Introduction

We hope vaguely, we dread precisely.

Paul Valéry, *On European Civilisation and the European Mind* (1922)

Europe in crisis

In the aftermath of the Second World War, 'never again' was more than just a slogan; it was an imperative for political change. During the postwar era (1945–89) collective memories of Europe's 'age of total war' (1914–45) served as the foundation for a broad movement that sought to move the 'savage continent' away from the state-centric nationalism that had led to two world wars towards a new, community-based political order based on 'the image of a peaceful, cooperative Europe, open toward other cultures and capable of dialogue.'[1] Taking shape primarily through the organisation known today as the European Union (EU), the European dream of unification over and above the nation-state has defined politics on the continent since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952.

For much of the postwar period the symbolic rupture of 1945 served as the driver of what is undoubtedly 'the most significant political innovation' of the twentieth century. By challenging the assumption that nation-states are the most fundamental and important political actors in international politics, the development of the 'Euro-polity' has significant implications for existing theories of the state, sovereignty, social welfare, democracy, and citizenship, all of which are plagued by an inherent 'methodological nationalism.' Building on collective memories of a nightmarish past to create a better future, the EU has served as 'the theoretical proving-ground of contemporary liberalism.'[2]

Despite its many achievements – a list that includes the fact that 'peace in Europe is secure, the economy sound and in spots dynamic, and the EU is a force to reckon with in international economic affairs' – European integration is haunted by both the 'spectre of tedium' and the dangers of bureaucratic 'rule by nobody.'[3] At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these long-standing concerns were reinforced by the problems emanating from the onset of the greatest financial downturn since the Great Depression of 1929. In 2010 Greece's difficulties in financing its sovereign debt metastasised into a full-blown 'crisis of the Eurozone,' affecting not only the states that share its common currency (the euro), but also the EU as a whole.[4] Far from spurring further cooperation, these issues have caused citizens across the continent to turn inward, away from the EU and back towards the seemingly safe harbour of the nation-state.

The problems radiating from the so-called Great Recession arguably reached their zenith on 23 June 2016, when the United Kingdom, driven by English nationalism and neo-imperial dreams of a 'Global Britain,' as well as a backlash against the austerity imposed by the Conservative government, narrowly voted to 'take back control' by leaving the EU.[5] Previously united by a common destiny based on the lessons of 1945, at the start of the third millennium the European continent is increasingly divided. With the rise of nationalistic populist movements across the continent – from Britain in the northwest, Hungary and Poland in the east, as well as Italy in the south – the core liberal values of the postwar settlement embodied by the EU, including rule of law, tolerance, and a respect for human and minority rights, are increasingly threatened by a 'return of fascism.'[6]

The almost universal diagnosis of these problems as a crisis signals their seriousness as a threat to the European project. In ancient Greece the concept of crisis (κρίσις) was 'coined to denote the moment in which the future of the patient was in the balance, and the doctor had to decide which way to go and what treatment to apply.' It thus describes a key moment of action and decision, whose resolution 'will determine whether the "patient" will recover or die.' The problems facing Europe and the EU at the start of the twenty-first century represent such a moment of decision. In the words of Stathis Kalyvas, the situation in the wake of the Great Recession 'has not only challenged our optimistic belief in the bright future of the European integration project, but it has also reminded us why this is, indeed, the most ambitious and far-reaching political experiment of our lifetime.'[7]

The premise of this book is that the crisis Europe is facing at the start of the third millennium is potentially existential. Building on the medical metaphor of crisis as a key moment of decision, I seek not only to identify what made the European project successful through much of the twentieth century and diagnose the issues at the root of its problems at the start of the twenty-first, but also to suggest treatments for these pathologies.[8] As a result, I am 'not concerned with pure truth,' but with the more practical task of 'discovering the real causes of the crisis.' Following Max Horkheimer and the writings of the Frankfurt School, I associate critical inquiry with the task of the physician, who searches for concrete solutions to real problems. In the words of Seyla Benhabib, 'The purpose of critical theory is not crisis management, but crisis diagnosis such as to encourage future transformation.'[9]

This starting point dictates the shape of my inquiry. Although it is notoriously difficult to provide a clear definition of the Frankfurt School, 'It has been common to treat critical theory primarily as a distinctive methodology.' One of its unique features is its two-stage approach to social criticism. Starting with an 'explanatory-diagnostic' analysis of the social pathologies of the present, the critic then seeks 'anticipatory-utopian' solutions that – building on the medical roots of the crisis metaphor – seek to provide treatments for the 'diseases of society' (*Krankenheiten der Gesellschaft*) it has identified.[10] Understood in this light, the 'practical interest' of critical theory is not unlike the 'emancipation' of the body from disease.[11]

In line with this approach, I seek to diagnose the pathologies of integration at the beginning of the twenty-first century while also charting possible courses for emancipation from the political, economic, and social storms that have battered the EU since the turn of the millennium. My basic thesis is that the difficulties facing the continent can be traced back to cognitive, motivational, and justificatory deficits resulting from the loss of the shared experience of war and suffering between 1914 and 1945. Through much of the postwar period, this collective memory of total war shared across state borders played a positive, constructive role leading to the construction of Europe on a community-basis. By focusing on the role of collective memory in the process of continental unification, I show that it was indeed 'the shadow of war, not its crucible, that sparked both the early European integration project and its later deepening.'[12] Unfortunately, with the passing of the generations that experienced and have personal memories of the war, the power of this collective remembrance is starting to fade.

My contribution to the existing scholarship is found primarily in my development of the concept of 'ruptures' (*Brüche*) or breaks that shatter the existing frameworks of collective memory, allowing new ideas and institutions to emerge. I argue that the Second World War, which followed closely on the horrors of the Great War, acted as a caesura that splintered prewar, nationalistic historical narratives. By making these traditional stories untenable, what I call the 'rupture of 1945' inspired new thinking by forcing individuals and communities across the continent to reframe their understandings of the past. By delegitimising national stories of glory, I argue that these violent collective memories of total war functioned as what Jacques Derrida calls a '*coup de force*,' i.e. a form of 'performative and therefore interpretive violence' that allowed Europeans to tell new, transnational narratives to replace the established nationalistic frameworks of history.[13]

Building on this shared remembrance of total war, I argue that in the aftermath of this rupture Europeans were able to imagine and build a common future. While the polity they created was initially established as part of a normative project designed to pacify the bloody nationalism that led to two world wars, my diagnosis is that the gradual forgetting that accompanies the passage of time and generations has undermined the EU's normative and moral dimensions, making economic prosperity its sole *raison d'être*. In this sense, I agree with Michael Loriaux that 'the real spectre haunting the European Union is not so much of failure as of loss of moral horizon.'[14]

Looking forward from this diagnosis to the future of European memory, I argue that in an increasingly globalised, multicultural, and interdependent age, stepping back and decreasing cooperation is not realistic. On the contrary, resolving the issues facing the EU at the start of the twenty-first century will require Europeans to construct a truly supranational understanding of history that does not require personal memories of suffering. However, given that debates about memory are as much about the future as the past, this narrative will need to have a forward-looking as well as a backward-looking dimension.

More specifically, I argue that a successful European identity will have to be based on the capacity of the EU to stand up to international pressures and resolve future problems in ways that the outdated institution of the nation-state cannot at the start of the third millennium. Only such a notion, which links collective memories to future projects, the past to the future through the present, can hope to resolve the European crisis. In this sense – and in line with the tradition of the Frankfurt School – my focus on the role of collective

memory in European integration helps to diagnose and explain the problems the EU is facing at the start of the twenty-first century. The basic thesis of this book is that resolving these issues will require Europe to develop a new, more inclusive narrative historical that will allow it to act as a more powerful and more unified entity in the future.

Collective memory and European integration

By treating collective memory as central to the creation of the EU, using it to explain the multiple crises it is undergoing seventy years after the end of the Second World War, and arguing for its role in Europe's future, I both build on and set myself apart from existing studies of European integration. In the first major theoretical assessment of this phenomenon, Ernst Haas defines integration as '*the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states.*' Since then, studies of the European project have sought to understand the process of creating 'a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.'[15]

Building on the subtitle of Haas's *Uniting of Europe* (1958), the existing literature has focused on the role played by 'political, social or economic forces.' Despite its insights and explanatory power, Catherine Guisan notes that 'much of the scholarship on European integration has overlooked, or misinterpreted, the self-understandings of political actors central to the process.' By focusing on functional 'spill over,' economic self-interest, or national power politics, existing approaches have operated at the third-person 'observer' perspective favoured by positivistic social science.[16] Due to its methodological commitments, this literature cannot account for the internal, first-person perspective of the participants in the creation of the European Communities.

In order to take account of the standpoints of the agents involved in this process, a more hermeneutical perspective inspired by the humanities and qualitative social sciences is necessary. In addition to this different methodological approach, taking the perspective of the participant seriously also requires a focus on a new explanatory factor: culture. It is, after all, cultural ideas and practices that shape the basic categories of scholarship, determining what 'Europe' is, who counts as 'European', and how 'Europeanness' is defined.

None of these notions are given or obvious. On the contrary, they are 'highly unstable,' requiring constant negotiation by the participants in the process of constructing Europe.[17] Additionally, Kathleen McNamara notes that the continent's 'banal cultural infrastructure' has 'made the EU a natural part of the political landscape, folded into national political identities' in ways that make them difficult for social scientists to discern. While these ideas inevitably remain contested, 'Culture has to be in the equation when explaining a social phenomenon as significant as the integration of former enemy countries.'[18]

From within the broad field of culture, I focus on the role that collective remembrance played in the origins and development of the EU. In response to the European crisis at the start of the twenty-first century, I also reflect on what the loss of this 'moral demand of memory' means for the project of unification as the generations that experienced Europe's age of total war begin to pass away. Throughout this volume I consistently emphasise the importance of this historical horizon in shaping 'how participants in the European founding dealt with their historical memories of war, invasion and mutual exploitation, and how they could trust one another enough to put their war industries under a common authority.'[19]

This perspective is not meant to deny the importance of the factors highlighted in the existing literature. It is merely intended to show that collective memories of the rupture of 1945 acted as an important lens that shaped how the political, social, and economic forces that are usually used to explain this phenomenon were seen and understood by key actors at the time. In so doing, I seek to bring the scholarly conversation about the importance of memory in social and political life together with the public rhetoric about European integration propagated by its leaders.

The idea that the project of integration 'originated in the ruins of the Second World War, aiming at ending nationalist aggression and inter-state war' is hardly new. However, to date it has been largely restricted to the politics of memory propagated by various European institutions.[20] For example, the House of European History, which opened in Brussels in 2017, recounts the EU's official narrative of integration, interpreting it as a learning process that builds on the wars, atrocities, and sufferings of the first half of the twentieth century. Similarly, just as burgeoning nation-states established universities to promulgate national histories, so the member-states of the EU have created the European University Institute in order to research 'the great movements and developments which characterise the history and development of Europe.'[21]

Despite these institutional efforts, scholars of integration are usually sceptical of attempts to root integration in the shared continental experience of total war. For example, Haas himself admits that memories of the traumatic events of the two world wars 'were undoubtedly primary among the specific stimuli' that helped to 'launch and then spur the process' of unification. However, he ultimately argues that 'this does not make the past an active causative agent' for the move towards political community beyond the nation-state.[22] Haas's scepticism, as well as that of the literature as a whole, is rooted in two main problems. First, there are those who argue that European memory is too divided to provide the foundation for a united political community, particularly after the accession of the postcommunist states of East-Central Europe in 2004.[23] The second issue is methodological, as the influence of memory on politics is hard to pin down.

As part of the broader 'memory boom' brought about by the desire of the children of the generation that fought in the Second World War to know what their parents had done during that fateful conflict, scholars have gradually come to recognise that the European push to postnational integration 'spring[s] directly from their unique historical experience.'[24] Analyses of the major discourses in mass media confirm that references to the Second World War played and continue to play an important role in public debates about the EU. Once dismissed out of hand, what Derrida refers to as the '*universal urgency* of memory' has become increasingly apparent. However, while almost all of the existing literature mentions the importance of the two world wars in helping to push the project of integration forward during the postwar period – at least in passing – few studies have treated collective memory as an explanatory factor driving the process of European integration.[25]

In focusing on remembrance in this way, this book is part of a new movement that has 'developed outside the mainstream of political science,' in which 'young scholars have increasingly started to pay attention to memory politics also on the supranational level.'[26] Two studies deserve particular attention. In contrast to the larger literature that focuses on the EU as a manager of conflict, in *A Political Theory of Identity in European Integration: Memory and Politics* (2012) Guisan argues that the European project should be understood as a peace-making experiment whose participants shared one main goal: 'to invent new forms of political life in Europe after the murderous wars of the early twentieth century.' Through an examination of the speeches and discourses of key agents of integration, she argues that Europe offers a new model of politics that focuses on 'action in concert rather than domination over the other.'

Focusing on the EU's approach to the politics of memory, she contends that 'the EU offers a viable model for the difficult "politics of recognition"' necessary to achieve peace and reconciliation between former enemies.[27]

As one of the first studies to focus on memory and the EU, Guisan's book opens the intellectual space for my research. I build on her methodological approach, which focuses 'on the self-understanding of important actors in the process' of integration in order to highlight the importance of remembrance as a 'hidden yet vital factor for the success of the enterprise.'[28] However, in contrast to Guisan, I am interested in collective memory as a resource for new political thinking and the creation of new forms of political community in the aftermath of experiences that break the existing narrative frameworks of history. The forward-looking aspect of my project, which seeks to think through possible resolutions to Europe's crisis at the start of the twenty-first century, also differs from her approach.

Although Guisan and I both interpret the experience of integration through the lens of political theory, our philosophical foundations differ considerably. As is clear from my brief reconstruction of her argument, Guisan builds primarily on Hannah Arendt's concept of 'action in concert' and G. W. F. Hegel's understanding of recognition (*Anerkennung*), along with some insights drawn from other thinkers, including Karl Jaspers, Paul Ricœur, and Charles Taylor. By contrast, I draw my inspiration from the Frankfurt School. Using ideas drawn from Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, and Jürgen Habermas, I focus on how ruptures free the imagination to think things anew. Although I also engage with Arendt, I engage more with her reading of Benjamin's ideas on history and memory, her reflections on totalitarianism, and her conception of 'new beginnings' than with the notion of 'action in concert.'[29]

In addition to Guisan, Aline Sierp's scholarship is also an important touchstone for my work. In *History, Memory and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions* (2017), Sierp 'challenges the widespread idea that political experiences in Europe continue to be interpreted in terms of national history.' Instead, she argues that 'the creation of a European memory culture' is visible in 'emerging common European characteristics of national commemoration, which are expressed either through similar approaches to addressing certain topics or through similar institutional acts of remembrance.'[30] Although I am less interested in the operations of the EU as a transnational political space for the politics of remembrance and more in how collective memory serves as a cognitive, motivational, and justificatory resource for integration as such,

Sierp's book is still an invaluable resource. In particular, it helps me to combat the 'presentism' of many existing studies of the politics of memory in Europe, which argue that the remembered past is merely the product of social and political manipulation that serves the needs of actors in the present.[31]

By focusing on ruptures as turning points, I reject presentist readings of the politics of memory by outlining the preconditions that define the crucial moments when memories can be fundamentally reframed through the creation of new historical narratives. In opposing instrumental interpretations of collective memory that conceptualise the past as essentially malleable, I help to identify how and when 'certain windows of opportunity' open, allowing political and cultural leaders to reshape the frameworks of collective memory. In this sense, my work can be seen as part of a move towards recognising the path-dependency of collective memory that sets in as a result of key decisions made at critical turning points. My development of the concept of historical ruptures that break apart existing narratives of the past, allowing new stories to be told, thus helps to explain both the 'constraints that se[t] limits on memory entrepreneurship in the present' and the specific circumstances under which the frameworks of collective remembrance are subject to change.[32]

A critical theory of memory

Social and political theorists have traditionally avoided explicitly addressing issues of methodology. This reluctance is puzzling, since 'the choice is not between having a method and not having one, but rather between deciding to think about method or simply carrying on unreflectively.'[33] This critique does not apply to the critical theory developed by the thinkers who coalesced around the Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung) and their successors in what has come to be called the Frankfurt School. These figures all agree that methodological reflection is central to a critical theory of society that seeks to address 'great philosophical questions with the most refined methods.' The goal of such research is not merely to reach greater theoretical understanding, but to transcend the division between theory and practice. What makes critical theory distinctive is its belief that 'apolitical reflections on praxis are unconvincing.'[34]

I choose to build on this tradition for three basic reasons. First, critical theory engages with the pathologies of the present in concrete ways that not only seek to understand contemporary problems in real time, but which are also able to 'guide criticism with a practical interest in emancipation.'[35] This focus on

developing a 'theory of society at the present time' is particularly well suited for my examination of the European crisis at the start of the twenty-first century, as it is based in the contention that the 'lived experience' of crisis 'afford[s] contemporaries privileged access to the structures of the social world.'[36]

Second, the fact that the Frankfurt School developed its emancipatory approach during the European 'age of total war' between 1914 and 1945 also allows me to combine theoretical insights with historical developments in an immanent manner. As a result of their common historical origins, the thinkers of the Frankfurt Circle were concerned with many of the same issues that faced the founders of the European project. Much like continental integration, the critical theory of the Frankfurt School is the product of two basic impulses: a strong commitment to antitotalitarianism based on the personal experience of war in Europe, as well as the articulation of an emancipatory vision of the good society based on an examination of this 'unmastered' – and perhaps unmasterable – past.[37]

My third motivation is that the Frankfurt School provides a model for an interdisciplinary approach grounded in real-world developments. The practitioners of critical theory are committed to the idea that the elaboration of philosophical concepts must both precede and respond to empirical research.[38] Such data, which has already been informed by philosophical reflection, is supposed to dialectically return to its starting point by enriching the theoretical ideas that the critic had laid out at the start of the project. Adorno notes that the members of the Frankfurt School 'never regarded the theory simply as a set of hypotheses but as in some sense standing on its own feet, and therefore did not intend to prove or disprove the theory through our findings but only to derive from it concrete questions for investigation, which must then be judged on their own merit.'[39]

This critical approach allows theoretical reflection and empirical analysis to mutually reinforce each other. My research therefore combines the 'explanatory-diagnostic' elements of social analysis with the 'anticipatory-utopian' perspective of normative research.[40] Working in these two stages depends on the appearance of a crisis that disrupts existing forms of life, thus serving as evidence for a disjunction between concrete social processes and the background assumptions on which they rest, such as Europe's difficulties at the start of the third millennium.[41]

In the first stage of crisis diagnosis, the theorist seeks to understand the underlying social and political pathologies of the present. Critique in its 'explanatory-diagnostic' moment seeks to penetrate below the surface of the

revealed crisis to provide a descriptive account of its deeper 'social-structural causes.'[42] After providing an explanatory diagnosis, critical theory proceeds to a second, explicitly normative stage. In this 'anticipatory-utopian' phase the critic charts possible paths for emancipation from the pathologies of life that gave rise to the need for social critique in the first place. In Marcuse's words, 'Theory … not only anticipates political practice, runs ahead of it, but also upholds the objectives of liberation in the face of failing practice.'[43]

As a result of its 'practical, emancipatory interest' critical theory is decidedly forward-looking.[44] However, the Frankfurt Circle resists outlining specific prescriptions out of respect for the decision-making ability of the inhabitants of the future: 'In regard to the essential kind of change at which critical theory aims, there can be no … conception of it until it actually comes about.'[45] While never prescribing concrete utopias, the critic seeks to spur the community to action by imagining and presenting alternative social arrangements. As a result of this approach, critical theory is 'explanatory, practical, and normative, all at the same time.' The social criticism encouraged by the Frankfurt School thus 'challenges the validity of prevailing social institutions and arrangements through reference to some alternative idea of the good society.'[46]

Although it is often not explicitly addressed in this context, memory plays a central role in this process. As Seyla Benhabib points out, true critique cannot be merely 'based upon norms and values derived from the self-understanding of this culture and social structure'; on the contrary, it must draw on resources outside the present, i.e. either on a 'utopian vision' of the future or on the 'retrospective remembrance' of a past that has been betrayed. By bringing these two perspectives together, critique can draw on 'the past that has been eliminated' to chart paths of possible transformation in the present, leading to a more emancipated future. Thus, in the words of Moishe Postone, 'The standpoint of the critic transcends the present and juxtaposes to the existent what ought to be or what could have been had the past not been betrayed.'[47]

This temporal dimension of social and political criticism is reflected in Horkheimer and Adorno's shared conviction that 'all reification is based on forgetting.' Marcuse goes even further, rooting reason itself in the remembered experience of the past. He argues that 'memory … is the hidden driving power behind the process of thought.'[48] By placing 'retrospective remembrance' at the centre of both empirical analysis and theoretical reflection, critical theory thus provides a model for how to combine philosophy and history through the concept of memory.

Roadmap

The argument of this book follows the basic methodological structure of investigation provided by the Frankfurt School. The first step is to clarify and elucidate the basic concepts that guide the rest of my inquiry.[49] Chapter 1 therefore lays out an ontology of collective memory and outlines its critical potential as a resource for social and political change. It builds on the insights of Frankfurt School to develop the concept of a historical rupture as a series of traumatic events that tear existing narratives of the past asunder, allowing collective memory to act as a resource for social and political change.

Despite the broad range of approaches applied to memory since the 1970s, scholars have tended to emphasise the violent, destructive aspects of memory.[50] By contrast, I argue that the tradition of critical theory offers a constructive understanding of memory. Although the past can function as a straitjacket, limiting freedom by forcing events into chains of cause and effect, it can also be a resource for rethinking following historical ruptures. My basic thesis is that the experience of total war between 1914 and 1945 created a caesura in European understandings of the past, which gave Europeans the *cognitive*, *motivational*, and *justificatory* resources to reimagine the future.

In making this argument I highlight the importance of political generations, defined by shared formative experiences, in large-scale political transformations such as the founding of the European project. Radical changes in political organisation, like the partial turn away from the principle of national sovereignty towards community-based solutions that delegate autonomous decision-making powers to insitutions outside the constitutional infrastructure of the nation-state, do not occur overnight.[51] They also cannot be attributed to factors that operate independently of political actors. The broader social environment, such as the need to rebuild destroyed cities, restart the postwar economy, and deal with the military, political, and ideological threat of communism and the Soviet Union, invariably needs to be interpreted and acted upon by individuals. In this sense, 'Politics is a matter of human, and not merely mechanical, interaction between individuals, institutions, or groups.'[52]

After elucidating the basic philosophical concepts that guide the rest of the book, I then proceed with the empirical diagnosis of the origins of the current crisis in the form of a 'critical history of the present.'[53] Part I substantiates my claims about the important role that collective memory played in the construction of the European Communities throughout the postwar period by measuring my ideas against the evidence found in the history of European

integration.[54] By drawing on historical and archival sources, I reconstruct the origins and development of Europe to demonstrate the crucial role that memory played in its success as a political project achieved by economic means.

In line with the 'explanatory-diagnostic' perspective that defines the first stage of research within the Frankfurt School, this elucidation of the history of European integration through collective memory studies also helps me to diagnose the crisis of the present. Coming to grips with the problems that Europe faces in the wake of the Great Recession requires an understanding of how the conditions that drove integration throughout the postwar period – i.e. a shared understanding of the moral dimensions of this project as a response to the violence that nationalism unleashed on the continent in the first half of the twentieth century – have started to dry up at the start of the twenty-first century. Only by understanding how the past successes of the EU built on a common memorial foundation is it possible to comprehend how the loss of this grounding has affected the project.

My qualitative, interpretive approach focuses on archival documents and other primary sources. This historical approach is well-suited to the elaboration of theoretical ideas. More specifically, the tradition of critical theory 'is deeply embedded in archival research.' Focusing on primary sources that date back to the time of the events in question respects the Frankfurt School's emphasis on the privileged perspective of the contemporary participant. Insofar as 'lived experience' is crucial to understanding the internal perspective of key agents, archival evidence is key.[55] Given my focus on individuals, engaging with archival sources also enables me to obtain 'a broader, richer, and more robust understanding of the nature of political thinking, and in particular its critical connections with political practice.' As Desmond Dinan points out, 'Contemporary, confidential records … hold the key to figuring out why the main player acted as they did.'[56]

When archives area unavailable or incomplete, I draw on other primary sources to supplement my analysis. As Guisan points out, 'Memoirs, essays and interviews abound and constitute a rich source of information regarding the common past.' Although such resources are often dismissed as propaganda, focusing on the reasons agents use to justify the narratives they tell is crucial in understanding how they sought to legitimise their actions in certain historical moments. As such, even non-archival sources are important as they reveal 'the story behind the story, how individual political actors changed their own minds, how they persuaded others to change their minds in order to pursue their worldly objectives.' I second Guisan's argument that this approach, based

on 'a political tradition grounded in the texts of the Republic's actors,' which is 'quite common in the study of American political roots,' is also applicable to European integration.[57]

The chapters grouped together in Part I proceed chronologically. Chapter 2 details the founding of the first European institution, the ECSC, in 1951 and of the European *relance* in 1957, which brought the European Economic Community (EEC) into existence. This initial period is of crucial importance, because 'The four-sided institutional framework that it brought into being – Assembly, Court, Ministerial Council, and High Authority – has continued in the form of the Parliament, Court, Council of Ministers, and Commission.'[58] The chapter documents how crucial postwar leaders, particularly the first President of the European High Authority Jean Monnet, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, built on their transnational collective memories to found the first European institutions. In so doing, it shows how their shared remembrance of the rupture of 1945 was crucial in helping them to create Europe based on the community model of autonomous decision-making, instead of through more traditional approaches based on international cooperation or confederalism.[59]

Based on my historical and archival research, I show that these three central actors in the first stage of integration all viewed the Second World War as an important historical rupture requiring fundamental changes to the underlying political architecture of the continent.[60] As a result of this process, they came to believe that supranational cooperation was necessary in order to curb the violent tendencies of nationalism. I call this 'the classic narrative of integration.' Although the United Kingdom was invited to participate in the European integration at its earliest stages, its leaders declined, foreshadowing the ambivalent relationship Britain has maintained with the EU since its founding.

My focus on these three leaders is hardly uncontroversial. For example, Alan Milward is critical of the traditional emphasis given to 'the lives and teachings' of these individuals, whom he dismissively labels as the 'European saints.' He argues that focusing on the 'legends of these great men' ignores the true imperatives of integration rooted in the need to reconstruct the economic, social, and political basis of Western Europe after 1945. Milward and his followers therefore argue that the history of European integration cannot be reduced to hagiography. This is certainly true, as far as it goes. However, even he is forced to concede that Monnet, Schuman, and Adenauer 'achieved prominence and success because they were among those who developed an accurate perception of … the need for those limited surrenders of national

sovereignty through which the nation-state and western Europe were jointly strengthened, not as separate and opposed entities, but within a process of mutual reinforcement.'[61]

While Milward is right to resist hagiography, his dismissal of the first-person perspective of the participants in the process of integration reveals the methodological blind-spot of much of the existing literature. Milward's positivistic narrative is driven by the assumption that postnational integration was the natural (and perhaps even only) solution to the problems the states of Europe faced after the end of the Second World War. By paying closer attention to the early debates of these individuals, which I lay out in chapter 2, I follow Craig Parsons in arguing that the 'Schuman Declaration and the subsequent creation of the ECSC were not inevitable,' nor were they part of 'a prearranged plan.' By focusing on the role that memory played from the first-person perspective of these participants, I show how the lessons of the past were deployed to overcome the traditional resistance to dismantling the doctrine of sovereignty. Although ruptures can trigger new thinking, 'entrepreneurial leaders must articulate a new vision of unity, formulate specific policy proposals, and shepherd those changes through stormy political seas.'[62]

Chapter 3, which focuses on 'countermemory and generational change' after the passing of the first generation of postwar European leaders, moves the narrative forward by normatively reconstructing the period of European stagnation (1959–84) and the second phase of integration (1985–2003), resulting in the culmination of what I call the 'classic narrative of integration' in the text Habermas and Derrida published in response to the pan-European protests against the American invasion of Iraq on 13 February 2003. The first phase of European integration was followed by a long period of institutional torpor lasting through the 1970s. This 'Eurosclerosis' was due at least in part to outside factors associated with the end of colonialism and the oil crisis. However, it was also the result of a counter-narrative brought to the fore by General Charles de Gaulle, who sought to return the state to the centre of political and economic power in Europe.

The expansion of Europe beyond its Franco-German core forced Europe to confront new understandings of the past. This was strengthened by the accession of the United Kingdom, whose more triumphalist memories of the war meant that the British took a fundamentally different view of the European project from the start. The first expansion of the European Communities to the United Kingdom – after it was vetoed not once but twice by de Gaulle – required the nascent European Communities to confront an

alternative memory regime with a different interpretation of the key events of the past. Although some parts of this narrative are based on archival evidence, it mostly builds on other types of primary source documents, including memoirs, speeches, and reporting from the time, due to the fact that most of the archives dealing with this period are still embargoed (the same is true of the even more recent material in chapter 4).

Despite political stagnation and challenges to the vision of the 'founding fathers,' the classic narrative survived de Gaulle's attack. In the mid-1980s a new cohort of European leaders, including Commission President Jacques Delors, French President François Mitterrand, and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, came to power. While they shared a preexisting disposition towards Europe, their leanings were reinforced by the opportunities offered by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Mirroring Monnet, Schuman, and Adenauer, the constellation of Delors, Mitterrand, and Kohl reinvigorated the project with a swath of new initiatives, including the completion of the Common Market (CM), the Schengen open-border zone, and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) under a shared currency. This second phase of integration also established the memory of the Holocaust as central to the EU's conception of itself, resulting in the culmination of the classic narrative of integration.

Chapter 4 – the last of Part I – traces the difficulties the EU has experienced since the turn of the third millennium through the lens of what I call 'fragmentation and the loss of European memory.' Recent challenges to the classic narrative have taken at least three different forms, including: (1) the desire of the new postcommunist member-states from East-Central Europe, which joined the union in waves after 2004, for recognition of their suffering under communism; (2) the growing economic problems brought about by the Eurozone crisis starting in 2010; and (3) the push towards a return to the nation-state symbolised by Brexit and the anti-European populist movements that have swept across the continent. All of these challenges have confronted the EU and the classic narrative with new interpretations of a past that has increasingly faded from experiential memory.

Chapter 4 analyses these difficulties. The postcommunist states of East-Central Europe questioned the central place of the Holocaust and the image of Auschwitz in the classic narrative of integration.[63] The divisions resulting from this confrontation, which bifurcated Europe along the old lines of the Iron Curtain, were further reinforced by the monetary, banking, and sovereign debt crisis emanating from the Great Recession, which created additional

periphery–core cleavages between north and south. This was followed by the Brexit referendum and is further threatened by the rise of populism and the spectre of additional votes to leave the EU. I argue the very different, more triumphalist collective memories Britain carried from the Second World War as a victor whose territory was never occupied by the Nazis have been a disrupting force within integration ever since its entry into the European Communities in 1975. These proximate challenges have been compounded by the rise to power of the first generation of European leaders with no personal memories of Europe's age of total war.

Following the methodology of the Frankfurt School, Part II charts possible paths for the future transformation of Europe by reflecting on the latent, immanent potential of the project to realise its own goals. Chapter 5 therefore examines how the EU can transform personal memories of total war into a more durable social imaginary by drawing on noneconomic social resources, especially in light of the populist challenge to postwar European values. While memories of the continental experience of total war between 1914 and 1945 helped push the founding and development of the Union along through two phases of integration, it is clear that they can no longer play this role. As Neil Fligstein points out, 'Memories of World War II have faded as that generation has passed. Europe now has a new set of challenges to deal with.'[64] This recognition, combined with the differing historical experiences of the leaders and populations of new member-states, poses a number of problems for Europe as 'a community of memory,' especially in light of the ongoing European crisis of monetary union and sovereign debt.[65] Whereas Europeans of the founding generation saw the Schuman Declaration of 1950, and the European movement borne of it, as what Arendt called 'the pardon and the promise' of the postwar world, the foundations of the EU and its guiding narrative have to be rethought for the project to sustain itself into the future.[66]

In chapter 6 I argue that social developments, such as rising rates of inter-European marriage and the advent of the first generation of Europeans that grew up within a continent of open borders, combined with civic education focusing on teaching national history within its European context, can help ground the intra-European solidarity necessary for a true supranational democracy. For the EU to survive, it must find a way to harness the normative resources of the past in the long term. If not, short-term economic calculations will be all that keeps the Union together, to the detriment of the citizens of Europe.

Chapter 6 thus moves away from the context of European unification by applying my understanding of the power of constructive memory in the aftermath of historical ruptures to other temporal and geographic contexts. I compare the generational crisis of leadership visible in the continental Euro-crisis to the American Civil War, the major crisis the United States experienced after the passing of the revolutionary generation that experienced its founding first-hand. Much like the United States seventy years after its creation, the EU will also have to find a way to preserve what their forefathers built after the passage of seven decades. US President Abraham Lincoln called the revolutionary cohort the 'pillars of the temple of liberty,' noting that after their passing 'that temple must fall unless we, their descendants, supply their places with other pillars.'[67] The same is true of the EU at a similar point in its own history. This brings my project into conversation with the broader debates on constitutional moments and the founding of political communities, allowing me to think about the broader theoretical implications of my argument.

In the book's concluding chapter I reflect on the ongoing issues facing Europe in the wake of the Brexit vote and the continued threat of right-wing populism. I focus in particular on the ways that populists leading the backlash against the constructive narrative of memory created in the aftermath of the European rupture of 1945 have drawn on older symbols, often associated with the fascist movements that dominated Europe's age of total war. While the experience of rupture enables the creation of constructive narratives out of the material of the past – as I argue in chapter 1 – collective memory can also function in destructive ways, as individuals and groups opposed to these projects are able to rehabilitate older narratives and symbols in times of crisis. A conception of European peoplehood that allows the EU to stand up to international pressures and resolve future problems by linking collective memories to future projects, the past to the future through the present, can hope to resolve the current European crisis.

In addition to bringing the book full circle by reflecting on the dangers of collective memory at the start of the third millennium, I also argue for the continued utility and applicability of the Frankfurt School's approach to social criticism. It is certainly possible to reconstruct the history of the past hundred years as part of a learning process resulting in large part from the world's experience of total war on the old continent. However, it is also true that many of the same problems – including prejudice, inequality, violence, and the increasing mechanisation of everyday life – that spurred the thinkers of the Frankfurt School to develop their distinctive approach to critical theory

in the 1920s and 1930s still persist, albeit in slightly different guises. I argue that the Frankfurt School's approach to understanding the social pathologies of the present remains as critical for diagnosing the European crisis at the start of the twenty-first century as it was for understanding the rise of totalitarianism and the problems associated with instrumental reason in the interwar years.

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