cost of maintaining contested colonial rule, and Mark Twain had provided an eloquent counterblast to supremacist sentiment, whether derived from the founding scriptures, a Teutonic heritage or the frontier personality: 'Shall we? That is, shall we go on conferring our Civilization upon the peoples that sit in darkness, or shall we give those poor things a rest? Shall we bang right ahead in our old-time, loud, pious way, and commit the new century to the game; or shall we sober up and sit down and think it over first?'⁶⁰

How to uphold such a view three generations later in the unforgiving depths of the Cold War? William Appleman Williams, whose register was more modulated than Twain's, lacked a significant popular resonance for his conviction that, 'In expanding its own economic system throughout much of the world, America had made it very difficult for other nations to retain their economic independence'.⁶¹ In *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1959) Williams identified the origins of this 'Open Door imperialism' in John Hay's 1900 'Open Door Notes' requiring imperial China to guarantee US access to its markets, but his thesis did not rest just on economic factors – still less did it attribute policy solely to material determinants – instead folding this into a *Weltanschauung* (a definition of the world combined with an explanation of how it works). Andrew Bacevich has summarised that as consisting of several elements: a tendency to equate anti-colonialism with opposition to empire as such; an insistence that American values are universal values; a

self-serving commitment to the principle of self-determination; a penchant for externalising evil; a reflexive predilection for demonising adversaries; a belief that the American economy cannot function without opportunities for external expansion; a steady if unacknowledged drift towards militarisation; and an unshakeable confidence in American exceptionalism and American beneficence.⁶²

Just as Turner before him, Williams's influence did not stop at the covers of his own books; the post-war Wisconsin School retained a significant presence into the post-Cold War era through the work not just of the maverick soldier-intellectual Bacevich but also that of long-term academic specialists such as Walter LaFeber, who modulated Williams's claims and enhanced his sourcing while also maintaining his scepticism, especially with regard to what was by the 1990s becoming known as 'liberal interventionism' and increasingly being associated with Woodrow Wilson's Princeton.⁶³

Unsurprisingly in the aftermath of McCarthyism and during the years immediately preceding the Vietnam War, Williams's work was treated as emanating from more radical, even Marxist, principles than he actually held. As Paul Buhle puts it, 'Williams's puncturing of the myth of the Open Door as the passage-way to world democracy has never been improved upon – and never been forgiven.'⁶⁴ However, his corpus, which includes the equally controversial and unreferenced *Contours of American History* (1961), was, like Turner's, subjected to the severe and often telling academic criticism that truly influential works inevitably attract.⁶⁵ For some, his definitions were mechanistic, his view of humanity static and his approach to policy excessively rationalistic.⁶⁶ For others, such as Robert Tucker, '[t]he reader is never quite clear – because Williams is never quite clear – whether America's institutions necessitated expansion or whether America has been expansionist out of mistaken conviction that the well-being ... of these institutions required constant expansion.'⁶⁷

Still others, including John Thompson, argued that his perception of continuous 'expansion' was not borne out by reliable economic evidence and was more a 'semantic sleight of hand' conducive to an overly deterministic approach.⁶⁸ That, though, might be more palatable if, as some did, one takes Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* more as a manifesto or 'passionate essay' than a monograph.⁶⁹

In some ways the enduring radicalism of Noam Chomsky may be seen as a Massachusetts extension of the Wisconsin School – not least in that it is immensely more popular amongst students than academics, but also because he continuously repudiates the 'doctrinal language' of 'economic freedom'. Having served for decades as an industrious paint-stripper of official US rhetoric, Chomsky has been widely ignored within the field of international relations. According to Ronald Osborn, this is because, although

he is the consummate ‘left realist’ with state power at the very heart of his understanding of the world, he rejects mainstream realism’s refusal to apply to state behaviour the ethical considerations that obtain for individual human beings.⁷⁰

Moreover, unlike Morgenthau, Carr and Niebuhr, with whom Osborn and Mark Laffey bracket Chomsky, he is essentially uninterested in theorising about international politics. At one level we could explain this by the weight of the tasks of persuading his audience of the demands of moral equivalence:

No one would be disturbed by an analysis of the political behaviour of the Russians, French or Tanzanians, questioning their motives and interpreting their actions in terms of long-range interests, perhaps well concerned behind official rhetoric ... We are hardly the first power in history to combine material interests, great technological capacity, and an utter disregard for the misery and suffering of the lower orders.⁷¹

So far, so unremarkable; John Mearsheimer could scarcely dissent. However, Chomsky is not simply outside the guild; he positively spurns its pretensions: ‘[W]orld affairs are trivial: there’s nothing in the social sciences or history or whatever that is beyond the intellectual capacity of an ordinary fifteen year old. You have to do a little work, you have to do some reading, you have to be able to think, but there’s nothing deep – if there are any theories around that require some special kind of training to understand, then they’ve been kept a closely guarded secret.’⁷²

In fact, Chomsky could never be part of this academic community, not just because of its incapacity to build on Thucydides or Machiavelli, but because in his understanding the great bulk of the intelligentsia forms a vital component of the prevailing power structure: ‘Norms are established by the powerful, in their own interests, and with the acclaim of responsible intellectuals. These may be close to historical universals. I have been looking for exceptions for many years. There are a few, but not many.’⁷³

There is, none the less, one area where Chomsky has sought to provide more inflection than allowed for by the portrait of hard power and intellectual collaborators – a model of propaganda. In his work *Manufacturing Consent*, co-authored with Edward Herman, five ‘filters’ are identified as variables in shaping media output: corporate ownership and common interests; media reliance on advertising; elite sources for stories; assiduous official ‘spinning’ of controversial news; and – the book appeared in 1988 – the importance of ‘anti-communism as a control mechanism’.⁷⁴

If these features appear a good deal less controversial nearly thirty years after they were first published, there is also something rather less fatalistic in Chomsky’s appreciation of popular protest against the ‘War on Terror’,

which he appeared to distinguish from that over Vietnam that had so animated his writing in the 1960s:

In the international arena, the President and a reactionary circle of advisers pressed forward with plans that are novel at least in the brazen arrogance with which they are proclaimed: notably the doctrine of preventive war, which accords them 'the sovereign right to take military action' at will to control the world and destroy any challenge they perceive. The doctrine was enunciated in the National Security Strategy of September 2002, which aroused many shudders around the world and within the foreign policy elite at home. The declaration coincided with a drumbeat of propaganda for a war that would establish the doctrine as a new 'norm of international practice' and even law. The drive for war elicited popular and elite protest with no historical precedent that I can recall. If relentlessly pursued, the policies might constitute a watershed in world affairs. Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that there are precedents, both of doctrine and implementation.⁷⁵

This does not represent a complete volte-face by Noam Chomsky, but it does suggest that there exists rather more space for understanding foreign policy in terms of history and ideas than indicated by some of his previous declarations. The editors and authors of this book, in any event, are convinced of the validity of that endeavour.

The shape of the book

In the next chapter of this volume Jeremi Suri approaches the peculiar US vocation for nation-building on a global scale from the perspective of domestic experience. Suri uses the study of the post-Civil War South by C. Vann Woodward to provide for non-Americans a sense of the ideological interstices and remarkable longevity of this feature of American 'exceptionalism'. Writing outside of the idiom but with empathy for its constituent parts and continuities, Suri describes a deep US civic culture that celebrates self-governance, popular sovereignty and open trade on an uninterrupted continuum from home to the rest of the globe. Denied the normal components of national identity, American elite and popular cultures have, from Washington's Farewell Address of 1796 to Obama's West Point speech of 2014, sustained a form of millennial conviction to universalise domestic beliefs. These ride above the particularities of culture, geography or ethnic encounters that necessarily confront a global power and which perforce cause alterations in tactics, but rarely for any length of time the broader strategic idiom. Equally, Suri argues, the contradiction between national self-interest and the need to construct states and societies along recognisably US lines is repressed through narrow, 'unionist' perspectives. It is almost as if the American public imaginary cannot conceive of an allowable 'other', even

though the efforts at self-fashioning undeniably create a multitude of victims. Suri does not expect this deep-seated cultural reflex, which sees itself as 'above history', to end in the short or medium term. Rather, he argues, the contradiction between ideals and interests could be better managed in terms of both the formulation and implementation of contemporary policy.

In Chapter 2 Duncan Bell considers the extraordinary vision of an 'Anglo-world' developed in the last decades of the nineteenth century by the Scots-American magnate Andrew Carnegie. Bell situates Carnegie's writings of the 1880s and 1890s in the context of what he describes as 'social dreaming on both sides of the Atlantic', both in terms of Utopian literature and in those of more politicised theses current in elite intellectual circles: 'democratic war' (H. G. Wells and William James); 'empire peace' (J. A. Hobson and D. G. Ritchie); and 'racial peace'. Carnegie's energetic prospectus for a fusion of the United Kingdom with the United States under a shared republican ethos and institutionality owed much to his conviction that the English-speaking peoples constituted a single race, which was a critical category in his political thinking. However, Carnegie never specified in detail the form of polity he proposed. Moreover, always happy to be identified as a 'dreamer', he was no ordinary follower of fashion. He viewed migration positively, opposed the Spanish–American War and wished to see Canada incorporated into the United States. Equally and perhaps more predictably for an industrialist, he placed great importance on the new technologies that were effectively shrinking the world. One by-product of this was that 'dreamworlds' no longer enjoyed such spatial imagination but needed a greater 'temporalisation' by being placed into the future. Carnegie's debt to Spencer, as well as the expansive confidence of the last quarter of the American nineteenth century, meant that he could disparage popular theological justifications of Empire whilst himself holding a providentialist belief founded on the Anglo-Saxons as agents of progress and the fount of human perfectibility.

Since the 1990s the German jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) has been read both as a mediated source of intellectual influence on the American political establishment and as a vehicle for radical criticism of this same establishment. In Chapter 3 Jean-François Drolet offers an analytical reconstruction of Schmitt's interpretation of American foreign policy on the backdrop of this apparent paradox in the reception of his legacy in America and Europe. Drolet's analysis engages with a wide range of well-known and less-well-known texts, in which Schmitt reflects on some of the key pronouncements and moments in the history of US foreign policy. This includes the Monroe Doctrine and its 'Roosevelt Corollary', the rise and fall of the League of Nations, the Nuremberg Trials, the Truman Doctrine and America's modernisation initiatives in the Third World. While working his way through these studies, Drolet draws particular attention

to the philosophical prisms through which Schmitt came to conceptualise the relationship between technology, political violence and ‘values’ in the formulation of American foreign policy during the second half of the twentieth century. Although this is a somewhat more sinuous path to Schmitt’s international political thought, it provides an understanding of his antagonism towards America that goes beyond the atavistic nostalgia of his own politics, and generates apposite insights into the webs of confused categories concerning war, space and historical time hardwired in the normative fabric of the so-called ‘American century’.

Vibeke Schou Tjalve and Michael C. Williams reflect in Chapter 4 on one of the most persistent and controversial themes in the intellectual history of US foreign policy: American exceptionalism. But the exceptionalism under investigation here is not the familiar account inspired by a mixture of early modern Puritan theology and nineteenth-century expansionist myths of Manifest Destiny. Rather, their main concern is with a second strain of exceptionalism that took shape during the first half of the twentieth century, in response to a series of political crises triggered by a variety of phenomena such as the rise of mass society, bureaucratisation, atomisation, secularisation, social differentiation and changes in modes of economic production. In this later form, what is exceptional was the ability of American institutions to cope with the political, economic and socio-cultural challenges that led to the backlash against liberal modernisation in European states during the 1930s and 1940s. The main thesis that the authors then proceed to develop is that the origins and evolution of the American realist tradition must be reinterpreted in the context of this second exceptionalist moment in US history. Although realists are best known for their uncompromising criticisms of traditional, self-indulgent myths of American exceptionalism, Tjalve and Williams argue that a closer contextual reading of post-Second World War realist studies will reveal that their authors in fact held far more ambivalent attitudes towards the exceptionality of the American experience. Through an engagement with the paradigmatic writings of Hans Morgenthau, they show that realist warnings against the pitfalls of messianic accounts of American exceptionalism were predicated on a sophisticated understanding of the limitations and exceptional strengths of America’s pluralist democracy.

The political theorist Tracy B. Strong revisits intellectual debates over the origins of the Cold War in Chapter 5. He reminds us that interpreting a historical event of such magnitude demands not only that we pay close attention to the multiplicity of causal mechanisms coming into play, but that we also leave plenty of room for accidents and contingencies. Accordingly, Strong sketches out the political and conceptual dimensions of the main domestic and international factors that are deemed to have led to the emergence of the Cold War, providing a fresh account of how the different pieces

interact with one another, and emphasising the key moments of indeterminacy and uncertainty that are often ignored in the mainstream literature. Through a close analysis of debates and developments within the American Left during the early to mid-1940s, he shows that the dynamics in American society during this tumultuous period were much more complex than is usually assumed; it was also sufficiently diverse to have made other geopolitical outcomes highly conceivable. While the Cold War may have been structurally over-determined, it was by no means inevitable. Strong maintains that this was also the general perception within the decision-making community on both sides of the political spectrum in the United States until at least 1946 or so. In the end, the policy path chosen by the United States was determined in great part by the ideational frameworks that were on offer at the time to make sense of an otherwise highly confusing set of events. Herein lies the historical importance of 'strategist-intellectuals' like Henry Luce, Henry Wallace, George Kennan and Paul Nitze.

Some twenty years after its initial publication, Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* has never gone out of print or lacked a controversial reception. As a core interpretative text of the immediate post-Cold War period, it acquired an almost infamous status amongst liberal circles on account of a perceived melange of cultural essentialism, conservative realist thinking and a confidently negative appraisal of world trends. Huntington's subsequent publication of *Who are We?* in 2004 picked up on the final 'Western' chapters of *Clash of Civilizations* and seemed to confirm a strong nativist and pessimistic substrate to his work. In Chapter 6, James Dunkerley reviews the initial, often critical reception of *Clash of Civilizations* and seeks to explain why the text has continued to enjoy such widespread attention. He agrees with the view that, alongside Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History* and John Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, it forms part of a distinct 'moment' following the collapse of the USSR and the complex challenges of the United States becoming, at least transiently, a 'unipolar power'. However, he also identifies the continued salience of the text in Huntington's often adept assessment of regional political trends, even when these are entirely divorced from his underlying civilisational thesis. That empirical relevance was fortified by the 11 September attacks which served to reanimate debate over the book's most controversial passages on the Muslim world as well as Huntington's category of 'fault-line states'. At the same time, the author's indefatigable capacity for qualifying or retreating from bold *ex cathedra* pronouncements made him a target for a wide range of academic and policy commentators opposed to both neo-conservatism and mainstream realism, with which Huntington remained associated.

The study of foreign policy and international relations often takes ideas as being rigid and fully formed, and assigned to individuals and categories

of school, without paying much attention to the processes by which they change calibre and gain or lose traction. In Chapter 7 David Milne provides a politico-intellectual biography of Paul Wolfowitz from 1969 until he took up service in the administration of George W. Bush, focusing precisely on the vagaries as well as the consistencies in the evolution of his thought. Many of the shifts and deepening convictions were derived, of course, from the experience of observing and implementing US policy in the latter stages of the Vietnam War and thereafter. Wolfowitz's experience as a medium-ranking official during the Carter administration was vital in terms of firming up his 'neo-conservative' credentials. But, as Milne shows, so was his failure to persuade senior Republican figures of the practicality of his 'blue skies' thinking, which almost always stood in contradistinction to the pragmatic preferences of Kissinger-style realism. As with the more cautious elements of the Carter administration, they tended to the view Wolfowitz as creating unnecessary threats; several of his efforts to develop radical policy guidelines were dispatched to the archive. Wolfowitz was indeed inclined to hawkish presumptions and kept that company in and beyond the Washington Beltway. He described himself as a 'Cuban missile crisis kid', but he did not lack intellectual curiosity or a cultural 'hinterland'. His spell as ambassador to Indonesia under Reagan provided regional specialism and existential granularity to the geo-strategic 'logic' of a Cold Warrior. Milne takes us through the phases of Wolfowitz's political evolution up to the moment of 11 September, showing that the 'War on Terror' cannot simply be attributed to the trauma of that event; there were many existing tributaries that played into the Bush doctrine, and these have not always been given the recognition they deserve.

Notes

- 1 R. Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. vi.
- 2 H. Frankfurt and M. Bischoff, *On Bullshit* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
- 3 His new post meant that Johnson might well have to treat directly with Hillary Clinton, whom he had recently described as being like a sadistic nurse in a mental asylum. This was neither a lie nor 'Bullshit', but an analogy designed to amuse by virtue of its explicit repudiation of international etiquette. It thereby possessed a strong family resemblance to Trump's rhetoric. For a judicious survey of presidential deception, particularly on health and foreign policy, see R. Dallek, 'Presidential fitness and presidential lies: The historical record and a proposal for reform', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 40:1 (2010), pp. 9–22.

- 4 R. Khalek, 'Robert Kagan and other Neocons Are Backing Hillary Clinton', *The Intercept* (25 July 2016). Kagan, the author of *Dangerous Nation: America and the World 1600–1898* (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), had opposed Trump from the very start of the campaign as being ignorant and possessed of Napoleonic delusions. Kagan is married to Victoria Nuland, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs under the Obama administration. The publicity given to her statement, 'Fuck the EU', during a phone conversation with a diplomatic colleague in 2014 over Ukraine occasioned a moment of diplomatic embarrassment, but, since it was a private call leaked by Wikileaks, it does not conform to the public vulgarities of Trump and Johnson.
- 5 A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America I* (New York: Vintage, 1990 [1835]), p. 243.
- 6 T. Jefferson to Peter Carr, Paris (10 August 1787) in J. Appleby and T. Ball (eds), *Jefferson: Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 253. Gramsci made much the same point: 'all men are intellectuals, one could therefore say; but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals.' A. Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks: Selections* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 9. For an update on this suggestive theme, see B. Kuklick, 'The plumber and the professor: Or, a primer on how to think about the war', *Diplomatic History*, 26:4 (2002), pp. 559–70.
- 7 For surveys that place the antebellum experience in a longer political process, see the work of D. King: *Making Americans: Immigration, Race and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) and *The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
- 8 Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism*, p. 19. Closer to the time, Merle Curti declared: 'McCarthyism, a particular virulent form of anti-intellectualism in the popular sense, has become an international issue.' M. Curti, 'Intellectuals and other people', *The American Historical Review*, 60:2 (1955), pp. 259–82 at p. 275. Susan Jacoby notes that it was at McCarthy's hearings in spring 1954 that the defence attorney Joseph Welch, hitherto calmly emollient in style, broke through the accusatory assumptions that prevailed: 'Until this moment, senator, I think I never gauged your cruelty or your recklessness ... Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last?' Quoted in S. Jacoby, *The Age of American Unreason* (London: Old Street Publishing, 2008), pp. 13–14. At one level this might be deemed a question of civil manners rather than intellect, but, again, any sharp distinction can be misleading – issues of ethics are decided in many mental registers, as may be seen from the Salem trials of the 1690s through to the debates on drones in the 2010s.
- 9 C. Hitchens, 'How to be a public intellectual', *Prospect* (24 May 2008).
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 R. Jacoby, *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); R. Jacoby, 'Last thoughts on *The Last Intellectuals*', *Society*, 46:1 (2009), pp. 38–44 at p. 40; R. A. Posner, *Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press,

- 2001). For a robust critique of, inter alia, Jacoby's notions of 'independence' and 'the public', see B. Robbins, 'Intellectuals in decline?', *Social Text*, 25/26 (1990), pp. 254–9.
- 12 Posner, *Public Intellectuals*, pp. 85–8.
 - 13 Hitchens, 'How to be a public intellectual'.
 - 14 T. Judt, 'Bush's Useful Idiots', *London Review of Books* (21 September 2006).
 - 15 For a useful discussion, see M. Ryan, 'Bush's useful idiots: 9/11, the liberal hawks and the cooption of the "War on Terror"', *Journal of American Studies*, 45:4 (2011), pp. 667–93.
 - 16 I. Kristol, 'American intellectuals and foreign policy', *Foreign Affairs*, 45:4 (July 1967), pp. 594–609 at pp. 596, 605.
 - 17 N. Chomsky, 'The Responsibility of Intellectuals', *New York Review of Books* (23 February 1967), reprinted in expanded form in N. Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969).
 - 18 D. Bell, 'The cultural wars: American intellectual life, 1965–1992', *The Wilson Quarterly*, 16:3 (1992), pp. 74–107 at pp. 74.
 - 19 *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 83. The notion of intellectuals as a new class is most closely associated with A. Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York: Seabury Press, 1979).
 - 20 B. Kuklick, *Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). See also S. M. Lipset, 'American intellectuals: their politics and status', *Daedalus*, 88:3 (1959), pp. 460–86.
 - 21 P. Anderson, 'American foreign policy and its thinkers', *New Left Review*, 83 (2013), p. 113. Amongst the writers considered by Anderson are: Walter Russell Mead; Michael Mandelbaum and John Ikenberry; Charles Kupchan; Robert Kagan; Zbigniew Brzezinski; Robert Art; Thomas Barnett; and Richard Rosecrance.
 - 22 For a general survey, see D. H. Price, *Cold War Anthropology: The CIA, the Pentagon, and the Growth of Dual Use Anthropology* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2016). In the single case of Guatemala, of keen interest to Washington throughout most of the post-Second World War era for Cold War and anti-narcotics reasons, we might distinguish the work of two anthropologists: Richard N. Adams, whose independent research in the 1950s received official support and yielded a rich ethnography, and David Stoll, who appears to have had no endorsement for his impugning of the famous account of Nobel laureate Rigoberta Menchú, which produced much scandal and little light. R. N. Adams, *Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social Structure, 1944–1966* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970); D. Stoll, *I, Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor Guatemalans* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999).
 - 23 Anderson, 'American foreign policy and its thinkers', p. 115.
 - 24 *Ibid.* Anderson prefers a Hamilton–Wilson dyad, listing as followers/emulators of the former Clay, Webster, Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt, Hull, Acheson and George W. H. Bush, whilst the Wilsonian line includes at least F. D. Roosevelt, Truman and John Kennedy. For James Livingston, '[t]he quaint but ineradicable idea that everything in American history can be explained by references to

- the differences between Jefferson and Hamilton derives from, or is validated by, this assumption [a fundamental division between agriculture and industry], as is the logical correlate that capitalism is foreign to the countryside.' J. Livingston, 'Social theory and historical method in the work of William Appleman Williams', *Diplomatic History*, 25:2 (2001), pp. 275–82 at p. 276.
- 25 I. Tyrrell, 'American exceptionalism in an age of international history', *The American Historical Review*, 96:4 (1991), pp. 1031–55 at p. 1036. The texts by Hartz that Tyrrell was considering were *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955) and *The Founding of New Societies* (1964).
 - 26 D. Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. xvi.
 - 27 D. C. Hendrickson, *Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate over International Relations, 1789–1941* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2009), pp. 3–4.
 - 28 *Ibid.*, p. xiii.
 - 29 D. Ross, "'Are we a Nation?': The conjuncture of nationhood and race in the United States, 1850–1876", *Modern Intellectual History*, 2:3 (2005), pp. 327–60 at p. 343. This has been an important motif in Dorothy Ross's work: 'Standing at the westernmost culmination of European history, the United States would not follow Europe into a historical future. American progress would be like a quantitative multiplication and elaboration of its founding institutions, not a process of qualitative change. Still pre-historicist, tied to God's eternal plan outside of history, American exceptionalism prevented Americans from developing a fully historicist account of their own history through much of the nineteenth century.' Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science*, p. 26.
 - 30 A. Stephanson, 'Kennan: Anglo-Saxon Superiority? Realism as Desire' in N. Guilhot (ed.), *The Invention of International Relations Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 177–8.
 - 31 Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science*, pp. 24–5.
 - 32 R. Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
 - 33 A. Saxton, *Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth-Century America* (London: Verso, 1990), p. 14. See also the work of E. Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
 - 34 In the early 1830s, de Tocqueville declared that there was 'hardly an American to be met who does not claim some remote kindred with the first founders of the colonies; and as for the scions of the noble families of England, America seemed to me to be covered with them'. De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America II*, pp. 173–4. Sixty years later John Fleming asked: '[w]hat about the descendants of Frenchmen, of Germans, of Slavs, and of Scandinavians, who do not admit Anglo-Saxon superiority? When, overpowered by his emotions, the average Fourth-of-July orator eulogizes the Anglo-Saxon, he does not pause to consider that the Celts and German among his audience may inquire of one another if there is any room on this continent for them.' J. Fleming, 'Are we

- Anglo-Saxons?', *North American Review*, 153 (August 1891), pp. 253–6 at p. 253, quoted in P. Kramer, 'Empires, exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880–1910', *The Journal of American History*, 88:4 (2002), pp. 1315–53 at p. 1324.
- 35 R. Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), pp. 10–11. See also A. Anievas, N. Manchanda and R. Shilliam (eds), *Race and Racism in International Relations. Confronting the Global Colour Line* (London: Routledge, 2015); J. M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); R. D. G. Kelley, "'But a local phase of a world problem": Black history's global vision', *The Journal of American History*, 86:3 (1999), pp. 1045–77; J. C. Parker, "'Made-in-America revolutions"? The "Black University" and the American role in the decolonization of the Black Atlantic', *The Journal of American History*, 96 (2009), pp. 727–50.
- 36 Quoted in P. Kramer, 'Shades of Sovereignty: Racialized Power, the United States and the World' in F. Costigliola and M. J. Hogan (eds), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edn, 2016), p. 245. This excellent essay contains a full bibliography. For a more conceptual survey of the period since 1945, see D. A. Hollinger, 'How wide the circle of the "we"? American intellectuals and the problem of the ethnos since World War II', *The American Historical Review*, 98:2 (1993), pp. 317–37.
- 37 See, for example, R. Hofstadter, *The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington* (New York: Vintage 1970); D. Hollinger, 'Perry Miller and Philosophical History' in *In the American Province: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ideas* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); and N. Guyatt, "'An Instrument of National Policy": Perry Miller and the Cold War', *Journal of American Studies*, 36:1 (2002), pp. 107–49, which properly places Miller's ideas in an extra-academic context. For a much wider (and longer) vision, see N. Guyatt, *Providence and the Invention of the United States, 1607–1876* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- 38 A. Preston, 'Bridging the gap between the sacred and the secular in the history of American foreign relations', *Diplomatic History*, 30:5 (2006), pp. 783–812. See also, A. Preston, 'The Religious Turn in Diplomatic History' in F. Costigliola and M. J. Hogan (eds), *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edn, 2016). Andrew Rotter makes a similar point about the disinclination of diplomatic historians to engage with the work of Edward Said, who was widely disparaged for a combination of selective illustration and expansive generalisation but who was still possessed of a sensibility necessary to a full understanding of the impact of US policies in the Middle East: A. J. Rotter, 'Saidism without Said: Orientalism and U.S. diplomatic history', *The American Historical Review*, 105:4 (2000), pp. 1205–17.
- 39 Anderson, 'American foreign policy and its thinkers', p. 33.
- 40 J. R. Pole, 'The American past: Is it still usable?', *Journal of American Studies*, 1:1 (1967), pp. 63–78 at p. 64.

- 41 L. D. White, *The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), p. 187.
- 42 C. Vann Woodward, 'The age of reinterpretation', *The American Historical Review*, 66:1 (1960), pp. 1–19 at p. 4.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- 44 J. A. Thompson, *A Sense of Power: The Roots of America's Global Role* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), p. 26.
- 45 Anderson, 'American foreign policy and its thinkers', pp. 22, 107.
- 46 R. W. Emerson, 'The American Scholar', available at: www.emersoncentral.com/amscholar.htm (accessed 27 August 2016). For an appreciation of the iconoclastic reach of this speech, see K. S. Sacks, *Understanding Emerson: 'The American Scholar' and His Struggle for Self-Reliance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). Oliver Wendell Holmes called the speech 'our intellectual Declaration of Independence', and Emerson was not invited back to Harvard for thirty years.
- 47 Quoted in H. N. Smith, 'Emerson's problem of vocation: A note on "The American Scholar"', *The New England Quarterly*, 12:1 (1939), pp. 52–67 at p. 64. The Cherokee question had, of course, occasioned a critical conflict between President Jackson and Chief Justice Marshall since it provoked issues of constitutionality. Many more native peoples were affected by the subsequent westward movement of European Americans into territory that had not yet acquired statehood, occasioning a syllogistic exchange in the Senate of 1849 between John Calhoun and Daniel Webster:
- Mr Calhoun:** [T]he single question is, does the constitution extend to the territories, or does it not extend to them? Why, the constitution interprets itself. It pronounces itself to be the supreme law of the land.
- Mr Webster:** What land?
- Mr Calhoun:** The land; the territories of the United States are part of the land.
- Quoted in J. Abboushi Dallal, 'American imperialism unmanifest: Emerson's "inquest" and cultural regeneration', *American Literature*, 73:1 (2001), pp. 47–83 at p. 47.
- 48 G. Bancroft, *History of the American Revolution* (1852), vol. 5, p. 330, quoted in G. A. Billias, *George Bancroft: Master Historian*, (Worcester MA: American Antiquarian Society, 2004), p. 523.
- 49 R. Beisner, 'Thirty years before Manila: E. L. Godkin, Carl Schurz, and anti-imperialism in the Gilded Age', *The Historian*, 30:4 (1968), pp. 561–77 at p. 564. Looking forward, Beisner found telling differences and similarities between the movements of 1898 and 1968: R. Beisner, '1898 and 1968: The anti-imperialists and the doves', *Political Science Quarterly*, 85:2 (1970), pp. 187–216.
- 50 F. Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), p. 6, quoted in Anderson, 'American foreign policy and its thinkers', p. 21.
- 51 Schurmann cited in Anderson, 'American foreign policy and its thinkers', p. 21.
- 52 *Ibid.* Anderson does not share the strength of Schurmann's depiction of F. D. Roosevelt's commitment to a global New Deal, but does accept it as an important constitutive element. See also R. Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and*

American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). Perry Anderson's discussion of domestic US variables that feed into foreign relations is rather truncated in this essay and best augmented by his 'Homeland', where he identifies four determinants of national politics: the historic regime of accumulation; structural shifts in the sociology of the electorate; cultural mutations of social value systems; and the aims of active minorities in the voter-bases of both national parties. P. Anderson, 'Homeland', *New Left Review*, 81 (2013), pp. 5–32.

53 Anderson, 'Homeland', p. 5.

54 Anderson, 'American foreign policy and its thinkers', p. 30. For John Thompson, 'The dramatic extension of America's overseas involvement and commitments in the past 100 years has reflected a growth of power rather than the decline of security. Yet the full and effective deployment of that power has required from the American people disciplines and sacrifices that they are prepared to sustain only if they are persuaded the nation's safety is directly at stake.' J. A. Thompson, 'The exaggeration of American vulnerability: The anatomy of a tradition', *Diplomatic History*, 16:1 (1992), pp. 23–43 at p. 43. Thompson's view on this has changed very little over the years: 'those who believed that the United States should pursue the wider goal of world order regularly argued that ... core interests were dependent upon such an order. In doing so they provided the evidence drawn upon by those historical accounts that explain the American policy in terms of those interests ... Such explanations are unpersuasive ... the dependence of America's core interests on the achievement of foreign policy objectives has always been very questionable.' Thompson, *A Sense of Power*, p. 250.

55 A variety of responses may be found in the symposium on Anderson's essay on foreign policy that was published in *Diplomatic History*, 39:2 (2015). Some of the language is bracingly energetic, and a little of it unnecessarily personal. However, he would take this as a mark of success. Just like his late comrade Peter Gowan, who long held the US-watching brief for *New Left Review*, Perry Anderson exhibits an aversion to the style of those who work within the expressive comforts of both state and university discourse, and, correspondingly, he shows an admiration for any thinker, whatever their politics, who supersedes them. This can produce an odd mix of enthusiasms, but many commentators would share Gowan's appreciation of John Mearsheimer: 'Not only is his writing refreshingly free from the cant that normally surrounds the world role of the United States, it is extraordinarily accessible: forceful, direct and clear, without a trace of the usual academic jargon'. P. Gowan, 'A calculus of power', *New Left Review*, 16 (2002), pp. 47–67 at p. 47, which reviews Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2002).

56 W. Cronon, 'Revisiting the vanishing frontier: The legacy of Frederick Jackson Turner', *Western Historical Quarterly*, 18:2 (1987), pp. 157–76 at p. 157.

57 Quoted in L. E. Ambrosius, 'Turner's frontier thesis and the modern American Empire: A review essay', *Civil War History*, 17:4 (1971), pp. 332–9 at p. 337.

- 58 W. J. Bryan, 'Imperialism' (8 August 1900), available at <http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/william-jennings-bryan-imperialism-speech-text/> (accessed 27 August 2016).
- 59 R. Dallek, 'National mood and American foreign policy: A suggestive essay', *American Quarterly*, 34:4 (1982), pp. 339–61 at p. 346.
- 60 M. Twain, 'To the person sitting in darkness', *The North American Review*, 531 (1901), pp. 161–76 at p. 164.
- 61 W. A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: Norton, 2009 [1959]), p. 15.
- 62 A. Bacevich, 'Afterword: Tragedy Revisited' in *ibid.*, pp. 319–20. See also the summary in A. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 23–31.
- 63 See, for example, W. LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860–1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963). In later years such a perspective became sufficiently mainstream for LaFeber to serve as an author for the *Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*.
- 64 P. Buhle, 'Williams for 2000: A Comment', *Diplomatic History*, 25:2 (2001), pp. 301–8 at p. 303. See also L. P. Ribuffo, 'What is still living in the ideas and example of William Appleman Williams? A Comment', *Diplomatic History*, 25:2 (2001), pp. 309–16.
- 65 According to S. Lynd, '[t]his brilliant, courageous and disappointing book has been too harshly condemned by professional historians, and too readily celebrated by radicals. It is a book both very good and very bad: so good that, with all its faults, it may prove to be the most important work by an American historian since Charles Beard's *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution*, published in 1913; yet so seriously flawed that many initially-sympathetic readers will find it difficult to read through to the end.' S. Lynd, 'Book Review: The Contours of American History', *Science and Society*, 27:2 (1963), pp. 227–31 at p. 227.
- 66 R. A. Melanson, 'The social and political thought of William Appleman Williams', *The Western Political Quarterly*, 31:3 (1978), pp. 392–409.
- 67 R. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: SAIS, 1971), p. 70.
- 68 J. A. Thompson, 'William Appleman Williams and the "American Empire"', *Journal of American Studies*, 7:1 (1973), pp. 91–104 at p. 93. Thompson's later work is less sharply critical, but he still expresses reservations about the Wisconsin style: 'Explaining US policy in terms of ... "grand strategy" neglects the extent to which the shape and limits of American actions derive from pressures generated by domestic politics. Never the less, the satisfactions and gratifications of wielding power do seem at times to have given an expansionist thrust to US policy, independent of any instrumental purpose of agenda. "Empire" is an inappropriate description of something as variable in its potency and as imprecisely defined geographically as America's influence in world politics, but the role the United States has played has given rise of an "imperial" mentality'. Thompson, *A Sense of Power*, p. 282.

- 69 B. Perkins, 'The tragedy of American diplomacy: twenty-five years after', *Reviews in American History*, 12:1 (1984), pp. 1–18 at p. 3.
- 70 R. Osborn, 'Noam Chomsky and the realist tradition', *Review of International Studies*, 35:2 (2009), pp. 351–70 at p. 359. See also, M. Laffey, 'Discerning the patterns of world order: Noam Chomsky and international theory after the Cold War', *Review of International Studies*, 29:4 (2003), pp. 587–604; E. Herring and P. Robinson, 'Too polemical or too critical? Chomsky on the study of news media and US foreign policy', *Review of International Studies*, 29:4 (2003), pp. 553–68. All these studies note the marginalisation of Chomsky's work within the academic sub-field.
- 71 N. Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins*, quoted in Osborn, 'Noam Chomsky and the realist tradition', pp. 357–8.
- 72 Cited in P. Mitchell and J. Schoeffel (eds), *Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky* (New York: The New Press, 2002), p. 137.
- 73 N. Chomsky, 'Simple truths, hard problems: some thoughts on terror, justice, and self-defence', *Philosophy*, 80:1 (2005), pp. 5–28 at p. 5, quoted in Osborn, 'Noam Chomsky and the realist tradition', p. 358.
- 74 Herring and Robinson, 'Too polemical or too critical?', pp. 555–6. See also, K. Lang and G. E. Lang, 'Noam Chomsky and the manufacture of consent for American foreign policy', *Political Communication*, 21 (2004), pp. 93–101.
- 75 N. Chomsky, 'Moral truisms, empirical evidence, and foreign policy', *Review of International Studies*, 29:4 (2003), pp. 605–20 at p. 607.